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"How does nature speak to our concern? That is the question" (H enry Bugbee,
"W ilderness in America" 11).
"W hen it is granted to m an to hear the songs of the herbs - how every herb
speaks its song to G od w ithout any alien will or thought - how beautiful and
sw eet it is to hear their singing. A nd therefore it is very good to serve G od in
their m idst in solitary w alks over the field am ong the plants of the earth an d to
p o u r o u t one's speech before G od in truthfulness. All the speech of the field then
goes into your speech and heightens its power. W ith every breath you drink the
air of paradise, and w hen you return home, the w orld is renew ed in your sight"
(anonym ous H asidic saying, quoted in M artin Buber, Ecstatic Confessions 149).
"There are forces in the w oods, forces in the w orld, that lay claim to you, that lay
a h a n d on your shoulder so gently that you do no t even feel it: not at first. All of
the sm allest elem ents - the direction of a breeze one day, a single sentence th at a
friend m ight speak to you, a raven flying across the m eadow an d circling back
again - lay claim to you, eventually, w ith a cum ulative power" (Rick Bass, W inter
68 ).

INTRODUCTION

I.
This p a p er attem pts to describe and in terp ret the sense an d m eaning of
o u r actual, lived relations w ith the nonhum an beings an d things of the
n a tu ra l w orld. In our everyday lives we enter into all m anner of relations
w ith n a tu re .1 W e eat n atu re’s creatures; w e w ear them; w e stu d y them; we
dam them ; w e even w rite papers on them. In general, w e use n ature in all
sorts of w ays, even aesthetically and spiritually. A nd yet, on occasion, we also
encounter the beings and things of nature in w ays that do not fit these
categories of analysis, m anipulation and use. A rushing m ountain stream or
a p a ir of soaring buzzards m ay also speak to us, not of their use, their physical
an d chem ical com position, their role in the ecology of the place, b u t sim ply
an d eloquently of them selves - as this stream or these b u zzard s, in all their
u niqueness, beauty and depth. In turn, we m ay hear their voices, not in
term s of our interests, our conceptual fram ew orks, our sciences, b u t sim ply,
directly and im m ediately as this particular stream , that pair of buzzards; and
their speech resonates w ithin us in a w ay calling forth - evoking - a spirit of
affirm ation, w onder and joy. These relational m om ents are charged w ith
m eaning - and responsibility. We feel called upon to answ er for them .

A ddress a n d response; call and answ er. A t the m ost fundam ental
level, at a level beyond and beneath m ere speech, a dialogue has occurred. In
such m om ents, w e find ourselves as participants in m eaningful an d destinate
dialogues, and, likewise, w e come to know these other - a n d fellow creatures w hom w e m eet as genuine partners in those dialogues.2
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I w ish to begin this paper sim ply by bearing w itness to the experiential
reality of such m om ents of dialogue through a few firsthand accounts. Such
testim ony, how ever inadequate it m ay be, will provide the necessary
experiential ground u p o n w hich this project m ust rest. Once this
g ro u n d w o rk is established, I will describe the structural p a ttern or eidos of
such relations an d attem pt to interpret their significance for the w ay we live
in, an d respond to, the natural w orld around us. I w ill present this eidetic
description and interpretation in term s of a philosophy of dialogue, draw ing
heavily, although not exclusively, upon the thought of M artin Buber.

The reason for choosing Buber's thought as m y p rim ary interpretive
tool in this project is a sim ple and, I believe, m ethodologically consistent one:
B uber’s description of our relationality in term s of I-Thou and I-It relations
an d his u n d erstan d in g of the ethical force of the I-Thou dialogue speak m ore
tru ly an d directly to m y own experience than any other account of our
relationality that I have come across. A nd, perhaps even m ore im portantly
for the purposes of this paper, Buber’s witness to the reality of I-Thou
d ialogue occurring betw een hum ans and nonhum an, n atu ral beings and
things has not only verified m y ow n experience b u t also p ro v id ed m e w ith a
vocabulary w ith w hich to begin to understand and speak about these
experiences.

To m e, this resonance of Buber's w ords w ith one's ow n experience
seem s crucial if one truly hopes to hear and u n d erstan d w hat he is, rather
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idiosyncratically, at tim es, attem pting to say. As Jacob B. A gus w rites, "If w e
are to u n d e rstan d the uniqueness of the I-Thou relation, w e m u st heed
B uber's appeal to find an echo of his w ords in our ow n life" (Q uoted in
D iam ond 23). A dm ittedly, w ithout such an "echo," Buber's w ork an d all th at
follow s in this essay m ay appear as nothing m ore than m ystification, double
talk, o r ju st bad science.3

A nd yet, if w e rem ain open to the possibilities of w hich Buber speaks, I
believe that we can hear that echo of his w ords in our lives. A nd so, I begin
this p a p e r by bearing w itness to the experiential reality of m y ow n dialogical,
I-Thou encounters w ith the beings and things of nature. That m y personal
accounts of such events m ay at first seem trivial a n d /o r parochial and th at I
lack the capacity to do them justice in speaking of them here should not
dim inish their crucial im portance for this project; as m entioned earlier, they
fu rn ish the necessary experiential ground u p o n w hich the entire project
depends.

Two events, in particular, come to m ind m ost clearly in this context.
The first occurred several years ago at the end of a long day of w alking in the
M ission M ountains. Com ing dow n a steep incline as the su n ’s last rays cut
across a stand of m ixed conifers, I w as stopped dead in m y tracks by the deep,
black eyes of a pine m arten standing alert on a branch directly ahead of me.
Startled by our m u tu al discovery, w e m om entarily stared at each other frozen in each other's presence - until perhaps the blink of an eye or a noise
from som ew here else (I never knew the reason) broke the gaze, an d the
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m arten scram bled across the branch and disappeared into the deep grow th of
the pine.

The other event th at comes to m ind for its strongly dialogical flavor is
one th at has occurred repeatedly, although alw ays w ith slight variations. In
these instances I am w alking the streets of M issoula in the early m orning on
cold and unusually clear w inter days. As I cross several of the streets running
diagonally across tow n, I am afforded a clear and unobstructed view of Lolo
Peak rising u p in the distance. Lit by the sun from the east, the dazzling w hite
su m m it shines against the intense blue backdrop of a cloudless sky and the
bluish-black foreground of the w ooded ridges below. Even at such a distance
the peak offers itself as an im m ediate and com pelling presence, causing m e to
tu rn again and again to the southw est as it gives itself afresh in subtle changes
of angle, texture, and shading.

Far from extraordinary, these two encounters stand out m ost clearly in
m y m in d, although they are hardly isolated occurrences. Just as clearly and
forcefully, I rem em ber the m otionless osprey perched in a cottonw ood snag
across the Bitterroot River, a certain m eadow high u p B lodgett Canyon, a
charging (bluffing?) bull m oose in the Pintler Range, an alpine ridge below
S tuart Peak covered in w ildflow ers, a certain stretch of the Blackfoot River on
a scorching ho t sum m er day, and a young bull elk along the ridgeline of
H ogback Peak in the Sapphire M ountains. For m e, these and other
encounters w ith the natural beings and things of w estern M ontana are not
m erely fond rem em brances; they provide the "im m ediate dat[a] of
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consciousness" - to borrow Erazim K ohak’s phenom enological term - u p o n
w hich the follow ing discussion rests ("I, Thou, and It" 51).

But n o t only these. The w ritings of naturalists, poets, novelists, an d
even som e philosophers (although the latter case is quite rare given the
rath e r abstract and theoretical nature of m uch of the philosophical enterprise)
are full of accounts of sim ilar encounters, presented w ith m uch greater pow er
a n d evocative force than m ine. These eloquent testim onials also p ro v id e m e
w ith the experiential foundation, albeit once rem oved, upon w hich to build
m y position. O ut of m any excellent exam ples, I have chosen four to present
h ere because of their explicitly dialogical character. The first comes from the
op en in g lines of Rachel C arson's The Sense of W onder, w here she w rites,
One storm y autum n night w hen my nephew Roger w as about
tw enty m onths old I w rapped him in a blanket a n d carried him
dow n to the beach in the rainy darkness. O ut there, ju st at the
edge of w here-w e-couldn’t-see, big w aves w ere th u n d erin g in,
dim ly seen w hite shapes that boom ed and sh o u ted a n d threw
great handfuls of froth at us. Together w e laughed for p u re joy he a baby m eeting for the first time the w ild tu m u lt of O ceanus, I
w ith the salt of half a lifetime of sea love in me. But I think we
felt the sam e spine-tingling response to the vast, ro arin g ocean
and the w ild night around us (8-9).
O r, consider John M uir’s w ords as he tells of his first encounter w ith a stand
of giant sequoias.
...I clim bed the high rock called W am ellow by the Indians. H ere
I obtained telling views of the fertile forest-filled basin of the
u p p er Fresno. Innum erable spires of the noble Yellow Pine w ere
displayed rising above one another on the b raided slopes, and yet
nobler Sugar Pines w ith superb arm s outstretched in the rich
au tu m n light, while aw ay tow ard the southw est, on the verge of
the glow ing horizon, I discovered the m ajestic dom e-like crowns
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of Big Trees tow ering high over all, singly an d in close grove
congregations. There is som ething w onderfully attractive in this
king tree, even w hen beheld from afar, th at draw s us to it w ith
indescribable enthusiasm ; its superior height and m assive
sm oothly ro u n d ed outlines proclaim ing its character in any
com pany; and w hen one of the oldest attains full statu re on
som e com m anding ridge it seems the very god of the w oods
(208-209).
The next exam ple occurs on a m uch sm aller scale than the first tw o, b u t the
en co u n ter is no less im m ediate and engaging. In his poem "The H eron,"
W endell Berry w rites,
A nd I go on until I see crouched
on a dead branch sticking out of the w ater
a heron - so still that I believe
he is a bit of drift hung dead above the w ater.
A nd then I see the articulation of feather
and living form , a brilliance I receive
beyond my pow er to m ake, as he
receives in his great patience
the river's providence. A nd then I see
that I am seen, adm itted, m y silence
accepted in his silence. Still as I keep,
I m ight be a tree for all the fear he shows.
Suddenly I know I have passed across
to a shore w here I do not live (113-114).
Finally, perh ap s m y favorite literary account of such an encounter is W illiam
Faulkner's depiction of that first and fateful m eeting betw een y o u n g Isaac
M cCaslin an d the great bear, O ld Ben, in Go Down, M oses.
Then he [Isaac] saw the bear. It did not emerge, appear: it w as just
there, im m obile, fixed in the green and w indless noon's h o t dappling,
n o t as big as he had dream ed it but as big as he had expected, bigger,
dim ensionless against the dap p led obscurity, looking at him . Then it
m oved. It crossed the glade w ithout haste, w alking for an instant into
the sun's full glare and out of it, and stopped again an d looked back at
him across one shoulder. Then it was gone. It d id n ’t w alk into the
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w oods. It faded, sank back into the w ilderness w ithout m otion as he
h ad w atched a fish, a huge old bass, sink back into the d ark d ep th s of its
pool and vanish w ithout even any m ovem ent of its fins (209).
In these brief passages/C arson, M uir, Berry and Faulkner speak of their
m eetings w ith the beings and things of nature in a w ay that seem s explicitly
dialogical, and, through their w ords, they bear w itness to the m eaning an d
d e p th of such encounters.4 N o less telling, how ever, are M uir’s accounts of
his first view of the Sierra N evadas (100-101), or a night spent gazing
w o n d ro u sly at the auroras in Alaska (305-307), or his cheerful encounters
w ith the w ater ouzels of Yosemite (147-161); or Aldo Leopold's reflections on
the revelatory force held in the green eyes of a dying wolf (138-139). Sim ilarly,
one can hear the pow er of an engaging and joy-filled dialogue w ith n atu re in
T h o reau ’s loving description of the ponds, particularly W alden P ond, near
C oncord (173-200) or in his account of a gam e of hide-and-seek w ith a loon
(233-236); or in H enry Bugbee's description of certain m ornings at M iner's
Bend on the G ualala River (Inw ard M orning 86-87) or in his brief account of
colorful aspens and larches "crying out" in the w ild C anadian Rockies
(Inw ard M orning 139-140). Finally, it seems to me that m ost of E dw ard
A bbey’s D esert Solitaire could serve as a pow erful testim ony of one m an's
intense an d intim ate dialogue w ith a particular place - the canyon country of
so u th eastern U tah - in all its various instantiations.

In m y ow n experience and in m y reading of the w itness of others,
h u m an beings, on occasion, encounter the beings and things of n atu re in a
u n iq u e a n d im portant w ay that, to me, seem s m ost accurately an d naturally
described as a dialogue - a genuine and reciprocal m eeting occurring betw een
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an I an d a Thou. In the few preceding accounts to w hich I have referred, I
have attem pted to bear w itness to the experiential reality of such encounters.

These narrative descriptions, then, will serve as the phenom enological
'baseline d a ta ’ for m y theorizing in this paper. H ow ever, they should serve
n o t only as the foundation bu t also as the litm us test for the conceptual
'concoction' that follows. T hroughout this paper I have tried to rem ain
faithful to the spirit of these relational events (as well as their w ritten
articulation) w ith o u t distorting or m isinterpreting them . The success or
failure of w hat follows depends prim arily upon the extent to w hich m y
conceptualizing rem ains true to - or betrays - these original encounters as they
actually grace and inform our lives.

II.
M oving from the particular I-Thou dialogues described above, w e can
generalize w ith Kohak and say, "Yet while the argum ent is inevitably
com plex, the basic thesis is simple.

It is that things initially present

them selves in im m ediate experience not as objects but as fellow beings,
capable of functioning both as it and as thou " ("I, Thou, and It" 36). Q uite
sim ply, things such as m ountain peaks and herons can a n d do enter into IT hou relations w ith us, and it is wholly legitim ate to describe our deep and
engaging dialogues w ith them in such terms. P u t negatively, nonh u m an
beings and things are not exclusively defined in term s of It.

9

I agree that this thesis is sim ple and hardly rem arkable. A nd yet, it
represents a m ajor breakthrough in overcom ing w hat Kohak describes as the
"noem atic prejudice” so prevalent w ithin m uch of m o d ern W estern th o u g h t
("I, T hou, an d It" 45).5 This prejudice involves the a priori lim iting of the
possible partn ers for m eaningful I-Thou dialogue to one type of noem a or
relata (the 'poles' of a relational event): hum an beings. A ccording to this
view , only hu m an beings can really become Thous for us. N o n h u m an beings
are, by their very nature, alw ays Its, objects of subjective experience and use,
a n d n ev er Thous, fellow participants in m eaningful an d destinate dialogue.

O vercom ing this noem atic prejudice requires a radical shift of focus.
In stead of focusing our attention on the noem a, we need to focus on the
relation itself, describing it in noetic - not noem atic - terms. In other w ords,
in attem pting to describe and interpret our relationality as accurately as
possible, w e m ust alw ays begin w ith the relational events them selves.
T hro u g h such noetic analysis, the fundam ental distinction that em erges is
n o t betw een the types of relata w e m eet bu t betw een the types of relations we
enter.

For M artin Buber, there are two basic types of relations: I-Thou and I-It.
W hile the form er refers to a reciprocal dialogue characterized by presentness,
im m ediacy and integrity, the latter describes the subject's m ediated and
fragm entary perception of an object in term s of experience an d use. H ow ever,
although Buber posits tw o basic types of relations, this does not m ean that, a
p r io ri, som e things are Thous and others are Its in d ep en d en t of our relations
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w ith them . A ny being or thing can be encountered as a Thou or experienced
as an It. Just as a w ildflow er can become m y Thou, so, too, a telephone
solicitor can - and usually does - become an It for me. W hat m atters here is
n o t the type of relata, b u t the type of relation.

For Buber, it is the relation that is prim ary. As he w rites in I and Thou,
"In the beginning is the relation" (69). U pon this ontological prem ise, all else
follows; being is constituted and defined in relation. Even "The self," as
Em m anuel Levinas writes, "is not a substance b u t a relation. It can only exist
as an T addressing itself to a 'Thou,' or grasping an 'It"' (136-137). There can
be no thing-in-itself except as it is abstracted from the relationality of actual
being-w ith-others; being, for Buber, is being-in-relation.6

In general, then, our being is constituted in term s of our relatedness,
w hich, for Buber, takes on one of two basic form s - I-Thou or I-It. H ow ever, it
is only through participation in the engaging dialogue occurring betw een an I
and a Thou that w e approach authentic being. For Buber, it is the interval
betw een I and Thou, das Zwischen (the betw een), that is the bearer an d locus
of actual and m eaningful existence. According to Buber, "We do n o t find
m eaning lying in things nor do we p u t it into things, bu t betw een us and
things it can happen" (Between 36). This betw een, how ever, does not exist
'out there' in dependently of us; neither is it som ething we can conjure u p at
will. It is the interstice that opens u p (graciously) an d into w hich w e step
(actively, willfully) in each I-Thou encounter; or, as G abriel M arcel describes
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it, it is a "creative milieu" - a m atrix of m eaning an d m eaningful being rising
u p betw een the I and the Thou (45).

In addition, the betw een of I-Thou relations is also the bearer of divine
presence. According to Robert W ood, "It [The betw een] is the place w here the
T ranscendent is present in the world" (111). In so far as w e enter into
authentic I-Thou dialogue and actualize the betw een, w e m ake the w orld a
holy place; the w orld becomes sacram ent. A lthough som etim es accused of
pan th eism , Buber's position m ight be m ore accurately (although som ew hat
laboriously) described as a panentheistic pansacram entalism , in w hich the
w orld exists in God, w hose presence am ong us is actualized in so far as we
"let G od in." In H asidism and M odern M an Buber presents this idea by
retelling and in terpreting the following H asidic tale.
"W here is the dw elling place of God?"
This w as the question w ith which the Rabbi of Kotzk su rp rised a
n u m b er of learned m en w ho h appened to be visiting him.
They laughed at him: "What a thing to ask! Is no t the w hole w orld full
of H is glory?"
T hen he answ ered his ow n question:
"God dw ells w herever m an lets H im in."
This is the ultim ate purpose: to let G od in. But w e can let H im in only
w here w e really stand, w here we live, w here w e live a true life. If we
m aintain holy intercourse w ith the little w orld entrusted to us, if we
help the holy spiritual substance to accom plish itself in th at section of
C reation in w hich we are living, then w e are establishing, in this our
place, a dw elling for the Divine Presence (175-176).
A ccording to Buber, although the w orld is full of G od's presence ( after all, the
w o rld exists in God), God is present am ong us - betw een us - only in so far as
w e actualize G od's presence in our lives.
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This u n derstanding of the w orld as potential sacram ent is at the core of
the H asidic notion of "hallowing the everyday" that so captivated Buber's
attention. For the H asid (as presented in Buber's w orks on H asidism ) and for
Buber, the distinction is not betw een the holy and the profane b u t betw een
w h a t is holy a n d w hat is not yet hallowed; there is no tim e or place that
cannot be m ade holy. As Buber w rites, "At each place, in each h o u r, in each
act, in each speech the holy can blossom forth" (H asidism an d M odern M an
31). But, in o rd er for the holy to "blossom forth," w e m ust enter essential, IThou dialogue - holy intercourse - w ith the other w ith w hom w e presently
have to do. O ur priestly capacity and calling to m ake the w orld a sacram ent a holy place - depends upon our capacity to say Thou to the creatures w hom
w e m eet.

In all cases, w hat is decisive for Buber is the m eeting betw een an I and a
Thou, regardless of w hether the Thou is a hum an being, a fish, or a boulder.
H ow ever, this does not m ean that the relata are unim p o rtan t or
interchangeable w ith one another. For m eaningful an d decisive dialogue to
occur, the I m ust be attentive and open to the irreducible uniqueness of the
p articu lar other w hom it m eets as Thou. As such, there is no generalizable
class of relata - nonhum an, non-sentient, non-anim al, non-living, etc. - th at
is, a priori, excluded from participation in genuine, m eaningful an d holy
relations. A ccording to Buber, "The lim its of the possibility of dialogue are
the lim its of [our] awareness" (Between 10).
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A nd yet, w hat I have outlined so far m ay offer us no m ore than w hat
M arcel rather disparagingly refers to as a "pure m ysticism of presence" unless
it is accom panied by "the proper ethical bearing" (Introduction to Bugbee,
In w ard M orning 24). W hat is crucially im portant here is not sim ply th at we
can and, occasionally, do enter into dialogue w ith the beings and things of
n atu re (although this, in itself, is indeed quite rem arkable), b u t th at such
dialogical events carry great ethical significance. These I-Thou encounters call
us forth to em body their m eaning in our active - ethical - response to the
beings an d things w ho address us in our daily lives. As M aurice Friedm an
w rites, "Only he w ho know s the presence of the Thou is capable of decision"
("Bases" 176).

H ow ever, according to Buber and others, we don't learn anything
about the T hou in our encounter w ith it; our know ledge of the T hou is no t
on the order of an empirical or objective 'know ing about.' Instead, it is an
im m ediate and participatory know ing similar in m eaning to the old hebraic
notion of 'to know ' - 'to touch' or 'to intercourse w ith' the being of the
o th er.7 W e receive it as a contentless know ledge that cannot be reduced to
objective, abstract terms. A nd yet, despite this lack of content, the know ledge
received in the present and unm ediated address of the Thou - received as
such - conveys a dep th and m eaning upon w hich w e m ay legitim ately gro u n d
o u r ethical response.
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W ithin the fram ew ork of a philosophy of dialogue, ethics is
u n d erstood prim arily in term s of responsibility, taken in the dialogical and
etym ological sense of the w ord: responding to the address of another.
A ccording to Friedm an, "Responsibility, for Buber, m eans resp o n d in g hearing the unreduced claim of each particular hour in all its crudeness and
disharm ony an d answ ering it ou t of the d e p th ’s of one's being" (Life of
D ialogue 93-94). In order to hear and respond to the claim of the m om ent,
how ever, w e m u st be fully present as attentive listeners - open and receptive
to the voice of the other as it addresses us in all its uniqueness and
irreducibility. O nly then can we receive the m eaning p resen t in the address
of the other in all its em pow ering and im perative force.

W ithin each present m om ent, decisively received, we are not only
ad d ressed by the other w hom we meet, but we are also confronted w ith the
very m eaning and purpose of our created being. For Buber, w e are not
"contingently throw n" into an absurd existence; rather, w e are created beings,
sent forth into a m eaningful w orld - a creation. A nd this creatureliness
involves a task - a vocation; we are forever called to becom e m ore fully the
u n ique creatures we are created to be. As Buber puts it, "Every m an's
forem ost task is the actualization of his unique, u n p recedented and neverrecu rrin g potentialities" (H asidism and M odern M an 140). H ow ever, this is
n o t som e internal m atter of 'self-expression' or 'self-realization.' As
F riedm an notes, "We have to realize our uniqueness in response to the
w orld" (T ouchstones 153). It is only in and through engaged participation in
ou r co-creaturely existence - in the existence we share w ith our fellow
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creatures in the ongoing event of creation - that w e becom e m ore fully the
persons w e are created to be. In turn, as w e become increasingly aw are of our
ow n u n ique potentiality, we become ever m ore able to respond to o u r fellow
creatures in an ethically decisive m anner, deciding and acting from out of the
d ep th s of w ho w e are and who w e are called to become in each n ew m om ent
of choice. Thus, the ethical situation claim s us in a tw ofold m anner; w e are
called forth by the address of the other w hom w e m eet, and w e are directed
from w ithin, so to speak, by our aw areness of the task for w hich w e have been
created.

In addition to the call of the other and the call of our creaturely task, w e
receive yet a third call present in the depths of the I-Thou encounter: the
ad d ress of our sponsoring and abiding Creator.8 A ccording to Buber, "God
speaks to m an in the things and beings H e sends him in life; m an answ ers
th ro u g h his action in relation to just these things and beings" (O rigin a n d
M eaning of H asidism 94). God the Creator addresses us in the events and
situations of our creaturely lives and beckons and guides us to incarnate the
m eaning of this divine address in the w orld of concrete actions. Therefore, as
w e atten d to and receive the threefold call present in the m om ent of dialogue
w e are both em pow ered and charged to respond in an ethical m anner. A long
w ith the gracious advent of dialogue also comes a com pelling im perative, a
com m and, w hich w e receive, n o t in term s of a generalizable "One should,"
b u t as a unique an d experiential "Thou shalt."
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As such, it is w ithin the context of our participation in dialogue that w e
come to know w hat w e m ust do and w ho w e m ust become; w e com e to know
w h a t is necessary. As H enry Bugbee develops the idea in In w ard M orning.
necessary action can only be understood w ithin the fram ew ork of authentic
dialogue. C oncerning Bugbee's notion of necessity, M arcel w rites,
[H]e [Bugbee] derives the fundam ental point that no satisfactory
account can be given of necessity, that it cannot even be acknow ledged,
if things are approached from a purely spectatorial standpoint. The
necessary can only become intelligible from a stan d p o in t in w hich w e
no longer abstract from our involvem ent in reality. The necessary is
appreciated as such only in that fundam ental engagem ent w ith things
in their uniqueness. ... Therefore necessity is properly construed as an
experiential category and not an em pirical one (Introduction to Bugbee,
In w ard M orning 28).
As w e participate in authentic dialogue - "that fundam ental engagem ent w ith
things in their uniqueness" - we come to know w hat is required of us, and
o u r actions become inspirited and directed w ith the force of necessity. Of
course, this also m eans that we cannot say w hat is necessary in advance of our
p articipation in the situation dem anding our response. In this sense, the old
tru ism seem s to hold: you really had to be there. A nd although an
experiential, dialogical ethic of responsibility is deeply contextual, it is
an y th in g b u t relativistic. T hrough our participation in dialogue w e come to
kn o w w h at the situation dem ands of us, not as a universal or general "One
should," b u t as a pow erful, personal im perative: "I must."

But w hat good is such an experiential ethic of responsibility? It offers
no generalizable guidelines about how one ought to act; it cannot prescribe
any course of action; it offers no solutions to hypothetical ethical scenarios. In
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a w o rd , it relieves none of the difficulties and am biguities of living the m oral
life. Instead, w h at such an ethic requires is presentness and openness to the
other - be it a river, a w ater ouzel or a hum an being - acknow ledged in its
irreducibility, richness and depth. A lthough not sufficient in an d of itself, it
is only th ro u g h such presentness, from w hich no being or thing can be, a
priori, excluded, that we can truly come to know the other and find the
stren g th and m eaning upon which we can gro u n d our ethical response.

A nd yet, this m uch seems generally true: w hile we know nothing
about the particular being or thing w hom we m eet in dialogue, through our
encounter w e come to know it as not only other but also as kin, eliciting both
o u r respect and com passion. According to Bugbee, "[I]t is in com ing to know
fellow creatures as such that our respect for them can obtain as w arran ted and
upheld" ("W ilderness" 12-13). To know another being truly an d d eep ly is to
know that being as w orthy of the respect and concern due one's kin. As for
w h at each situation dem ands of us, we cannot say apart from our
involvem ent in that particular situation. H ow ever, if our response to that
d em an d is to be genuine (and genuinely ethical), it m ust actualize and
em body the respect engendered in the I-Thou dialogue w ith our fellow
creature. Yet even this is no general or abstract notion of respect; rather, it is a
living respect born of actual participation in particular dialogical m om ents.
In an d through our involvem ent in, and reflection upon, such relations, we
catch a glim pse of the experiential ground of our capacity for respect and, in
tu rn , respectful action; it is at such a point that ethical discourse - including
environm ental ethics - m ust begin.
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III.
It is m y intent to establish such a starting point in the first half of this
pap er, w hich will consist of C hapters One an d Two. In C hapter O ne I will
presen t a detailed description of the basic tenets of a philosophy of dialogue. I
w ill begin by suggesting the fundam entally dialogical character of existence
an d proceed to exam ine our relationality in term s of Buber’s fam ous
distinction betw een I-Thou and I-It relations. A long w ith presenting the basic
differences betw een these tw o types of relations, I will also show how both are
necessary for living a w hole and active life and for actualizing the m eaning of
I-Thou relations in our everyday lives.

In C hapter Two I will attem pt to outline a dialogical ethic of
responsibility. I will suggest that the address of the situation, received in its
m eaning an d depth, m akes claims upon us and calls us forth to respond in a
decisive and ethical m anner. How ever, this address not only places dem ands
u p o n us; it also em pow ers and directs us as we m ove to em body its m eaning
in o u r decisions and actions. Here I will begin by follow ing Buber's
u n d e rstan d in g of the threefold call present in the address of the m om ent,
exam ining, in som e detail, the im perative quality of the call of o u r fellow
creature, the call of our creaturely task, and the call of the Creator. I will also
show th at these three elem ents of the address of the m om ent do no t speak to
us in isolation from one another; they ring unisonously as the claim of the
p articular and concrete situation - in toto- to w hich we m ust respond. A nd,
in so far as w e ground our responsibility upon the m eaning received in this
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address, w e m ay find the capacity to act w ith decisiveness, integrity and
com m itm ent - or, to use Bugbee's term s, necessity an d certainty. Finally, I
w ill conclude by show ing how , for both Buber an d Bugbee (w hose ideas I will
d ra w u p o n heavily in this chapter) genuine ethical responsibility defies
generalization, prescription or even verification in any objective sense; for
both thinkers, responsibility cannot be abstracted from the irreducibly
concrete and im m ediate m eaning present in the ever new an d changing
situations in w hich w e find ourselves called upon to respond.

In the second half of this paper I will exam ine the relevance of this
philosophy of dialogue and its correlative ethic of responsiblity - as presented
in C hapters O ne and Two - for particular questions concerning our relations
w ith the nonhum an beings and things of nature. In other w ords, I w ill be
try in g to establish their relevance and im portance w ithin the discourse of
environm ental philosophy and, m ore specifically, environm ental ethics and
w ilderness preservation. H ow ever, C hapters One an d Tw o are no t intended
to contain m erely general background inform ation for the environm ental
m atters discussed in C hapters Three and Four. The reader m u st rem em ber
th at the descriptions and interpretations of our relationality presen ted in the
first half of the paper are presented in noetic or relational term s; they are not
lim ited to any particular type of noem a or relata. Therefore, once w e bracket
the noem a tic prejudice, which, a priori, excludes the n o n h u m an beings and
things of n ature from consideration as partners in I-Thou dialogue, the ethic
of responsibility outlined in C hapter Two already includes an im plicit
en v iro n m en ta l ethic.
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In C hapters Three and Four I w ish to point out, both generally and
quite specifically, some of the w ider im plications of the ideas p resented above
w ith in the realm of environm ental concerns. I will begin C hapter Three by
a rg u in g for, an d then presenting, three basic prem ises concerning the
possibility, actuality and m eaning of our I-Thou dialogues w ith the
n o n h u m an beings and things of nature. Then, after subm itting these
prem ises to critical scrutiny, I will m ove on to suggest how these dialogical
events inform our ethical responsibility w ith respect to - and for - n o nhum an
creatures. A nd here I will proceed both generally and quite specifically. After
o u tlin in g this dynam ic rhythm of dialogue and responsibility in theoretical
term s, I will conclude this chapter by show ing, via tw o brief an d exploratory
n arrativ es of ethical concern, how this rhythm ic interplay m ay actually
inform our decisions and actions regarding nonhum an creatures.

C hapter Four concludes the paper by exam ining the specific issue of
w ilderness preservation. H ere I w ish to explore the unique character of
w ilderness as a place w here, having suspended or at least tacitly questioned
ou r p ro p rietary and usury claims, we are especially receptive to the pow erful
an d eloquent voice of nature as it speaks to us. D raw ing on the ideas of
Bugbee, Buber and Kohak as well as the poetry of W endell Berry, I will
suggest that the unusually strong and evocative presence of w ilderness, as
both an 'anti-resource' and a 'hom e of dialogue,' engenders w ithin u s a spirit
of p ray er and play that encourages and fosters our participation in dialogue
w ith o u r n o nhum an fellow creatures. Furtherm ore, I will argue th at such a
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sp irit provides the tonic (in Kohak's phenom enology, both the "conceptual"
an d "practical" brackets) that can hold in check the technological ethos
described in C hapter Three and elicit the respect required to ground our
ethical responsibility. A nd here, I will conclude by bearing w itness to m y
"certainty" that the truly com passionate and respectful response to the
ad d ress of w ild nature lies in preserving the few rem aining tracts of
w ilderness left on this continent.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - A t the outset, I w ould prefer to define "nature” as m atter-of-factly as
possible. For now , I m ean by "nature" the order of things an d beings w hose
existence is not derivative of hum an handiw ork a n d /o r artifice. A dm ittedly,
such a vague definition is beseiged w ith obvious problem s an d shortcom ings,
m ad e all the m ore com plicated by h um anity’s ubiquitous im pact a n d
presence on the planet (see Bill McKibben’s The End of N a tu re ), genetic
engineering, the selective breeding and dom estication of plants an d anim als,
etc. All are interesting topics, bu t all beyond the im m ediate scope of this
paper.
M ore to the point, how ever, is the fact that h u m an beings are also
inclu d ed w ithin such a broad definition of nature. We, too, are sponsored and
anim ated by a source outside ourselves; that is, we are not self-created, selfcreating beings. Therefore, m y intent in speaking specifically about the
"nonhum an beings and things of the natural world" is not to establish an
absolute distinction betw een "man [sic] and nature" b u t to include these
beings an d things in the category of "persons” (in the m ost inclusive sense)
w ith w h om we can enter into dialogue. I w ould argue that this entire paper
is an attem p t at inclusiveness, not exclusiveness; I w an t to suggest that
n o n h u m an "creatures" (Actually, "creation" is the w ord I w o u ld prefer to use
in stead of "nature," b u t it is so open to m isinterpretation th at I think it is
better to w ait before introducing that term ; over the course of the paper,
how ever, creation will becom e a central idea.) w arran t our ethical
consideration, not as m ere resources, bu t as independent and eloquent
p artn ers in dialogue.
A t the sam e time, saying all this does nothing to com prom ise the
irreducible and non-negotiable otherness of nonhum an beings a n d things
like b u zzard s and m ountain stream s. A nd yet, it is an otherness that,
precisely because it is other, we can m eet in dialogue. In this case, then,
alterity does not necessarily im ply contrariety or objective over-againstness.
T hrough our participation in dialogue, w e m eet and 'know ' the oth er in an
intim ate and m eaningful w ay that stands in contrast to o u r subjective
'kn o w in g about' the other as an object of representation and analysis. O ur
experiential and im m ediate know ledge of the other received in dialogue does
n o th in g to dim inish or com prom ise the radical otherness of the other; it
rem ains as ineffable and m ysterious as before.
Finally, I cannot help bu t think that talking about "m an an d nature" or
"m an as nature" is all som ew hat besides the point. Such broad strokes not
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only set u p som ew hat arbitrary distinctions, but they do a great injustice to all
the d istinct an d unique term s that are sum m arily and m onolithically lu m p ed
together. C onsider the non-negotiable otherness of our fellow h u m an beings
- an otherness that can som etim es overw helm us w ith its aw esom e and
devastating force w hen, for instance, seen in the vacant eyes of a street d ru n k
or a m other's w eary smile, or heard in a young child 'barking' y o u r nam e for
the first tim e or the inconsolable voice of Robert Johnson or George Jones, or
felt in a lover's touch or in the embrace of a friend you thought y o u 'd never
see again. O u r interhum an relations, as well, are m ade possible and
m eaningful by our irrefutable otherness; and although this otherness m ore
often th an no t begets estrangem ent and alienation, it opens u p the possibility
of tru ly sacram ental, holy intercourse; m eaningful relationality seem s
inextricably bound up w ith the fact of non-negotiable otherness.
2 - To be sure, "dialogue," as I am using it throughout this paper, does not
refer to the w ritten or spoken exchange of w ords, so, in a sense, I suppose I am
using it m etaphorically. As Erazim Kohak presents it, the purpose of a
m etap h o r is no t to describe and define a content, but rather it is an attem pt to
evoke the sense of lived experience; as such, this evocation is, to a certain
degree, dep en d en t upon an experiential resonance w ithin the listener. For
K ohak’s discussion of m etaphor, see The Embers and the Stars, pp.52-56. To
speak of our m eaningful relations as dialogues, then, is an attem pt to evoke
the sense and m eaning of those relations; to me, the language of dialogue
seem s to be the m ost essentially accurate description of such events. W hether
or n o t such im agery resonates w ith my readers m ay be another issue.
3 - For such an out-of-hand dism issal of Buber's ideas and their place in
en v iro n m ental ethics, see John K ultgen's article entitled "Saving You for
Real People." I will take up w ith his argum ents in the second half of this
paper.
4 - A nd, in the case of Carson, M uir and Berry, it is not only their w ords that
bear w itness to the m eaning received in such encounters; over the course of
their respective lifetimes, they actively struggled to preserve, protect and heal
those things in n atu re that spoke to them m ost pow erfully an d eloquently.
P erhaps this, m ore than any rigorous ethical discourse, bears w itness to the
com pelling im perative force received in and through our dialogical
encounters w ith the nonhum an beings and things of n ature as well as the
sense of vocation that comes over m any years of intim acy an d com m itm ent.
5 - K ohak describes this "noematic prejudice" in his article "I, T hou and It: A
C ontribution to the Phenom enology of Being-in-the-W orld." H e focuses his
arg u m en t on a critique of the implicitly interpretive categories H eidegger and
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Sartre em ploy to 'describe' the various types of relations w e enter w ith both
n o n h u m an things and our fellow hum ans; according to Kohak, although
both philosophers set out to describe relations, their descriptions of those
relations are prejudiced by the relata involved in them . Therefore, they end
u p offering noem atic, not noetic, accounts of these relational form s - hence
K ohak’s term : "noem atic prejudice."
6 - As Levinas correctly points out in the article referred to above, Buber's
u n d erstan d in g of being as being-w ith-others or being-in-relation is w holly
"consistent w ith contem porary views," such as those of H usserl, Bergson and
H eidegger. It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey the various schools
of phenom enology and defend m y choice of Buber’s ideas as m y prim ary
interpretive tool for this paper; for me, the resonance of his w ords w ith my
ow n experience m ay be sufficient enough reason. Regarding H eidegger,
how ever, the issue of Kohak's "noematic prejudice" comes u p again. Things,
for him , are excluded from possible participation in Mitdnsein ; they cannot
becom e fellow subjects and partners in authentic and reciprocal relations.
Instead, they are relegated to relations of Mitsein, as either zuhande , the
objects of m anipulation, or vorhande , the objects of speculation. In neither
case are things granted the status of independent co-participants in a genuine
dialogical relation. Buber's acknow ledgm ent and defense of this possibility,
therefore, stands as unique and, for me, preferable.
7 - The old hebrew sense of 'to know ' seems especially fitting here. In his
read in g of "W ilderness in America" several years ago at the U niversity of
M ontana Philosophy Forum , H enry Bugbee also m ade use of this notion in
several side com m ents over the course of the reading. A nd although it m ay
be an archaic usage, such a category of know ledge has som e currency w ithin
contem porary philosophy. Again, it is Levinas w ho places Buber's theory of
know ledge squarely am ongst his contem poraries, citing those ontological
ideas that suggest that we cannot know about or have access to know ledge
about being in any objectifiable sense; w hat we 'know ' of being is of a
different order of know ledge altogether. For Buber, such know ledge is
accessible through the I-Thou encounter, although in m oving from the
encounter to articulation we are unable to represent that know ledge in any
objective way; in the m ost basic sense, it is ineffable.
8 - O bviously, m y presentation of this rhythm of dialogue and ethical
responsibility is a religious, even theistic, one. For this I need neither
apologize nor rationalize. A nd w hile I find M artin Buber's (as w ell as Erazim
Kohak's) thought explicitly and inescapably religious, and hear in the works
of H enry Bugbee a deeply religious - though non-theistic - sensibility, m y
p rim ary reason for offering this religious account of the rh y th m of dialogue
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an d responsibility is far m ore basic: the w orld presents itself to m e in
religious term s and as a religious place - a place pervaded by M ystery, w here
grace and faith m ay reveal or w ithhold them selves and w here the Divine
Presence m ay, at times, flash like lightning in a sum m er sky or glow and
quiver like those fleeting lum inescences on open w ater (both come an d gone
in the in stan t of their apprehension)- So, yes, m y account of the rhythm ic
in terp lay betw een dialogue and responsibility will be a religious one; for m e,
to do otherw ise w ould be both disingenuous and dishonest. A nd yet, the
indefinite article in m y project's title - the "a" - should not be overlooked.
This essay is not intended to exhaust the w ays w e m ight describe and
in te rp ret our participation in relational events that sponsor m eaning and
m eaningful action in our lives. O thers m ay very well offer such descriptions
a n d in terpretations w ithout recourse to religious language; for me, how ever,
th at isn't an option.

BASIC TENETS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF DIALOGUE

In attem pting to outline a philosophy of dialogue, it m akes sense to
begin at the beginning, and for M artin Buber, the m ost em inent philosopher
of dialogue, "In the beginning is the relation" (I and Thou 69). Every aspect of
Buber's philosophy of dialogue is based upon his acknow ledgm ent of the
ontological prim acy of our relationality. O ur existence is constituted and
d efin ed in term s of our involvem ent in an infinitely com plex n etw o rk of
relational events. Q uite sim ply, "To be is to be related: everything in the
w o rld is being-w ith-others" (W ood 66). Of course, this insight is hard ly
u n iq u e to Buber or, for that m atter, to the philosophy of dialogue in general.
Beginning w ith H usserl and Heidegger, the entire school of thought loosely
referred to as phenom enology (of which it seems to m e the philosophy of
dialogue is an especially rich and experientially grounded subspecies) is
ro o ted in the aw areness of our existential situation as one of being-in-relation
w ith o th er beings.

W hat seem s unique to the philosophers of dialogue, how ever, is their
em phasis on the vocative character of the relational events that m ake u p our
lives. A ccording to Buber, "Living m eans being addressed. ... W hat occurs to
m e addresses me" (Between 10 & 12). The beings and things w hom w e m eet
in o u r daily lives ’say’ som ething to us; by their very presence and w ith their
very being, they speak to us and call us forth.
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In turn, "We are as respondents" (Bugbee, "Loneliness, Solitude" 5).
O ur fellow beings address us in a w ay that calls forth - evokes - our response.
W e are responsible - answerable. In one w ay or another, w e are called to
an sw er for the situation, the relational event, in w hich w e find ourselves.

Therefore, our lives can be understood in term s of o u r involvem ent in
relational events in which we are addressed in a w ay that calls forth our
response. A ccording to H enry Bugbee, "'Appel et reponse ' [A ddress and
response] is the basic m ode of our participation in being w ith other beings"
("Lv Exigence " 6). In so far as we respond genuinely to the address of our
fellow beings, decisively received, our lives take on the character of a
dialogue; we participate in being as partners in dialogue.

It is this experientially grounded aw areness of the fundam entally
dialogical character of our existence that serves as the foundation for the
th o u g h t of Buber, Bugbee and other philosophers of dialogue such as Gabriel
M arcel. In general, our being is constituted in term s of our being-in-relation,
b u t it is only actualized - m ade fully real - as it takes on the character of a
dialogue. T hrough our participation in such dialogical events w e come to
k n o w o u r co-existents in an intim ate and m eaningful way, and w e find the
capacity to actualize the m eaning received in the encounter in com m itted and
decisive action. As engaged and responsive partners in dialogue, w e are able
to share in that degree of fullness, integrity and m eaning w hich is open and
available to us in our finite, creaturely existence.
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O ftentim es, how ever, our relations w ith the other beings w ho cross
o u r p aths do not assum e the character of a dialogue. These beings seem to
have nothing to say to us; we do not find ourselves addressed by them . Or,
p erh ap s w e hold back in our response; we answ er the call of the other and the
claim of the m om ent in a half-hearted, distracted, or self-preoccupied way. In
such cases, and for w hatever reasons, w e do not m eet our fellow beings in
genuine dialogue. W e fail to actualize the potential fullness and m eaning of
o u r existence, and w e find ourselves incapable of conclusive decision or
action.

It seem s, then, that our relations w ith others take on alternate form s,
an d although our lives m ay be essentially and potentially dialogical in n ature,
they are not alw ays necessarily and actually so. Thus, the key question for a
philosophy of dialogue is the one Bugbee asks w hen he w rites, "H ow is it that
beings m ay come to 'speak' to us in a decisive m anner - coordinately w ith ou r
com ing to receive them in a decisively responsive way? A nd how is it, too,
th at this m ay not come to pass" ("Le Recueillement " 3)?

C hapter One of this paper is m y attem pt to point tow ard an answ er to
this question. In doing so, I will rely upon M artin Buber’s u n d erstan d in g of
o u r relationality in term s of his distinction betw een I-Thou and I-It relations
as m y prim ary, although not exclusive, interpretive tool. I will begin by
describing the "basic attitude" - orientation, m ovem ent or p o stu re m ight be
better here - necessary, although not sufficient, for the gracious ad v en t of
genuine I-Thou dialogue in our lives. I will then describe the contrary
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"attitude," w hich fosters a w ay of taking u p w ith things defined exclusively in
term s of I-It. After outlining these general dispositions, I will describe the
qualities and characteristics of both I-Thou and I-It relations and distinguish
betw een the different types of know ledge received in these tw o relational
form s. I will then conclude by exam ining how I-Thou and I-It relations
com plem ent and balance each other in m eaningful and active existence.

M artin Buber opens his book I and Thou w ith the follow ing lines:
The w orld is twofold for m an in accordance w ith his tw ofold attitude.
The attitude of m an is twofold in accordance w ith the tw o basic w ords
he can speak.
The basic w ords are not single w ords but w ord pairs.
O ne basic w ord is the w ord pair I-You.
The other basic w ord is the w ord pair I-It;...
Basic w ords are spoken w ith one's being. ...
W hoever speaks one of the basic w ords enters into the w o rd and stands
in it" (53-54).1
For Buber, the w ord pairs I-Thou and I-It describe the two prim ary w ays we
take u p w ith reality in our everyday lives. As relational w ord pairs they are
not in tended to be 'objective' descriptions of the w ay things are in and of
them selves (for Buber, nothing is in and of itself). We cannot say, "This is a
Thou," or "That is an It." Rather, I-Thou and I-It are noetic and
anthropological descriptions of the w ay we hum ans m ay relate to our fellow
b ein g s.2 As Buber explains in his essay entitled "Religion and Philosophy,"
For m an the existent is either face-to-face being or passive object. The
essence of m an arises from this tw ofold relation to the existent. These
are not two external phenom ena but the tw o basic m odes of existing
w ith being. ... Because they are the two basic m odes of existing w ith
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being, they are the two basic m odes of our existence in general - I-Thou
and I-It" (Eclipse of G od 44).
W hether w e exist in the "basic mode" I-Thou or the "basic m ode" I-It d epend s
in large p a rt (although not exclusively) upon the "basic w ord" w e speak; as
b o th Sm ith and K aufm an translate it, it depends on our "attitude." A nd yet,
such a translation is m isleading if it suggests a m erely m ental or intellectual
position that w e can m anipulate and change as a m atter of conscious and
willful choice. W e cannot sim ply say "From now on, I choose to speak the
basic w ord I-Thou." Rather, such 'speech' arises out of the depths of our very
being. It is rooted in a basic disposition or fundam ental posture that inform s
our w ay of taking up with things at the m ost prim ary level - at the level of
faith .3 In fact, for Buber this is the very m eaning of "real faith," w hich he
defines as "presenting ourselves and receiving" (Between 12). O ur capacity to
say Thou to the beings we encounter is grounded in a faith that seem s bound
u p w ith that deeply rooted affirm ation which inform s our w ay of being-inrelation at the m ost prim al level. H enry Bugbee testifies to the prim acy of
such a faith p osture for our participation in dialogue w hen he w rites, "If we
have looked upon the m ountains time and again, and they have called upon
us, an d w e have responded, let us rem em ber that w e have looked u p o n them
w ith the eye of faith" (Inw ard M orning 116).

As we speak the basic w ord I-Thou out of the depths of faith, w e m ove
to w ard (but not actually into) dialogue with the beings and things who cross
ou r paths. In saying Thou, we present ourselves to the other in a spirit of
openness and attentive listening, w hich Marcel refers to as disponibilite,
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availability.4 Unless we m ake ourselves available and receptive to the voice
of the other, it is unlikely that we will be able to hear its address. As Buber
suggests, "You say that often you hear nothing? W ell, w e have to be attentive
w ith the unreserved effort of our being" (Between 76). Participation in actual
I-Thou dialogue depends (from 'our side' of the relation, anyw ay) upon our
capacity to attend to and hear the voice of the other as it addresses us.

In turn, through such participation in actual encounters w e come to
realize the fundam entally dialogical character of our existence; w e come to
recognize our situation as one in which we are alw ays and forever being
addressed by, and called to answ er for, the relational events of our lives. In
his essay entitled "Dialogue," Buber refers to this recognition as "becoming
aw are," w hich he distinguishes from "observing" an d "looking on." "But in
each instance a w ord dem anding an answ er has h ap p en ed to m e. W e m ay
term this w ay of perception becoming aivare " (Betw een 10). Such aw areness
is essentially twofold. We become aw are of the dialogical n ature of our
existential situation, in general, and we become increasingly aw are of the
"signs of address" given in the particular relational events that m ake up our
daily lives. For Buber,
The signs of address are not som ething extraordinary, som ething that
steps out of the order of things, they are just w h at goes on tim e and
again, just w hat goes on in any case, nothing is ad d ed by the address.
The w aves of the aether ro ar on always, bu t for m ost of the tim e we
have turned off our receivers (Between 11).
These signs are sim ply the call of the other and the claim of the m om ent
received and acknow ledged, personally and decisively, in our everyday
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relations w ith our fellow beings. For the m ost part, how ever, we rem ain
caught u p w ithin ourselves - our thoughts, purposes, concepts a n d values a n d cannot hear the signs present in the address of the other. According to
Bugbee, w e have "noisy souls," and, "In a noisy soul this call is utterly
ignored" (Inw ard M orning 221). For both Buber and Bugbee, our failure to
actualize m eaningful and decisive dialogue - I-Thou dialogue - testifies, above
all, to o ur inability to m ake ourselves available and open to the signs of
a d d ress given in the call of our fellow creatures. In order truly to hear, we
m u st still the noise within; we m ust turn the receivers 'back on' and listen
attentively to the signs which address us in the relational events of our lives.

Such a posture of availability and attentiveness, w hile not of itself
sufficient cause for the actualization of dialogue, is surely necessary. As we
take u p w ith our fellow beings in such a m anner we step tow ard them and
to w ard that 'place' that Buber refers to as 'the between." As M aurice
F riedm an explains, "Only w hen one really listens - w hen one becom es
personally aw are of the 'signs of address' that address one not only in the
w o rd s of b u t in the very m eeting w ith the other - does one attain to that
sphere of the 'betw een' that Buber holds to be the 'really real.’" (Introduction
to Buber, B etw een xv). In saying Thou to the other w hom we m eet we m ove
to w ard das Zioi.sch.en, the betw een. As m entioned in the Introduction of this
pap er, the betw een is the 'place' w here I-Thou dialogue is actualized; as such,
it is the bearer and locus of m eaningful being - reality. A ccording to Buber,
this is n o t m erely a psychological or conceptual construct; rather,
It [the between] is som ething ontic. ... [T]he dialogical situation can be
adequately grasped only in an ontological way. But it is not to be
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grasped on the basis of the ontic of personal existence, or of th at of tw o
personal existences, but of that w hich has its being betw een them , and
transcends both. ... On the far side of the subjective, on this side of the
objective, on the narrow ridge, w here 1 and Thou m eet, there is the
realm of "between" (Betw een 204).
Buber's em phasis on the betw een - the "narrow ridge" - allow s him to m ove
outside the usual understanding of relationality (and know ledge, as I will
discuss later in this chapter) in term s of typical subject-object distinctions.5
For Buber, reality cannot be described, let alone understood, purely in term s
of the subject's experience of objective phenom ena; actual being occurs
b etw een an I and a Thou and is reconstituted again and again in each I-Thou
encounter. E m m anuel Levinas succinctly describes Buber's ontology of the
betw een in the follow ing passage:
The [I-Thou] Relation cannot be identified w ith a "subjective" event
because the I does not represent the Thou but meets it. The m eeting,
m oreover, is to be distinguished from the silent dialogue the m ind has
w ith itself; the I-Thou m eeting does not take place in the subject bu t in
the realm of being. H ow ever, we m ust avoid an interp retatio n of the
m eeting as som ething objectively apprehended by the I, for the
ontological realm is not a block universe but an occurrence. The
interval betw een I and Thou, the Zwischen, is the locus w here being is
being realized (139).
As w e m ake ourselves available to the other and encounter it as a Thou in
dialogue, w e step into the betw een and participate in the actuality of
m eaningful being. Only then do we find a m easure of authenticity and
in teg rity in our lives. As Buber puts it, "All real living is m eeting." (I and
T h o u , trans. Smith, l l ) . 6
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Thus, the possibility of m eaningful being is open to us in so far as we
step into the betw een and enter I-Thou dialogue w ith the other beings and
things w hom we m eet in our lives. H ow ever, for such an encounter to occur,
w e m u st be willing to go- out to m eet the other in a spirit of availability and
openness g rounded in a fundam ental posture of faith, Buber sum m arily
describes this entire m ovem ent as Hindwendung , w hich he defines sim ply
as "turning tow ards the other" (Between 22). Elaborating slightly, R obert
W ood calls Hindwendung "a sw ing outw ard tow ard the O ther, to w ard the
Between" (102). For Buber, this m ovem ent describes, in general term s, a way
of taking u p w ith our fellow beings characteristic of the life of dialogue.

As w e enact this basic m ovem ent of the life of dialogue, o u r concern
and attention is not focused upon ourselves and our interests b u t upon the
other beings w hom we encounter. To the degree our hearing is conditioned
by the 'filters' of self-interest, we will be unable to hear the voice of the other
as other - as it speaks to us out of the depths of its uniqueness, independence
an d integrity. In such cases, we rem ain w ithin ourselves and do not step out
to w ard the betw een; we fail to actualize the possibility of dialogue in our
lives. For authentic dialogue to grace our lives, we m ust focus o u r attention
u p o n the other w ho speaks to us. In discussing M arcel's notion of
disponibilite , which, like Buber's H indw endung , is a double m ovem ent in
w hich w e turn to w ard the other from our rootedness in a fundam ental
posture, Bugbee writes,
The disposition in question stands in definite contrariety to selfcenteredness and the w hole set of interests on w hich self-centeredness
sym biotically feeds. 'L ' Eire disponible' [The available being] is
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discovered to others as available to them and he is open to the
o p p o rtu n ities w hich life brings ("Le Recueillement " 9).
A lth o u g h contrary to self-centeredness and self-interest, such an orientation
or m ovem ent is not one of self-negation. W ithin a philosophy of dialogue,
the integrity and presence of the self (the I) are essential to the very structure
an d form of the dialogue (I-Thou). That is, both I and Thou are necessary for
the actualization of the relation occurring betw een them. W hat is crucial
from the I's side, how ever, is that the I turns tow ard the other and attends to
the voice of the other as it addresses the I.

To speak of this m ovem ent in yet another way, we m ay again follow
Bugbee and say that while we rem ain attentive to and intently interested in
the other w ith w hom we have to do, our interest is rendered disinterested.
To m eet another being in a m ode of disinterested interest m eans that our
interest in that being, although keen, is not conditioned by our private selfinterest or interests. H ow ever, m erely because such interests are suspended,
that does no t m ean that we cease to care. According to Bugbee, "On the
contrary, we have tended to suppose that disinterestedness is only possible for
a p erso n w hose interest is profound; the very opposite of superficial, or
casual, or optional" ("The M oment" 4). Therefore, our disinterested interest
is m arked by an intense and deep interest; how ever, w hat w e are intent u p o n
is not o u r ow n self-interest, but the voice of the other addressing us.

For Bugbee, such disinterested interest is akin to respect. "[Ojur regard
for anything approaches respect in so far as our interest in that thing becom es
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in sp irited in a w ay qualifying our m ode of interest as d isinterested” ("The
M om ent" 3). We respect the other w hom we m eet to the degree w e take up
w ith it in its ow n right and on its ow n terms, w ithout reducing it to a m eans
th ro u g h w hich we m ay fulfill our ow n intentions. To respect som eone or
som ething is to let it speak to us of itself and to listen attentively and openly
to th at speech as it truly addresses us. However, we m ust rem em ber that such
respect is only actualized in and through our active participation in dialogue.
As Kohak rightly points out, our respect for others is not a passive sein-lassen
(letting be), "but rather the active respect for the dem ands of the other" ("I,
T hou, and It” 67). As we actively m ove tow ard and enter into dialogue w ith
others in the m anner of respect and openness, we are, in turn, called to active
response through w hich that respect finds em bodim ent. T hus, this respect
n o t only conditions our participation in dialogue, but it is, in turn, also
fu rth er engendered w ithin the dialogical events them selves.

In sharp contrast to Hindzvendung , which I have characterized as a
tu rn in g tow ard the other (and, consequently, tow ard the betw een) in a spirit
of attentive listening, availability and respect, Buber sets a second "basic
m o v e m e n t”: Ruckbiegung . Just as Hindwendung

is the basic m ovem ent of

the life of dialogue, so Ruckbiegung is the basic m ovem ent of the life of
m onologue.

Like H indw endung , Ruckbiegung

also involves a turn in g

tow ards, b u t in this case it is a turning tow ards the self, w hich M aurice
F riedm an translates as "reflexion."7
I term it reflexion w hen a m an w ithdraw s from accepting w ith his
essential being another person in his particularity - a particularity
w hich is by no m eans to be circumscribed by the circle of his ow n self
and though it substantially touches and m oves his soul is in no way
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im m anent in it - and lets the other exist only as his ow n experience,
only as a "part of myself." For then dialogue becom es a fiction (Buber,
Between 23-24)8
In the I-Thou dialogue, the I m oves out into the betw een an d acknow ledges
the other in all its unique and irreducible otherness; how ever, in the
'fictitous' dialogue referred to above, w hich m ay be described m ore accurately
as a m onologue or soliloquoy, the I w ithdraw s or rem ains w ith in itself, and
the other is reduced to a m ere object of the I's experience. In other w ords, the
other is reduced to an It. As opposed to the I-Thou relation in w hich the I
m eets or encounters the other, the I-It relation is defined in term s of
subjective experience and use. In I and Thou Buber writes, "The w orld as
experience belongs to the basic w ord I-It. I perceive som ething. I feel
som ething. I im agine som ething. I w ant som ething. I sense som ething. I
think som ething. ... All this and its like is the basis of the realm of It" (54).
For Buber, the I-It experience occurs w ithin the I, while the I-Thou encounter
occurs betw een the I and the Thou. Several pages later he w rites, "Those w ho
experience do not participate in the w orld. For the experience is 'in them '
and not betw een them and the world" (56). Instead of going ou t to m eet the
other in dialogue, the I of I-It rem ains closed in upon itself and its
experiences. As Malcolm D iam ond puts it, ”[T]he 'I' holds back" (21). Such a
p o stu re is directly opposed to the openness and attentiveness necessary for
hearing the address of the other as it speaks to us. To d raw upon language
used above, we could say that the I of reflexion has not becom e aw are of the
signs of address as they speak to it; the receivers are turned off. In the m ode
of reflexion w e no longer find ourselves addressed by the other beings w hom
w e m eet. O ur lives lose their vocative character, and the w orld becomes no
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m ore than an assem blage of voiceless objects, passive an d plastic, w hich can
be taken up w ith, used and m anipulated according to our interests and
purposes. As objects, the beings and things w ho cross our paths no longer
speak to us in their ow n right; their speech (or, m ore accurately, o u r hearing
of their speech) is conditioned and m ediated by our self-centered categories of
utility and intention. They exist for us and our purposes. As d ead tools or
m ere resources, the others we experience cannot w arran t or engender our
respect, and our relations w ith them will bear w itness to this.

A ccording to Buber, then, we take up w ith our fellow beings in one of
tw o basic ways, according to the basic w ord we speak and the basic m ovem ent
w e enact. To be sure, unless we turn tow ard the other from out of a
disposition of attentiveness, availablility and respect - unless w e say Thou to
the other - we cannot possibly enter into 1-Thou dialogue. A nd yet, such an
orientation is not, of itself, the I-Thou relation; a disposition is not a dialogue.
Real dialogue is based upon reciprocity. According to Buber, "One should not
try to dilute the m eaning of relation: relation is reciprocity" (I an d Thou 58).
A nd again, a few pages later, he writes, "Relation is reciprocity. My You acts
on m e as I act on it. ... Inscrutably involved we live in currents of universal
reciprocity" (67). By definition, I-Thou relations are reciprocal and m utual
encounters in which both the I and the Thou play active roles.

In the I-Thou relation, the Thou is not sim ply a passive object; it is an
active co-participant in dialogue, addressing and responding to the I. In
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describing Buber's u nderstanding of reciprocity in the I-Thou encounter, Emil
Fackenheim w rites,
This relation [I-Thou] is, above all, m utual. The other is for m e, b u t I
am also for the other. I do som ething to the other, but the other also
does som ething to me. This happens in the relation of dialogue, w hich
is a relation of address and response-to-address. The other addresses
m e and responds to m y address; that is, even if the other h appens to be
a lifeless and speechless object, it is treated as one treats a person"
(279).9
The I-Thou relation is fundam entally reciprocal and dialogical; it is a relation
of m u tu al address and m utual response, with both partners actively
in v o lv e d .

Because of this, even our Thou-saying disposition is, of itself,
insufficient for the actualization of a reciprocal dialogue. A nd if som ething
akin to faith (only partially inform ed by conscious will) is a necessary p re 
condition of our capacity to say Thou, then an elem ent of grace is also
required for the consum m ation and fulfillment of the actual dialogical
encounter. A ccording to Buber,
The You encounters m e by grace - it cannot be found by seeking. But
that I speak the basic w ord to it is a deed of m y w hole being, is m y
essential deed.
The You encounters me. but I enter into a direct relationship to it.
Thus the relationship is election and electing, passive and active at
once (I and Thou 62).
For Buber, I-Thou dialogues grace our lives in unforeseeable and
u n procurable ways. Even o u r m ost sincere Thou-saying cannot g uarantee the
actualization of I-Thou encounters in our lives. A nd yet, in so far as w e say
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T hou an d openly attend to the other in the givenness of the situation in
w hich w e find ourselves, we m ake ourselves available to receive the gift of
existence as it is given to us - here and now. In saying Thou we recognize and
affirm our existence (and, correspondingly, the face-to-face existents w ith
w hom w e share our existence) as a gift, one which w e are free either to accept
or reject in each m om ent it is granted us.

In contrast to the tw o-sided reciprocity of the I-Thou dialogue, I-It
relations are decidely one-sided and monological. As stated earlier, the I of IIt does not step forth to receive the address of the other b u t rem ains enclosed
w ithin its subjectivity and experiences the other m erely as an object of
speculation, m anipulation and use. W ithin the exclusive fram ew ork of I-It
experience, the other is taken up w ith as a passive and inert object, and any
discussion of vocative and reciprocal relations w ith it w o u ld indeed sound
absurd. As an It, the other can neither speak to us in its ow n right nor can it
offer any real response. In so far as w e take up w ith others as m ere objects, Its,
w e rem ain closed to the gift of the other, and we lead solitary lives in a w orld
of deadening silence, devoid of grace.

In addition to reciprocity, the I-Thou dialogue is also characterized by
presentness. W hen we encounter another being as a Thou, w e are totally and
exclusively engaged in the present moment. In fact, it is only in our I-Thou
relations that we find ourselves dw elling in the present. A ccording to Buber,
The present - not that which is like a point and m erely designates
w hatever our thoughts m ay posit as the end of "elapsed" tim e, the
fiction of the fixed lapse, but the actual and fulfilled present - exists
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only insofar as presentness, encounter, and relation exist. O nly as the
You becomes present does presence come into being" (I an d Thou 63).
For Buber, living in the present m eans entering into I-Thou relations w ith
the others w hom we m eet in each present situation. Of course, for this to
occur, w e m ust be present ourselves - receptive and attentive to the address of
the other as it speaks to us in that particular m om ent. As Buber suggests, "He
w ho is not present perceives no Presence" (Eclipse of G od 126).10 Unless we
are fully present in the m om ent of relation, we cannot truly say Thou to the
p articu lar other w ith w hom we have to do; consequently, o u r relation w ith
the other does not take on the character of a dialogue, and we fail to m ake the
m om ent fully and actually present. In other w ords, if we are no t present,
then the present m om ent passes us by. According to Buber, then, the "one
thing needful" for living the life of dialogue, is "the total acceptance of the
present" (I and Thou 126).

In the I-It relation, on the other hand, the I does not atten d to - is absent
from! - the present situation. As such, the I does not encounter the face-toface presence of the other, and the present m om ent slips into the past.
A ccording to Buber, w hen we confront the other as an It, as the object of our
in n er experience and according to our categories of m anipulation and use, we
are living in the past. "[Ijnsofar as a hum an being m akes do w ith the things
th at he experiences and uses, he lives in the past, and his m om ent has no
presence. He has nothing but objects; but objects consist in having been"
(Buber, I and Thou 63-64). As an object of our experience, the other is taken
o u t of the present m om ent and re-presented in term s of our conceptual
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constructs of space and time, species and genera, cause and effect, and the like.
This process, to be sure, is extremely useful to us; it allow us to com prehend,
organize and, to som e extent, even control our im m ediate environm ent.
H ow ever, in doing so w e rem ove ourselves from the lived p resen t and dwell
in the past.

A third general characteristic of the I-Thou relation is im m ediacy. In
dialogue, we encounter the very being of the Thou in a direct and
unm ed iated way. For the m ost part, Buber describes this attribute of the IT hou relation in negative terms. "The relation to the You is unm ediated.
N othing conceptual intervenes betw een I and You, no p rior know ledge and
no im agination. ... N o purpose intervenes betw een I a n d You, no greed and
no anticipation; ...Every m eans is an obstacle. O nly w here all m eans have
d isin teg rated encounter occurs" (Buber, 1 and Thou 62-63). In the m om ent of
authentic dialogue, w e encounter the other, not in term s of our conceptual
categories and m ental constructs, our purposes and projects, b u t in direct
response to the unfiltered and undistorted voice of the other as it speaks to
us, on this particular occasion, out of its irreducible and uncanny otherness.
We encounter the very being of the other - a sheer, ineffable presence.

In the I-It relation, how ever, w hat we confront is not the other as a
presence b u t as an im age - our projected im age of it. H ere, our m eeting w ith
and, therefore, our know ledge about the other is conditioned by the
conceptual fram ew ork that we im pose upon it and into w hich w e attem pt to
m ake it fit. That is, we 'hear' (in as m uch as we can be said to hear at all in
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the I-It relation) and interpret the address of the other in term s of the
subjective (and objective - both, as they are com m only understood, belong to
the w o rld of It) categories we bring w ith us to the relational event. These
categories act as the conceptual and even em otional filters through w hich we
screen o ur experience as we try to understand, order and m anipulate our
w orld. A nd again, although extrem ely useful, our categories, w h eth er they be
of science or poetry, act as a barrier betw een ourselves an d others th at prevent
us from receiving their call as they speak of them selves from ou t of their very
being. O nly in those gracious m om ents w hen this barrier is suspended (it
w o u ld be neither possible nor desirable to do aw ay w ith our im age-form ing
constructs altogether) can dialogue occur, not w ithin one's m ind, b u t betw een
an I and a Thou.

In addition to reciprocity, presence and im m ediacy, the I-Thou
dialogue is also characterized by the quality of wholeness. A ccording to
W ood, "In the I-Thou relation the undivided self m eets the undiv id ed
O ther" (41). In saying Thou we go out to m eet the other w ith o u t reservation,
giving fully and com pletely of ourselves; in turn, it is only through our
participation in such actual encounters that we come to realize w holeness
a n d integrity in our lives. In his essay "What Is Man?," Buber w rites, "Man
can becom e w hole not in virtue of a relation to him self b u t only in virtue of a
relation to another self. This other self may be just as lim ited and
conditioned as he is; in being together the unlim ited and the unconditioned
is experienced" (Between 168). Of course, this personal w holeness is not
som ething w e have once and for all; like the I-Thou dialogues them selves,
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such integrity is fleeting and evanescent. A nd yet, as our lives becom e m ore
an d m ore inform ed by our participation in m eaningful dialogue w ith our
fellow beings, we become m ore fully w ho we are m eant to be; w e come to
realize a degree of integrity in our lives.11

In contrast to the w holeness of I-Thou dialogue, our participation in IIt relations is partial and fragm entary. In turn, the It we experience is
sim ilarly fragm ented, divided into analyzable com ponents, classes and
functions. Speaking of our I-It experiences, W ood writes, "Each object is
located w ithin a hum anly constructed frame of reference relative to other
objects and is broken up into various perceptible and interpretable parts" (40).
A gain, such analysis and dissection is very useful in m aking sense of and
ordering the w orld in which we live. H ow ever, in doing so we do not
encounter the other in its fullness, integrity and irreducibility - in all its
"u n d iv id ed ” otherness; and so, participation in actual dialogue is denied us.
For, as Friedm an explains, "Dialogue is ... the response of one's w hole being
to the otherness of the other, that otherness that is com prehended only w hen
I open m yself to him in the present and in the concrete situation an d
respond" (Introduction to Buber, B etw een xvii).

But w hat good are these reciprocal, present, im m ediate and w hole
encounters w ith our fellow beings? As suggested above, the know ledge we
receive in I-Thou dialogue defies representation, interpretation and analysis.
A ccording to Buber, our uncanny I-Thou encounters are devoid of content,
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and, in them , w e learn nothing about the others w hom w e meet.
Furtherm ore, although we m ay m ove in the direction of such encounters, w e
cannot procure them through an act of will or ’hav e’ them on o u r ow n
term s. In turn, through our participation in them we accom plish nothing;
they serve no purpose. As Buber writes, "The purpose of the relation is the
relation itself - touching the You. For as soon as we touch a You, w e are
touched by a breath of eternal life" (I and Thou 112).

A lthough we learn nothing about the other w hom w e m eet as a
p artn er in dialogue, in so far as we "touch a You," we come to know that
particular other in a deep and decisive way, and our lives are graced w ith
tru th and m eaning - "finality," to use Bugbee's term .12 A ccording to Buber's
epistem ology, our 'know ing' takes one of two basic form s, according to the
type of relation - I-Thou or I-It - from which it arises. Generally, our I-It
know ledge is a 'know ing about,’ in which we know the other superficially
and abstractly, as a subject knows an object of study and inquiry, in term s of its
qualities, characteristics and attributes. On the other hand, the know ledge
received in our I-Thou dialogues is sim ilar to the Hebraic m eaning of 'to
know :’ to touch or to intercourse w ith the being of the other. For Buber, it is
this latter know ing, our deep and intim ate know ledge of the other in all its
otherness, through which we m ay glim pse the truth, "which can never be
possessed and yet m ay be com prehended in an existentially real relation”
(Buber, B etw een 82). We come to know truth and m eaning in our lives only
th ro u g h our com m itted and w hole-hearted participation in dialogue - or
w h at Bugbee calls "sacram ental participation in being w ith beings"
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("L'Exigence " 15). For both Buber and Bugbee, the truth is not som ething we
'have,' n o t a m ental possession; rather, it is som ething w e m ay encounter - or
n o t encounter.

Buber describes the experiential and participatory know ledge we
receive in our I-Thou encounters as a contentless "force." In I and Thou he
w rites, "They [I-Thou relations] leave no content that could be preserved, but
th eir force enters into the creation and into m an's know ledge, an d the
radiation of its force penetrates the ordered w orld and thaw s it again and
again" (82). In the I-Thou dialogue we do not gain any know ledge about the
other that is susceptible to analysis and representation in thought or speech;
the m eeting is, in the fullest sense, ineffable. As Levinas explains,
Buber describes a sphere of being which cannot be told because it is a
living dialogue betw een individuals w ho are not related as objective
contents to one another: one individual has nothing to say about the
other. The sensitivity of the I-Thou relation lies in its com pletely
form al nature. To apprehend the other as a content is tan tam o u n t to
relating oneself to him as an object and is to enter into an I-It relation
instead (143).
A nd yet, despite the lack of content and our inability to say anything about the
other, th rough our participation in I-Thou dialogue we come to know the
other in an im m ediate and decisive way. This know ledge, how ever, is not so
m uch a know ledge about the other as it is a know eldge of the other. In
describing this experiential, contentless know ledge, Buber em ploys the
biblical sense of 'to know ' - to touch or to intercourse w ith the other - as in
"A dam knew Eve" or "God knew Hosea." In his book G ood and Evil. Buber
w rites,
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[T]he original m eaning of the H ebrew verb 'to recognise, to know ', in
distinction from W estern languages, belongs not to the sphere of
reflection but to that of contact. The decisive event for 'know ing' in
biblical H ebrew is not that one looks at an object, but that one comes
into touch w ith it. This basic difference is developed in the realm of a
relation of the soul to other beings, w here the fact of m utuality changes
everything. A t the centre is not a perceiving of one another, b u t the
contact of being, intercourse" (56).
T hrough participation in dialogue we come to know the other - touch the
other - at the m ost intim ate and fundam ental level, at the level of being.

In such prim al encounters we come face-to-face w ith the other in all its
otherness and recognized as such. We come to know the other as other.
According to Buber,
The actual other who m eets me meets me in such a w ay that m y soul
comes in contact with his as with som ething that it is not and th at it
cannot become. My soul does not and cannot include the other, and
yet can nonetheless approach the other in this m ost real contact. This
other, w hat is more, is and rem ains over against the self, no m atter
w hat com pleteness the self m ay attain, as the other. ... All beings
existing over against me w ho become "included" in m y self are
possessed by it in this inclusion as an It. O nly then w hen, having
becom e aw are of the unincludable otherness of a being, I renounce all
claim to incorporating it in my soul, does it truly becom e T hou for me
(Eclipse of God 88-89).
This know ledge of the other - as other - is not som ething w e can possess; nor
is it som ething we can fit into our systems of thought or include as p a rt of
ourselves. T hrough our dialogical encounters w e come to know the other as
an in d ep en d en t partner in dialogue (not-I yet also not-It), an irreducibly and
radically other being w hom we cannot appropriate or possess b u t w hom we
can m eet - and, therefore, know - in m om ents of dialogue.
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It is through this know ing intercourse w ith others that w e recognize
their inexhaustible m eaning and w orth as fellow creatures w arran tin g our
respect. In turn, w e come to know our ow n lives and situations as em inently
m eaningful. For Buber, and for Bugbee, we can only know such m eaning
th ro u g h our full and com m itted participation in the situations in w hich we
find ourselves; w hen exam ined objectively as a detached observer an d not as
a participant, our fellow beings and our existential situation appear absurd
an d m eaningless. As Bugbee writes,
Perhaps the existence of things, the standing out of the distinct, can
only m ake sense, as we stand forth ourselves, as we are m ade to stand
forth. In ecstnsis (literally a 'being m ade to stand forth') the m eaning
of the existent becomes clear, and the infinite im portance of existent
things becomes clear. ... This is to say that there can be no conclusive
m eaning to our situation so long as it is abstractly considered” (Inw ard
M orning 106 & 126).
T hrough our w hole-hearted participation in existence - through our
"standing forth" - we come to know existence, instantiated in our ow n and
fellow existents', as m eaningful. Only through the know ledge received and
engendered in dialogue w ith our fellow beings is such m eaning accessible to
us. A nd yet, like the dialogical encounters them selves, we cannot go out
looking for and striving after such m eaning. It daw ns upon our lives as a gift,
w hich is open to acceptance or refusal; we can only m ake ourselves ready to
receive it and answ er for it w ith our actions. In his essay "Religion and
Philosophy" Buber writes,
M eaning is to be experienced in living action and suffering itself, in the
un red u ced im m ediacy of the m om ent. Of course, he w ho aim s at the
experiencing of experience will necessarily miss the m eaning, for he
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destroys the spontaneity of the mystery. Only he reaches the m eaning
w ho stands firm, w ithout holding back or reservation, before the
w hole m ight of reality and answers it in a living way. ... The reply of
the people of Israel on Sinai, "We will do it, we will hear it," expresses
the decisive w ith naive and unsurpassable pregnancy. The m eaning is
found through the engagem ent of one’s ow n person; it only reveals
itself as one takes part in its revelation" (Eclipse of God 35-36).
M eaning is accessible and open to us in the here and now of our everyday
lives. In fact, it is only through our unreserved participation in the here and
n ow that such m eaning is granted to us - in hearing and resp o n d in g to the
claim s of the m om ent as it addresses us in the m anifold situations of our
lives. As participants in dialogue we know the other in an intim ate and
decisive w ay, and correspondingly, we come to know m eaning in our lives as
well.

All of this is not to say that our know ledge about others - our I-It
know ledge - is unnecessary or unim portant. Q uite the opposite, it w ould be
im possible for us to live and act w ithout it. Only by exam ining our
experience in term s of space and time, cause and effect, species and genera and
sim ilar categories of analysis and interpretation could we m ake any sense ou t
of the w orld in which we live. Scientific and technical know ledge about
things - w hat m ay be called objective know ledge - is useful and im portant.
H ow ever, it is a detached know ing that, by definition, abstracts from our
know ledge of things encountered in their dep th and m eaning; the m eaning
of o u r co-participation in existence w ith our fellow beings is not accessible to
em pirical investigation or so-called objective know ledge. In his essay "On
Starting w ith Love" Bugbee writes,
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N ow objectivity is a stance in which we abstract from the evocative
w ay in w hich the beings w e represent to ourselves are present as
holding concrete m eaning for us. It is a kind of deliberate detachm ent
from the m utuality of existence, though a sense of that m u tu ality w ith
the beings w e are thus considering m ay well persist, and is further
im plicitly presum ed in the address of thinking an d speaking w ith
other persons, or as in the presence of other persons, w ith reference to
w hat is throw n into objective aspect. Still, the explicit rendering of
m eaning coordinate w ith the stance in objectivity abstracts from the
m utuality of existence betw een oneself and the beings thus being taken
into account. Likewise abstraction is m ade from the concern b u t for
w hich w e could not be called upon by anything to render w h at is called
for w ith respect to it, even if that be in giving an objective account of it
(7).
From the position of an objective investigator, we m ay accum ulate a great
deal of good and useful know ledge about the w orld in which we live. In our
attem pts to reduce suffering and prom ote justice and healing, such
inform ation m ay indeed come in very handy. Yet, by itself, it is a
directionless and, ironically, m eaningless know ledge. Only as it is inform ed
by our know ledge of others as inexhaustibly m eaningful and w orthy of
respect - a know ledge engendered in our im m ediate and intim ate intercourse
w ith them - does our empirical, objective - I-It - know ledge becom e valuable.
Respect and m eaning daw n upon us through participation in engaged and
destinate dialogue w ith our fellow beings.

T hroughout this chapter I have attem pted to describe our relationality,
for the m ost part, in term s of M artin Buber's distinction betw een I-Thou and
I-It relations. Up to this point I have contrasted the fundam ental postures or
m ovem ents w ith which we enter into I-Thou an d I-It relations, the generic
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traits and characteristics of these two types of relations, and the kinds of
know ledge we receive through our participation - or non-participation, as the
case m ay be - in these relations. N ow , how ever, I w ould like to close this
ch ap ter by exam ining how I-Thou and I-It relations com plem ent one another
in b u ild ing u p an integrated and active life.

A ccording to Buber, full and m eaningful hum an existence is
characterized by an ongoing m ovem ent betw een I-Thou and I-It relations. As
he w rites in I and Thou. "Mortal life is by its very n ature an oscillation
betw een You and It" (101). A nd earlier, he states, "The individual You must
■* becom e an It w hen the event of relation has run its course. The individual It
can become a You by entering into the event of relation" (84). A life of pure
I-Thou relation is neither possible or desirable; our dialogical I-Thou
encounters are fleeting and evanescent, brief m om ents of sheer reciprocity,
presence and im m ediacy. On the other hand, while it is all too possible to
live in a w orld defined exclusively in term s of I-It, such a life lacks m eaning,
authenticity and the neccesary experiential ground of decisive action. N either
I-Thou or I-It, taken in isolation from the other, can sustain us in m eaningful
an d active existence. As Friedm an explains, "[Ijt is not I-Thou or I-It which is
the basic choice bu t the healthy alternation betw een I-Thou and I-It" (Preface
to Life of Dialogue x).

This "healthy alternation," how ever, is no random bouncing back and
forth. As discussed earlier, the know ledge about things we gain from I-It
experiences is very useful in com prehending, analyzing and m anipulating

52

o u r w orld; such subjective-objective know ledge provides us w ith an orderly
an d fairly reliable vision of the w orld - a w orld that 'm akes sense' an d in
w hich w e can live. H ow ever, this know ledge about things cannot provide
m eaning for our lives or direction for our actions. As Buber em phatically
concludes, "And in all seriousness of truth, listen: w ithout It a h u m an being
cannot live. But w hoever lives only w ith that is no t hum an" (I a n d Thou
85). So, although both I-Thou and I-It relations are necessary, it is alw ays the
form er that m ust inform the latter and serve as the signpost. A ccording to
Buber,
Both [I-Thou and I-It] together build up hum an existence; it is only a
question of which of the tw o is at any time the architect and w hich is
the assistant. Rather, it is a question of w hether the I-Thou relation
rem ains the architect, for it is self-evident that it cannot be em ployed as
assistant. If it does not com m and, then it is already disappearing
(Eclipse of God 128).
T hrough our participation in dialogue with our fellow beings o u r lives are
graced w ith m eaning and we find ourselves em pow ered to act in a decisive
way. If our lives and actions are to approach authenticity, they m u st alw ays
be gro u n ded in the deep and decisive know ledge received in a n d through our
participation in such dialogue, even in those tim es w hen w e experience the
others w hom we m eet as Its; the Thou-saying spirit m ust perm eate our lives
an d inform our m anner of taking up with things in an en d u rin g way.

Furtherm ore, in the address of the other received in the m om ent of
dialogue, we find ourselves called forth to respond and, consequently, to
em body that response in the w orld of action. And yet, in actualizing our
response and acting upon it, we return to the w orld of It. A ccording to Buber,
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"All response binds the You into the It-world. That is the m elancholy of
m an, and that is his greatness. For thus know ledge, thus w orks, thus im age
an d exam ple come into being am ong the living" (I and Thou 89-90). W hile
o u r response m ay be grounded in our participation in I-Thou dialogue, it is
em bodied - incarnated - in the It-world. For Buber, the dynam ic w hereby our
dialogical encounters find em bodim ent in com m itted action, w hich he refers
to as Verwirklichung ("realization" or "actualization," d e p en d in g on
translations), provides a critical link betw een the w orlds of Thou and It.13
T hrough this process the It-world is illum inated and hallow ed w ith the
m eaningful and destinate force of the I-Thou encounter, and, at the sam e
tim e, the presence and m eaning received in that encounter is 'm ade flesh' actualized - in the w orld of experience. For the I, the actualization of the
dialogical encounter in action offers the possibility of integrity and unity in
the continuity of com m itted response. Born out of the m om ent of holy
intercourse, we find our actions inspirited w ith a sense of decisiveness and
resolve.

In trying to explain this process of actualization, Buber uses the
exam ple of the artist. In the conception of the creative act, the artist
encounters the sheer presence of the form. According to Buber, "The form
that confronts me I cannot experience nor describe; I can only actualize it.
A n d yet I see it, radiant in the splendor of the confrontation, far m ore clearly
th an all clarity of the experienced w orld. N ot as a thing am ong the 'internal'
things, n o t as a figment of the 'im agination,' but as w hat is present" (I and
T h o u 61). In the m om ent of encounter, the artist and the form enter into an
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actual relation. H ow ever, if the form is to find em bodim ent, the artist m ust
actualize it. In doing so, Buber writes, "I lead the form across - into the w orld
of It. The created w ork is a thing am ong things and can be experienced and
described as an aggregate of qualities" (I and Thou 61). As such, the artistic act
involves both participation in an actual relation and the actualization and
em bodim ent of that relation in the w orld of action.

Of course, given the incom prehensible and ineffable natu re of the IThou relation, such actualization will, of necessity, be incom plete. O ut of the
m u ltitu d e of potentially appropriate responses, the artist m ust choose one
an d com m it h im self/herself to its actualization. For Buber, this is the
"sacrifice" involved in the actualization process, w here "infinite possibility is
su rren d ered on the altar of the form" (I and Thou 60). To a certain degree, all
creative acts of em bodim ent necessarily involve the death of possibility.
H ow ever, through this sacrifice and death, resurrection also becom es a
possibility - not only for the artist but for the larger com m unity as well.
T hrough the artist's active and creative response to the sponsoring relational
event, h e /s h e actualizes the encounter and allows it to be shared. Robert
W ood explains this in the following way:
But in all this there is the alternation of the actual and the latent; once
achieved, relation is recognized as that which is hid d en w ithin the
Thou-becom e-It, and from time to time it can be actualized - provided
one persists in faithful openness. The situation of thinghood envelops
the Thou as a chrysallis envelops the butterfly. But in being reduced to
this state, the It is located as som ething that can become Thou for
others. Hence the It-w orld has a function to play that is essential.
Relation, how ever, is first (62).
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In o u r response to the dialogical m om ent, faithfully articulated, we bear
w itness to the reality and truth present in the encounter. In doing so,
how ever, our w itness becomes a thing am ong things, but it is a thing which
points to, and invites participation in, the ongoing life of dialogue. Like the
actual encounters them selves, our faithful testim ony m ay w ork evocatively u p o n ourselves and others - and call us forth in renew ed readiness to m eet
ou r fellows in dialogue.

At this point, then, we have come full circle. Beginning w ith an
account of the faith posture in which we m ust necessarily stand if w e hope to
hear the call of the other as it addresses us and, thus, encounter the other in
dialogue, w e have concluded by describing the alternation betw een I-Thou
an d I-It relations which, in turn, m ay engender such a disposition and point
us to w ard future participation in I-Thou dialogue. As w e go forth to m eet
others in faith, we m ay come to know them - intim ately and decisively - and
find m eaning and truth in our lives; in doing so, our faith is u p h eld and
deepened as it finds em bodim ent in our com m itted response. It is this
response, exam ined in term s of our ethical responsibility, that I will exam ine
in the follow ing chapter.
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EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - K aufm an, in his 1970 translation, uses I-You instead of I-Thou. H e does so
to preserve the intim ate and fam iliar nature of Ich-Du and, at the sam e time,
d o w n p lay the over-em phasis on the theological associations ro o ted in the
tendency of m odern English readers to understand "Thou" as referring
exclusively to God. See K aufm an's lengthy translator's introduction for a
m ore com plete account of his reasons for preferring I-You over I-Thou.
2 - For Buber, "The w orld is twofold for m an ." Given that w e enter relations
from the stan d p o in t of hum ans, w e can only legitim ately describe those
relations in anthropological terms. The ontology Buber presents here is a
lim ited, regional one. See Ray H art's U nfinished M an and the Im agination
for a discussion of regional ontologies, especially pp.91-92.
3 - A lthough often used interchangeably, especially in English, w e m ust
distinguish betw een faith, as I wish to use it here, and belief, w hich
com m only refers to our intellectual assent to a truth claim or proposition
such as "I believe that the w orld is flat," or "I believe that God exists." For an
excellent analysis of faith and belief along these lines see W ilfred Cantw ell
Sm ith’s The M eaning and End of Religion and Faith and Belief.
4 - See Bugbee's "Le Recueillement et L' Accueil ," especially page 9, for a
discussion of availability and its central im portance in M arcel's thought.
5- Both Bugbee and Marcel m ake sim ilar m oves in their use of "metatechnical" and "meta-objective" as referring to being and beings in a w ay that
defies charaterization and reduction into the fram ew ork of a subject's
know ing and representing an object. I will take up w ith Bugbee's
u n d erstan d in g of the meta-objective categories of finality, necessity and
certainty in considerable detail in C hapter 2.
6 - A note on translations: Smith translates Buber's Begegnung as "meeting,"
w hile K aufm an translates the sam e w ord as "encounter." In K aufm an's
translation of I and Thou this passage reads, "All actual life is encounter" (62).
For Buber, Begegnung alw ays describes the I-Thou relation (Ich-Du
Beziehung ) and never the I-It relation (Jch-Es Verhnltnis ). Thus, m eeting
here refers to the m eeting betw een an I and a Thou. In this paper, I w ill use
m eeting and encounter interchangeably.
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7 - Friedm an's choice of terms is som ew hat unfortunate for my purposes
here. In his discussion of the twofold nature of M arcel’s disponibilite ,
Bugbee distinguishes betw een "reflexive" and w hat we m ight call referential
disponibilite . In his essay "Ly Exigence Ontologique," Bugbee describes the
inerplay betw een the two as follows:
Reflexive disponibilite is the deepening of concern in its radical
character—and ultim ately no less than a w illing disposition of oneself
in accord with being unconditionally claimed. But it is in an d o u t of
being so claim ed that we can come to 'hear' and to heed beings in their
g rounded claim upon us; that hearing and heeding is the m anner of
our disponibilite in the direct engagem ent of concern by beings
occupying our attention; accordingly disponibilite is also coordinate
w ith respect to them (5).
For M arcel and Bugbee, reflexive disponibilite is som ething like a prim ary
aw areness of our situation as one in which we find ourselves as given along
w ith o u r fellow beings who are likewise given in our m utual co-existence. It
is out of such recognition that we find ourselves called upon to m ake
ourselves available to our fellows - in the referential sense. Thus, it is akin to
the fundam ental posture w e have been discussing and com pletely antithetical
to w hat Friedm an m eans by reflexion as he uses the term. In a translator's
note to Buber's essay entitled "Dialogue," Friedm an describes reflexion as
"...the essence of the 'm onological' life, in which the other is not really m et as
the other, bu t m erely as a part of the m onological self, in an Erlebnis or inner
experience w hich has no objective im port: w hat happens is that the self
'curves back on itself" (Buber, Betw een 206).
8 - For the purposes of this paper, it is im portant not to read "persons" w ithin
the fram ew ork of the noem atic prejudice we are attem pting to overcom e.
The category of "persons” is not lim ited exclusively to hum an persons. I will
follow the inclusive personalism of Erazim Kohak, here, as he presents it in
The Em bers and the Stars. According to Kohak,
To speak of the w orld as 'personal' m eans to conceive of it as
structured in term s of relations best understood on the m odel of
m eaningful relations am ong persons. It is to conceive of it as peopled
by beings w ho are sim ilarly best understood on the m odel of persons,
m odified as needed, rather than on the m odel of m atter in m otion,
raised to infinite complexity(209).
Thus, for Kohak- and for us - "[A] person, ultim ately, is not just a being w ho
possesses a psyche or m anifests certain personality traits as m uch as a being
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w ho stands in a m oral relation to us, a being we encounter as a Thou" (The
Em bers and the Stars 128-129). Throughout this paper, then, "person" refers
to a being w ith w hom we may engage in authentic I-Thou dialogue and
should be understood in the m ost inclusive, noetic sense of that term.
9 - A t this point in the paper I am m erely trying to outline the basic
characteristics of I-Thou and I-It relations in general terms. Therefore, I w ish
to hold off on m y (and Buber's) attem pt to answ er the obvious question: H ow
d o these "lifeless and speechless objects" (sic) reciprocate? For now , I will
follow Buber and say that reciprocity w ith such beings involves "the
reciprocity of being itself" (Afterw ord to I and Thou, 173). I will take u p with
this question in m ore detail in C hapter Three, w here I w ill p resen t Buber's
defense of his claim that reciprocal I-Thou relations can and do occur betw een
h u m an s and anim als, plants and rocks.
10 - A lthough this quote occurs in the context of Buber's discussion of our
relations w ith G od, it also holds true for the whole of our relational lives,
including our relations w ith our fellow finite beings. As w ith the other
im plicitly theological references I have m ade up to this point in the paper, I
ask the read er’s patience until C hapter 2, w hen I will address Buber's theology
an d philosophy of religion explicitly and in some depth.
11 - Two notes here: First, my discussion of integrity and w holeness in this
p arag rap h brings us to the topic of a life informed by w hat can be called a
sense of vocation; as an active, non-static category it im plies that our lives
becom e inform ed w ith direction and follow along a path that becom es a way.
But here, we m ove into the realm of Buber's - and Bugbee's - philosophical
anthropology, a subject I will discuss in detail in C hapter 2. Second, the m ore
static connotations of w holeness still persist. And yet, Buber m akes it clear
th at w e never become whole in any finished or once-and-for-all sense; to use
Ray H art's language, we cannot bridge the "ontological difference" betw een
w ho we are and w ho we are to become - between w ho w e actually and
potentially are - in any absolute sense. I think the w holeness of w hich Buber
speaks is m ore akin to finding direction and vocation along the course of
one's life. T hroughout the paper, it is this m ore fluid, process-oriented
m eaning of w holeness and integrity that I mean.
12 - Because "eternal life" is so easily m isinterpreted, I w ould suggest that
Bugbee's sense of "finality," as he presents it in Inw ard M orning, is m ore akin
to w h at Buber m eans here. For a m ore detailed discussion of finality, see
Bugbee's Inw ard M orning: I will discuss Bugbee's u n d erstan d in g of finality in
som e detail in the next chapter.
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13- Friedm an follows Sm ith's original translation of Verwirklichung as
"realization," w hereas Kaufm an opts for "actualization." See Friedm an's
Preface to M artin Buber: The Life of Dialogue for a m ore detailed explanation
of the translators' choice of words.

A CORRELATIVE ETHIC OF RESPONSIBILITY

As I tried to show in C hapter One of this essay, our existence,
u n d ersto o d dialogically, is essentially a m atter of address and response. In the
m u ltitu d e of relational events that constitute our daily lives, w e find
ourselves addressed in a w ay that calls forth our response. In turn, w e
resp o n d through our w ords and actions or, in other cases, our silences and
non-actions; even our failure to hear a n d /o r respond is a form of response.
As relational beings, w e are forever placed in the position of being responsible
- answ erable - to the address received in each new an d unforeseeable
relational event. As w e participate in these events, w e find ourselves called,
claim ed, and it is our responsibility to respond in an ap propriate and decisive
m an n er - in an ethical m anner.

This dynam ic of address and response - claim and responsibility - lies at
the h eart of a dialogical understanding of ethical responsibility. W ithin the
context of a philosophy of dialogue, ethical decision-m aking an d action are
n o t m atters of applying or prescribing general or universal principles to the
p articu lar situations in w hich we find ourselves and acting accordingly.
Instead, ethics begins w ith our being truly present and attentive to the
concrete situation and venturing to respond to the unique and
u n p reced en ted claim s of that m om ent. As M artin Buber explains in his essay
e n title d "Dialogue,"
The idea of responsibility is to be brought back from the province of
specialized ethics, of an "ought" that sw ings free in the air, into that of
lived life. G enuine responsibility exists only w here there is real
responding.
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R esponding to w hat?
To w hat happens to one, to w hat is to be seen and heard and felt. Each
concrete hour allotted to the person, w ith its context d raw n from the
w orld and from destiny, is speech for the m an w ho is attentive.
A ttentive, for no m ore than that is needed in order to m ake a
beginning w ith the reading of the signs that are given you. ...
It will, then, be expected of the attentive m an that he faces creation as it
happens. It happens as speech, and not as speech ru sh in g ou t over his
head but as speech directed precisely at him (Between 16)
As Buber suggests, our ethical responsibility begins as w e take u p w ith things
in a sp irit of attentiveness, availability and respect - that fundam ental posture
of faith described in Chapter One. Only as we step out to m eet our fellow
beings in such a m anner do we find ourselves addressed by them and called
forth to respond. O ur capacity to say Thou to our fellow creatures is a
necessary precondition of our participation in genuine I-Thou dialogue. A nd
it is here, in and through our participation in dialogical encounters (and,
m ore generally, in life lived in the m ode of dialogue), that w e are em pow ered
to com m it ourselves in decisive ethical action. Ethical responsibility
involves, above all, the actualization of our I-Thou encounters in the w orld
of action. T hat is, as we come to know the other as Thou, we come to know
w h at is asked of us (required of us), and our actions, if they are to be ethical,
w ill em body the know ledge and m eaning received in the m om ent of
dialogue. The address received in dialogue is not neutral; it carries w ith it an
im perative - a com pelling claim to respond in a decisive and com m itted
m a n n e r.
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H ow , specifically, our response will be actualized is im possible to say
outside of the situation in w hich w e find ourselves called upon. G enuine
ethical responsibility, by its very nature, cannot be prescribed. U niversal
m oral law s, categorical im peratives, and the like m ay, at tim es, be useful, b u t
they cannot rem ove from us the burd en of our responsibility in the particular
an d utterly unique and unforeseeable situations in w hich w e find ourselves.
O ur responsibility can only be fulfilled in responding to the claim s of each
p a rticu la r relational m om ent.

For Buber, the m om ent, received in depth, speaks to us in w hat m ay be
u nderstood as a threefold way. First, and m ost obviously, we are addressed by
the particular finite other w hom we m eet and w ith w hom we have to do.
H ow ever, in being so addressed, we are also confronted w ith the m eaning of
o u r existence as called upon by beings who, although radically other, are, at
the sam e time, co-existents w ith w hom we share our being - a being w hich w e
d id not choose or originate. In traditional theological language, w e find
ourselves together w ith our fellows as creatures - created, derivative,
sponsored beings. And, w hat is more, this creatureliness involves a task; we
are called, out of creation and in the depths of each m om ent, to becom e the
p articular beings w ho w e are created to be. O ur proper vocation is to actualize
o u r unique potentialities, and w e do this insofar as w e truly respond to the
evocative speech of our fellow creatures.1 A nd lastly, in the address of the
m om ent acknow ledged in its fullness and m eaning, we receive the call of the
C reator w ho speaks to us through our fellow creatures an d who, in creating
us, sponsors us and sends us forth along our w ay - w ho offers us a destiny we
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are free to fulfill. Thus, the call of the other, the call of our creaturely task,
an d the call of our sponsoring and abiding Creator speak together in the
d ep th s of the m om ent, decisively received, and charge our dialogical
encounters w ith im perative force, em pow ering us to resp o n d in a decisive,
com m itted m anner. T hat is, through our engaged participation in these
events, w e come to know w hat is necessary in this our unique situation, and
w e find, at the sam e time, the capacity to comm it ourselves in necessary
action.

In attem pting to outline a dialogical understanding of ethical
responsibility, I will begin this chapter by examining, in greater detail, how
the call of the other, the call of our creaturely task, and the call of our Creator
each address us in and through our participation in dialogical encounters,
claim ing us and calling us forth into com m itted, ethical action. I will suggest
th at in the claim of the situation, heard singularly and in its entirety, our
lives are inform ed w ith a fundam ental m eaning, an d w e receive a
com pelling im perative to incarnate that m eaning in our actions. A fter
attem p tin g to outline this 'rhythm of ethical responsibility' I will close by
show ing the experiential, non-prescriptive and non-verifiable n atu re of such
an ethic an d restating the necessity of grounding our responsibility in our
p articipation in dialogical encounters w ith our fellow beings.

W ithin each relational m om ent, w e find ourselves ad d ressed , m ost
im m ediately and apparently, by the particular, finite other w ho crosses our
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path. As suggested in C hapter One, the m ultitude of others w hom w e m eet
have a w ord to speak to us, which, w hen decisively received in dialogue, calls
us forth to respond; in fact, the very m eaning of this w ord of address lies in its
evocative force. As Em m anuel Levinas explains, "The essence of the 'w ord'
does n o t initially consist in its objective m eaning or descriptive possibilities,
b u t in the response that it elicits" (142). W ithin the dialogical, I-Thou
encounter, the beings w hom we m eet speak to us evocatively, an d w e find
ourselves called upon to answ er their w ord of address; we are responsible to
th e m .

O ur participation in such dialogical m om ents grounds genuine ethical
responsibility. Only as we m eet the other in dialogue do w e hear the w ord of
ad d ress that elicits our ethical response. As Buber w rites in I and T hou, "Only
those w ho know relation and w ho know the presence of You have the
capacity for decision" (100). Q uite simply, ethical decision-m aking begins
w ith o u r participation in I-Thou encounters, w hich come to fruition as we
a ttem p t to actualize them in our various actions an d non-actions.

As such, we practice genuine responsibility, at the m ost basic level, to
the others w hom we m eet - that is, w hom we m eet as Thous. As described in
C h ap ter One, in the reciprocal, present, im m ediate and w hole I-Thou
encounter, w e come to know the other in a deep and intim ate way. The other
speaks to us, not as an object to be analyzed a n d /o r m anipulated for our
private p urposes and according to our intentions, b u t as an in d ep en d en t
p artn er in dialogue - a unique and wholly other being. It is the voice of the
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other, h eard as such, that m akes ethical claims upon us an d elicits our
response. In his essay "The Q uestion to the Single One" Buber w rites,
"Responsibility presupposes one w ho addresses m e prim arily. T hat is, from a
realm in dependent of myself, and to w hom I am answ erable. ... It can only be
experienced w hen one is not closed to the otherness, the ontic an d prim al
otherness of the other" (Betw een 45). In the m om ent of dialogue w e find
ourselves responsible to the other w hom we m eet, an other th at is neither It
no r I b u t Thou. As Levinas explains, "For only w hat is other can elicit an act
of responsibility. Buber attem pts to m aintain the radical otherness of the
Thou in the Thou relation: The I does not construe the T hou as object, nor
ecstatically identify itself w ith the Thou, for the term s rem ain in d ep en d en t
despite the relation into w hich they enter" (141). For Buber, w e cannot
practice responsibility to the other if we reduce it to just another object am ong
objects; objects cannot claim our responsibility. H ow ever, neither can w e
include or appropriate the other w ithin ourselves; we are no t responsible to
ourselves. If the other is to engender and elicit our ethical response, it m ust
speak to us of its singular, irreducible, independent, and uncanny otherness.
Q uite sim ply, it m ust speak to us of itself, and w e m ust hear it as such. For, as
H en ry Bugbee points out, "Things say them selves, univocally, unisonously,
form ulating a tautology of infinite significance" (Inw ard M orning 141). As
w e m eet w ith others in authentic dialogue, they speak to us of their deep and
inexhaustible otherness, and their voices resonate w ithin us, stirring us up
an d calling us forth into decisive and com m itted response. A cknow ledged in
their ow n right, they rightfully claim our responsibility and, at the sam e time,
ren ew an d deepen our respect.
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H ow ever, this em phasis upon the otherness of the beings w hom we
m eet in dialogue does not im ply contrariety or 'atom ic' isolation. These
beings are, indeed, other, bu t they are other in such a w ay that they can be
m et. In turn, as we m eet these others as independent partners in dialogue,
w e come to know them as co-existents, fellow creatures, kin. A ccording to
Bugbee,
Things exist in their ow n right; it is a lesson that escapes us except as
they hold us in awe. ... A philosophy of the given m isses the point
w hich does not think of things as given in their independence.
Yet the truth of the independence of things should not lead us to
succum b to a sense of isolation and insularity am ong independent
existents. The independence of things is no w arrant for an
objectivizing m ode of thought about them , for taking an abstract point
of view tow ard them and ourselves. For concretely, experience of the
presence of things is also complete intim acy w ith them , the opposite of
estrangem ent from them and ourselves. The gift of things in their
independence is also the gift of ourselves together w ith them (Inw ard
M orning 164).
To acknow ledge the independence and otherness of the beings and things w e
com e across in our daily lives does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
they are, therefore, atom ic objects existing over-against us and from w hom
w e are separated by an unbridgeable and, finally, incom m unicable gulf. The
either-or choice betw een fusion/identification and atom ism is a false one,
born of ideologies trapped w ithin an exclusively subjective-objective (I-It)
u n d erstan d in g of our relationality.2 In the reciprocal and dialogical
encounter - in the reception of the given thing as presence, to follow Bugbee's
use of M arcel’s term s in the quote above - we m eet w hat is other not as an It an object - b u t as a Thou, a fellow being and co-participant in the m utuality of
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our shared existence. In and through our participation in I-Thou dialogue we
com e to know the beings w hom we m eet as both other an d kin, stan d in g side
by side as fellow m em bers of w hat M aurice Friedm an calls the "com m unity
of otherness" (T ouchstones 268).

Bound together w ithin this existential com m unity of otherness, we
hear the address of the particular being w hom we m eet as the call of the other
w h o is, at the sam e time, also our fellow creature. A nd if the otherness of our
fellow s, received in depth, elicits our respectful response, so too, w ill the
realization of our m utual standing and co-creaturely kinship as it daw ns
u p o n us through the gracious advent of our dialogical encounters. As we
com e to know our fellow beings as kin, we come to know them as
engendering and w arranting our respect. According to Bugbee, "It is in and
o u t of that m utuality appreciated as final and ultim ate that we can affirm
things and other persons in their independence, and also at the sam e tim e reflexively - ourselves. This affirm ation is respect" ("The Sublime" 5). O ur
capacity for respect and, in turn, respectful response is gro u n d ed in our
p articipation in authentic encounter, through w hich we come to know the
oth er as kin and become aw are of ourselves as bound together w ith one
an o th er in a shared existence.

O ur ethical responsibility will, then, involve the active em bodim ent
(or, in Buber's language, actualization) of the respect engendered a n d /o r
deep en ed in our dialogical encounters w ith the beings w hom we m eet - an d
com e to know - as both other and kin. As other, we becom e aw are of these
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beings as existing in their ow n right, independent of our purposes, desires
and intentions. They do not exist m erely as psychological extensions of our
m in d s or as tools and resources for our use; their being an d value lies beyond
o u r m ental constructs and instrum entality. As such, they are to be treated not
m erely as m eans to our ends bu t also as ends in them selves. Therefore, as
F riedm an points out in his discussion of Buber’s ethics, "Buber's concept of
the responsibility of an I to a Thou is closely sim ilar to Kant's second
form ulation of the categorical im perative: N ever treat one's fellows as a
m eans only but alw ays also as an end of value in himself" (Life of Dialogue
200). Yet even here, w here Buber and Kant seem to be saying the sam e thing,
there is a crucial difference. W hereas K ant comes to this principle
universally and abstractly (and exclusively, in so far as he lim its its
application to our treatm ent of rational beings), attem pting to apply it to each
p articu lar situation as it presents itself, Buber's ethic of responsibility is rooted
in our genuine participation in the particular situation in w hich w e find
ourselves and m ust be renew ed and re-tested again an d again in the unique
an d unforeseeable m om ent of each new encounter. Friedm an attem pts to
articulate this fundam ental difference as follows:
To Kant the respect for the dignity of others grow s out of one's
ow n dignity as a rational being bound to act according to
universal laws. For Buber the concern for the other as an end in
him self grow s out of one's direct relation to this other an d to
that higher end w hich he serves through the fulfilm ent of his
created uniqueness. Thus Kant's im perative is essentially
subjective (the isolated individual) a n d objective (universal
reason) w hereas Buber's is dialogical (Life of Dialogue 200).
For Buber, our respect for the other is grounded in our hearing its address spoken o u t of all its unique, irreducible and uncanny otherness - in the
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m om ent of dialogue. O nly as we receive the w ord of the other as a Thou, and
not m erely and exclusively an It, can we venture to respond in a truly
respectful - ethical m anner.

In addition, if our aw areness of the otherness of the being w hom we
m eet in dialogue evokes our respect for it as an end in itself, th en our
sim ilarly experiential aw areness of the kinship of our co-creatureliness will
call forth our respectful solidarity w ith and com passion for our fellow beings.
A s kin, w e share an intim acy and affinity w ith our fellow beings, an d we
recognize them , even in their independence, as co-participants in a com m on
situation; w e are all, so to speak, in the sam e ontic boat. Born ou t of the
acknow ledgem ent of our com m on lot, w e treat the fellow being w hom we
m eet w ith the respect - even love - due one w ho is "like yourself." H ere,
again, Buber arrives at the sam e point, although again via a different route, as
a traditional ethical norm: G od's injunction in Leviticus 19:18 to, "Love your
n eighbour as one like yourself" (Between 51). In m eeting our fellow beings as
Thou, w e come to know and respect them as creatures like ourselves, and
our actions tow ard them , if they are to be ethical, will em body that
know ledge, com passion and respect. But again, this cannot be reduced to the
rote application of a universal norm to the particular situations that arise; our
com passion, respect and consequent response - the fulfilm ent of our
responsibility - are inseparable from the unique relation out of w hich they
arise an d becom e actual. Thus, in his book Touchstones of Reality. Friedm an
in terp rets, and qualifies, Buber's use of the biblical com m and as follows:
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H ere the true m eaning of "love your neighbor" unfolds itself: "Deal
lovingly w ith your neighbor as one equal to yourself," as y o u r fellow
creature, your brother, your "Thou."
You cannot "deal lovingly w ith your neighbor as one equal to yourself"
as a general principle, bu t only in a m utual relationship in a concrete
situation (266).3
T hrough our participation in the I-Thou relation, w e come to know the being
w hom w e m eet as our neighbor and our kin - a being w ith w hom w e share
o u r existence. To know our fellow beings in such a decisive and intim ate w ay
is to know them as w arranting our com passion, com m itm ent, and respect.

Initially, then, ethical responsibility involves hearing the
ad d ress of the other as it speaks to us out of both its otherness and its fellowcreatureliness; ethical responsibility begins w ith m eeting the other as a Thou,
a being w ho is neither I nor It. Only as a Thou can such beings elicit our
respect and com passion and call us forth to incarnate that sam e respect and
com passion in com m itted, ethical response. Therefore, although certain
m oral principles and com m andm ents m ay be suggestive and helpful, they
cannot substitute for our engagem ent in genuine dialogue w ith our fellow
beings. Ethical responsibility involves responding w hole-heartedly to the
voice of the other w hom we m eet as Thou in the concrete and u tterly unique
m om ent of dialogue; unless we hear that voice as it speaks to us, how can we
find w ithin ourselves the capacity for authentic response?
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In the m om ent of dialogue w e find ourselves addressed by the beings
w h o m w e m eet, and through our participation in such dialogical encounters
w e becom e aw are of ourselves as called upon. That is, w e recognize our
existential situation as one of standing together w ith our fellow beings in the
m an n er of being called upon and, consequently, of being answ erable. This is
the m ean ing of w h at M arcel and Bugbee refer to as "Vexigence ontologique
"the w ay in w hich w e are as called upon" ("L'Exigence Ontologique" 16). In
each particular situation we find ourselves called u p o n by the other w hom
w e m eet and w ith w hom we have to do, but, underlying and circum scribing
each particular relational event, we are likewise addressed by the very
m eaning of our existence as one w ho is called upon. In turn, w e practice
responsibility for this m eaning - w e participate in m eaningful existence - in
so far as w e respond truly to the situations of our lives. As such, b oth the call
of the other - of our fellow being - and the call of our unique existence speak
together in the relational m om ent, claim ing us and calling forth our
com m itted, ethical response.

If o ur existence is defined in term s of our being beings w ho are called
u p o n - both by our fellow creatures and from the root, existentially, so to
speak - then w e m ay rightly speak of our existence as assum ing the character
of a vocation, in the Latin sense of vocatio : a calling or sum m ons, an
invitation. A nd, according to Bugbee, this is, indeed, the case: "Our lives are
in essence vocational" ("Thoughts on Creation" 5). H ere the m eaning of life
as an ongoing dialogue carries existential im port. U nderstood in term s of a

72

vocation - a calling - our very existence speaks to us in the m anner of a
fund am ental address to w hich we m ust venture to respond. In turn, w e
practice responsibility not only in and for each relational m om ent b u t also w rit large - for the m eaning and purpose of our creaturely being. T ow ards the
end of In w ard M orning Bugbee writes,
I think of reality as ever questioning, calling upon us, as if in syllables
sh ap ed from a m outh, w hich issue alm ost soundlessly. In a noisy soul
this call is utterly ignored. But as true stillness comes upon us, we
hear, w e hear, and we learn that our w hole lives m ay have the
character of finding that anthem w hich w ould be native to our ow n
tongue, and w hich alone can be the true answ er for each of us to the
questioning, the calling, the dem and for ultim ate reckoning w hich
devolves upon us (221).
As our lives come to us in the m anner of a calling, so it is w ith our lives that
w e m u st answ er this sam e call.

Thus, like a dialogue, the vocational character of our lives is essentially
twofold: call and answ er, claim and responsibility. Buber addresses both
aspects of our existential vocation w hen he w rites, "[T]rue h u m an existence ...
m eans being sent and being commissioned" (Eclipse of God 69). In speaking
of ourselves as "sent" he acknow ledges the m eaning of our creatureliness, as
discussed above. We exist as creatures, created beings, originated and
sponsored from a source outside ourselves. "For one is anim ated; a n d one
does not anim ate himself" (Bugbee, "On Starting w ith Love" 17). As
creatures w ho are sent forth into existence, our very being comes to us as a
gift, and w e recognize it as such as we become m ore clearly aw are of our
creatureliness.
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But, according to Buber, we are not only sent; w e are also
com m issioned. That is, our creatureliness involves a task; w e are sent into
existence w ith a purpose. In G ood and Evil Buber w rites,
M y uniqueness, this unrepeatable form of being here, no t analysable
into any elem ents and not com poundable out of any, I experience as a
designed or preform ed one, entrusted to m e for execution, although
everything that affects m e participates in this execution. T hat a unique
hu m an being is created does not m ean that it is p u t into being for a
m ere existence, but for the fulfilm ent of a being-intention, an intention
of being w hich is personal, not how ever in the sense of a free
unfolding of infinite singularities, but of a realisation of the right in
infinite personal shapes (142-143).
As creatures, w e are created, intended for a task peculiar to each of us, and
th at task is to become w ho w e are created to be. To repeat a statem ent quoted
in the Introduction to this paper, according to Buber, "Every m an's forem ost
task is the actualization of his unique, unprecedented and never-recurring
potentialities, an d not the repitition of som ething that another, an d be it even
the greatest, has already achieved" (H asidism and M odern M an 140). O ur
true vocation, the task we have been sent forth to accom plish, is to become
ever m ore fully the unique creatures we are called u p o n to be. This is the
m eaning of the H asidic saying attributed to Rabbi Z usya of H anipol, which
Buber recounts in his Tales of the H asidim : Early M asters as follows: "Before
his death, Rabbi Z usya said, 'In the coming w orld, they will no t ask me: W hy
w ere you not Moses? They will ask me: W hy w ere you not Zusya?'" (251).
For both Buber and the H asid, each one of us is called to fulfill our particular
task - a task w hich no one else can perform and w hose responsibility we
cannot abrogate. Only we - each one of us - can become m ore truly ourselves.
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H ow ever, this does not m ean that our essential task is to achieve
in d iv id u al perfection or to attain som e pre-ordained and fixed vision of an
ideal o r potential self; our uniquely personal vocation is not a m atter of selfrealization, nor is it a term inus or goal tow ard w hich w e strive. As creatures
w h o exist as co-participants in an ongoing process of creation, w e can only
becom e w ho w e are called to be (and receive that m easure of authenticity in
o u r lives) through m eaningful and decisive relations w ith o u r fellow
creatures. A ccording to Bugbee, "We are such as we are in answ ering these
beings in their address to us - in that m eaning they come to hold in our
receiving them , w orked out answeringly. ... [0 ]n e ’s m ode of being only
receives definition in and through the m anifold of relations an d
u n d ertak in g s through w hich one participates in the w orld" ("Loneliness,
Solitude" 4 & 5). We are who we are in and through our various relations
w ith o u r fellow beings. If we are to become m ore authentically w ho w e are
called to be, then our m eetings w ith our fellow beings m ust carry the w eight
of authenticity. Therefore, entering dialogical relations w ith our fellow s goes
h a n d in h a n d w ith fulfilling our essential task. For, as M aurice Friedm an
explains, "If m an becom es authentic, if the person becom es w h at only he can
an d should become, it is through responding w ith his w hole being to the
ad d ress of the unique situation which confronts him , through becom ing
w hole and finding his true personal direction" ("Bases" 179). O u r personal
vocation calls to us tim e and time again in the m ultitude of relational events
th at m ake up our lives. As we engage ourselves in dialogue, we heed the call
an d answ er for the potential m eaning in our lives, and, in doing so, o u r lives
are directed along a path - the pathw ay of dialogue - ever open and calling us
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o n w ard to renew ed attentiveness and responsibility. A nd, it is along the w ay,
w hich w e m ust continually w ork out and discover for ourselves w ith each
step, th at our lives find a degree of integrity and our actions m anifest an
en d u rin g constancy and com m itm ent. According to Buber,
O nly on the path of true intercourse w ith the things and beings does
m an attain to true life ... [MJore than ever, existence in reality is
recognizable as an unbroken chain of m eetings, each of w hich
dem ands the person for w hat can be fulfilled by him , just by him and
just in this hour. In opposition to the illusion of ostensibly-attained
perfection, as it prevailed in the confusion of the false M essianic, here
stands the life of the everyday, which has found its fulfillm ent as the
true m iracle (Origin and M eaning 86).
In w orking out our w ay along this path, the unique and personal task of our
existence calls to us, and, in responding truly, we find that m easure of
m eaning and fulfillm ent accessible to us - here and now , m iraculously.

H ow ever, just as the struggle to fulfill our essential task - o u r vocation
- is not a m atter of self-realization, neither is the p ath along w hich we
incarnate and enact our personal direction one of blind, indeterm inable fate.
For although we are called unto and along our w ay, we alone m u st practice
responsibility for the m anner of our response in each new m om ent of
m eeting and for the m eaning and direction of our lives. O nly as w e take this
responsibility (often heavy and burdensom e w ith ever new claim s, dem ands,
choices) upon ourselves, can we find genuine, liberating freedom in our
liv es.
In resp o n ding decisively to the dem ands of the m om ent, we are free to fulfill
ou r unique, creaturely task. Thus, according to Bugbee, our existence comes
to us not as inscrutable fate bu t as a destiny we are free to fulfill - or refuse. In
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In w ard M orning he distinguishes betw een fate and destiny in the follow ing
way:
C are m ust be exercised in w orking out the idea of having a destiny to
fulfill so as to extricate it, for one thing, from the idea of having a fate,
of being fated. It seems to m e that I am invited by the idea of fate to
think from the standpoint of a certain inner paralysis often reflected in
speaking of m an's helplessness in the hands of fate. O n the other h and
the idea of having a destiny to fulfill seem s to invite m e to think from
the stan d p o in t of responsibility, as one responsive to a call: a call
clarifying itself in its constancy as w e respond w ith relevance in
m ultiform situations engendering it: a call im parting to sustained
courses of action a vocational significance w hich is at the h eart of not
acting in vain.
The idea of fate not only suggests that we act in vain; it tends to
controvert the very idea of our acting. The idea of a destiny to be
fulfilled suggests that we are followed w herever we go, w hatever we
do, by a basic significance in term s of which our lives m ust be
construed, and that we act in vain only as we fail to respond
consonantly w ith the significance aligning the otherw ise contingent
m om ents of our lives (144-145).
As opposed to doom ing us to a fate tow ard w hich w e m ust passively resign
ourselves, the call of our existence offers us a destiny we are free to fulfill
insofar as we practice genuine responsibility for it in the course of our beingw ith-others. In turn, as we struggle to fulfill this vocation, our lives are
inform ed by a sense of direction and w holeness out of which we are
em p o w ered to respond to the claims of each new situation w ith p u rp o se and
integrity. W e are free to act, w ithin the lim itations - the liberating lim itations
- of the situation in which we find ourselves, in a m eaningful an d ethical
m a n n e r.

This aw areness of ourselves as creatures w ith a unique and particular
task - a destiny to fulfill - carries w ith it a pow erful im perative force. The
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creatures w e are created to become are also, then, the creatures w e ought to
becom e. For Buber, this ever-grow ing, ever-changing aw areness of w ho we
o u g h t to be, as well as the recognition of the gap betw een w ho w e are and
w ho w e ought to be, are central to his understanding of the role of conscience
in ethical decision-m aking and action. In his essay "Religion a n d Ethics"
Buber describes w hat he m eans by conscience as follows:
It is the individual's aw areness of w hat he is "in truth," of w h at in his
u n iq u e and non-repea table created existence he is intended to be. From
this aw areness, w hen it is fully present, the com parison betw een w hat
one actually is and w hat one is intended to be can em erge. W hat is
found is m easured against the image, no so-called ideal im age, nor
anything im agined by m an, but an image arising out of that m ystery of
being itself that we call the person (Eclipse of God 95-96).
As I have already said, in each m om ent we are called upon not only by the
other being w hom we m eet but also by the very m eaning of our created being
- o u r creaturely task. H ow we respond to the m om ent is determ ined by the
voice of the other as it speaks to us as well as by our u n d erstan d in g of w ho we
are called to be and how we are to fulfill that destiny as it comes to us in this
p articu lar relational event. That is, we m ust take stock of ourselves, deciding
and acting out of the depths of who we are and who we are called to be; we
m u st answ er for ourselves and for the direction of our lives in the present
m o m en t of decision. Thus, our ethical responsibility involves not only
resp o n d in g to the call of the other but also from the d epths of our conscience ou r reflective recognition of our being as called upon to perform a particular
task th at has been entrusted to us. This is the reflective and inescapably
personal elem ent of all truly ethical decision-m aking and action. A ccording
to Friedm an,
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It is only w hen I ask, "What ought I do in this situation?" - not w hat
o u ght one, but w hat ought I do? - that I begin to u n d erstan d the
problem of m oral action from w ithin. ... [T]he only real perspective for
m oral judgm ent and decision [is] the ground on w hich I stand and
from w hich I respond to the claim of the situation u p o n m e
(T ouchstones 281).
The "ground" upon and from w hich we m ove an d act is alw ays a deeply
personal one, and thus, our ethical responsibility is, likewise, a deeply
p ersonal (but, at the sam e time, neither individualistic nor relativistic) affair.
In the m om ent of ethical decision, w e find ourselves placed in a situation
th at requires an answ er from us. The beings w hom w e encounter and our
aw areness of our creaturely vocation call forth our response, an d no one else n o t God, not the prophets, not even the m oral theorists - can respond for us.
In tu rn , if our response is to be genuinely ethical, it m u st em body not only
the respect and com passion engendered in the m eeting w ith the other w ho is
at the sam e time our kin, but it m ust also be brought forth out of our
recognition of ourselves as called upon to fulfill our intended task, which
comes to us ever anew in an ongoing chain of relational events and w hich
w e m u st w ork out and struggle to fulfill through engaged participation in
dialogue w ith our fellow beings. As we ever m ore clearly come to realize the
task p referred us, our lives take on the character of a way, and w e come to
know integrity and vocational unity as we act in consonance w ith the
direction and m eaning our lives find along that path.

79

U p to this point, I have portrayed our ethical responsibility in term s of
o u r responsiveness to the call of our fellow creatures as well as our
responsiveness to the call of our unique, creaturely vocation. Yet, according
to Buber, Friedm an and others, there is yet a third call to w hich w e m ust
respond: the call of the Creator, w ho not only sends us forth to fulfill our
particular task but w ho also m eets us and speaks to us in an d through each
encounter w ith the other finite creatures w hom we m eet in dialogue. As
such, our ethical responsibility involves our decisive and com m itted
response to the call of this sponsoring and abiding Presence, as it reveals itself
to us - and w e discover it - in our lives.

W hat follows in this section, then, m ight be described as the explicitly
religious elem ent of our ethical responsibility. But is this really necessary? Is
the overtly religious an indispensable part of the ethical orientation in
question? Clearly, for M artin Buber, the answ er is an em phatic yes.4 In his
essay entitled "The Bases of Buber’s Ethics," M aurice Friedm an - the forem ost
English-speaking translator and student of Buber's w orks - asks this same
question and answ ers it as follows:
Can we say, then, that it is possible to carve ou t of Buber's philosophy
an autonom ous ethics, free from a necessary connection w ith religion?
Yes and no. Yes, if we m ean by religion a separate sphere of special,
specifically religious revelation and com m and; no, if we u n d erstan d
G od’s "Where art thou, Adam?" to be addressed to every m an at every
h o u r through each everyday event that confronts him , for then
"religion" is just m an's listening and responding to this address (188189).5
N o t surprisingly, the religious life, for Buber, is prim arily a m atter of
dialogue. The genuine, I-Thou dialogue w ith our fellow creature is, at the
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sam e time, the religious dialogue w ith God, the eternal Thou. A nd as we
hear the address of the eternal Thou in the dialogical m om ent, w e, in turn,
resp o n d w ith our actions and non-actions. Buber, himself, describes the
essentially dialogical character of "religion" in the follow ing way:
I know no fulness bu t each m ortal hour's fulness of claim and
responsibility. Though far from being equal to it, yet I know that in the
claim I am claim ed and m ay respond in responsibility, and know who
speaks and dem ands a response.
I do not know m uch m ore. If that is religion then it is just everything,
sim ply all that is lived in the possibility of dialogue (Between 14).
H ere, Buber's 'definition' of religion comes very close to his understanding of
ethics in the m ode of dialogue: claim and response. Conversely, elsewhere
Buber defines "the ethical" in decidely religious language: "But the ethical in
its plain truth m eans to help God by loving his creation in his creatures, by
loving it tow ards him" (Betw een 57). For Buber, at a certain level - the level
of dialogue - there is very little difference betw een the truly religious and the
truly ethical; together, they weave a seamless fabric of m eaning - and
m eaningful action - in the life of dialogue.

As such, it is im possible to have one w ithout the other. If the religious
is necessary for the ethical [And for Buber, there is no question about this. In
"Religion an d Ethics" he writes, "But alw ays it is the religious w hich bestows,
the ethical w hich receives" (Eclipse of God 98).], then religion w ithout ethical
responsibility is sim ilarly bankrupt. The m eeting w ith G od, the eternal Thou,
carries w ith it an im perative force that turns us tow ard an d renew s our active
com m itm ent to our fellow beings. God calls to us in an d th ro u g h our
relations w ith our fellow creatures, and our response to the call of the Creator
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a n d the creature is inseparable. We cannot know G od ap art from G od's
creation (and apart from or outside of our ow n createdness), an d as w e treat
o u r fellow creatures, so, too, we treat their (our) Creator. In I an d Thou Buber
w rites,
Sea and rivers - w ho w ould m ake bold to.separate here and define
lim its? There is only the one flood from I to You, ever m ore infinite,
the one boundless flood of actual life. One cannot divide one's life
betw een an actual relationship to God and an inactual I-It relationship
to the w orld - praying to God in truth and utilizing the w orld.
W hoever know s the w orld as som ething to be utilized know s God the
sam e w ay (155-156).
A n d , again in a later essay entitled "Love of God and Love of Neighbor," he
w rites,
[A] direct relation to God that includes no direct relation to the w orld
is, if not deception, self-deception; if you turn aw ay from the w orld in
o rder to turn to G od, you have not turned tow ard the reality of G od bu t
only tow ard your concept of God; the isolated religious is also in reality
the not religious (H asidism and M odern M an 235).
For Buber, religiousness and ethics cannot be separated because both are
g ro u n d ed in the dialogical, I-Thou encounter, w here we cannot - and need
n o t - distinguish betw een the address of the present other and the divine
Presence. In the m om ent of dialogue both speak to us and call us forth to
actualize the sacram ental m eaning of the encounter in our com m itted
response. Thus, Buber can claim that, "The genuine m oral act is done to
God" (H asidism and M odern Man 241).

That we can - and do - encounter God, the eternal Thou, at all is
possible because God addresses us in all the various, creaturely situations of
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o u r everyday lives. A ccording to Buber, "The first Biblical axiom is: 'M an is
ad d ressed by God in his life'" (On Tudaism 218). This is the fundam ental
startin g p oint for Buber's understanding of religious life, and specifically
Jew ish religiousness, as an ongoing dialogue betw een G od an d hum anity - a
dialogue betw een heaven and earth. It is the aw areness that w ithin the
ad d ress of our fellow beings and w ithin our never-ending struggle to find
direction and integrity in our finite existence, som ething of the ineffable and
transcendent m ystery speaks to us and endow s our lives and actions w ith that
degree of m eaning, resolve and finality available to us. Furtherm ore, this call
comes to us not only as it spoke to Moses in the b urning b u sh or atop M ount
Sinai b u t in the seem ingly inconsequential and ordinary occurrences of our
lives, and it is here - and now - that it m ust ever be re-discovered and heard
anew . Buber likens this aw areness of ourselves as 'divinely' called upon to
the often m isunderstood biblical notion of the "fear of God."
All religious reality begins w ith w hat Biblical religion calls the "fear of
God." It comes w hen our existence betw een birth an d d eath becomes
incom prehensible and uncanny, w hen all security is sh attered through
the m ystery. This is not the relative m ystery of th at w hich is
inaccessible only to the present state of hum an know ledge and is hence
in principle discoverable. It is the essential m ystery, the
inscrutableness of w hich belongs to its very nature; it is unknow able.
T hrough this dark gate (which is only a gate and not, as som e
theologians believe, a dwelling) the believing m an steps forth into the
everyday w hich is henceforth hallow ed as the place in w hich he has to
live w ith the m ystery. H e steps forth directed and assigned to the
concrete, contextual situations of his existence. That he henceforth
accepts the situation as given him by the Giver is w h at Biblical religion
calls the "fear of God" (Eclipse of God 36).6
The m ystery of the existence given us as created beings an d the Present
m ystery that beckons to us in and through the particular events of that very
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existence speak together, for the theistically religious person, as the call of the
sponsoring and enduring Creator - a call which is ever open to us as
p articip an ts in the ongoing event of creation.

A nd if it is through creation that the C reator G od speaks to us, then it is
th ro u g h o ur engagem ent in authentic dialogue w ith creatures th at w e are
able to hear this divine address and respond to it. That is, our m eeting w ith
G od, the eternal Thou, occurs w ithin and through our I-Thou m eetings w ith
our finite, fellow creatures.7 As Buber explains, "Meet the w orld w ith the
fullness of your being and you shall m eet Him" (On Tudaism 213); "[I]f you
hallow this life you m eet the living God" (I and Thou. Sm ith trans. 79).8
T hus, the necessary condition for m eeting God and receiving G od's divine
address, is genuine dialogical participation in the relational events of our
daily lives.

F urtherm ore, any relational event, no m atter how seem ingly trivial or
insignificant, m ay be the bearer of divine Presence - and speech - in so far as it
is received in dialogue. A ccording to Robert W ood, "It is in the dep th s of the
Between, g rounded upon spirit, that the opening to the eternal T hou occurs"
(72). A nd the betw een, as discussed in the previous chapter, is no t lim ited to
an y fixed place or genus of relata; it is constituted in the relation of an I and a
T hou - any Thou.
In every sphere, in every relational act, through everything that
becom es present to us, w e gaze tow ard the train of the eternal You; in
each we perceive a breath of it; in every You w e address the eternal
You, in every sphere according to its m anner. All spheres are included
in it, while it is included in none.
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T hrough all of them shines the one presence (I an d Thou 150).
As w e open ourselves to the address of our fellow creatures, w e receive, at the
sam e tim e, the address of God; in m eeting other finite beings as Thou, we
m eet the eternal Thou. Because of this, all the relational events of our lives
have the potential to become revelation and sacram ent insofar as they take
on the character of dialogue.

But just as we m ay encounter the Divine Presence and receive the
divine address in and through each and every dialogical m eeting w ith our
fellow creatures, so, too, there is one 'place' w here God can never be
encountered: the I-It relation. A ccording to W ood, "The only w orld w here
G od cannot be m et is the w orld of It" (95-96). Here we are at the heart of
B uber's notion of God as the eternal Thou. In contrast to the tw ofold nature
of our relations w ith other finite beings (I-Thou and I-It), we can only m eet
an d know G od in one way, as a Thou. In I and Thou Buber w rites,
By its very nature the eternal You cannot become an It; because by its
very natu re it cannot be placed w ithin m easure and lim it, no t even
w ithin the m easure of the im m easurable and the lim it of the
unlim ited; because by its very nature it cannot be grasped as a sum of
qualities, not even as an infinite sum of qualities that have been raised
to transcendence; because it is not to be found either in or outside the
w orld; because it cannot be experienced; because it cannot be thought;
because we transgress against it, against that which has being, if we say:
"I believe that he is" - even "he" is still a m etaphor, w hile "you" is not.
A nd yet we reduce the eternal You ever again to an It, to som ething,
tu rn in g God into a thing, in accordance w ith our n ature (160-161).
Elsew here, Buber sim ply says, "[I]t is also only the relation I-Thou in w hich
w e can m eet God at all, because of H im , in absolute contrast to all existing
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beings, no objective aspects can be obtained" (Eclipse of G od 128). For Buber,
w e cannot experience God as an It, and we cannot know anything ab o u t God.
A nd yet, G od can be m et as Thou, as a real and abiding presence in dialogue.

Therefore, it is through our participation in dialogue that the D ivine
Presence addresses us and reveals itself to us. For Buber, the genuine I-Thou
relation is nothing less than the bearer of divine revelation, an d w h at G od
reveals to us in and through the dialogical event is not an objective content
b u t a presence. As Emil Fackenheim explains, "[T]he core of the revelation is
not the com m unication of content but the event of G od's presence" (290).
A nd F riedm an echoes this idea w hen he w rites, "Revelation is thus m an's
encounter w ith G od's presence rather than inform ation about His essence"
(Life of D ialogue 246). Divine revelation does not disclose anything about
God; th rough it, we learn nothing about the divine essence, nature, attributes
or properties. Instead, w hat God reveals to us is G od's enduring presence as
the eternal Thou - our ever-present partner in dialogue. Indeed, for Buber,
this is the m eaning of God's m essage to Moses in Exodus 3:14, w hich Buber
in terp rets as follows:
This is the eternal revelation w hich is present in the here a n d now . ...
The w o rd of revelation is: I am there as w hoever I am there. That
w hich reveals is that w hich reveals. T hat w hich has being is there,
nothing m ore. The eternal source of strength flows, the eternal touch
is w aiting, the eternal voice sounds, nothing m ore (I and Thou 160).9
For Buber, the significance of the "word of revelation" is not only that God is
b u t that this God is also present am ong us a n d prom ises to be present in the
future. Expanding upon Buber's interpretation of G od's w ords to M oses from
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the b u rn in g bush, W alter K aufm ann w rites, "The T etragram m aton, w ith the
initial J or Y w hich indicates the third person, w ould then m ean: HE IS
PRESENT" (381). In addition, this prom ise of abiding presence is no t lim ited
to G od's encounter w ith Moses at the burning bush or w ith the children of
Israel at M ount Sinai; according to Friedm an, "YHVH is H e w ho is present in
every no w and in every here" (Life of Dialogue 246). Each event in our lives
h o ld s the possibility of divine revelation; through each (no m atter how
seem ingly trivial or 'profane'), we m ay receive the gracious self-disclosure of
the D ivine Presence. For, as Buber explains, "The pow erful revelations
invoked by the religions are essentially the sam e as the quiet one th at occurs
every w here and at all times" (I and Thou 165-166).

H ow ever, this revelation of Divine Presence, which is potentially open
to us w ith in each and every m om ent of our lives, is not som ething tim eless,
changeless or m onolithic. G od's revelation of God's en d u rin g presence
m anifests itself w ithin and through the particularity of each unique situation.
In other w ords, G od’s revelation is not one of generic presence; G od reveals
G od's self as the Present One - whose presentness is inextricably b o u n d u p
w ith the irreducible particularity of the dialogical event th ro u g h w hich it is
revealed. According to Fackenheim ,
The God of dialogue, like any Thou in any dialogue, speaks to a unique
p a rtn e r in a unique situation, disclosing H im self according to the
u n ique exigencies of each situation. ...[God] can only be encountered in
each here and now, as He m ay show Him self in each here and now
(285).
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Thus, G od reveals G od's enduring, eternal presence ever anew an d afresh in
the m ultiplicity of each new m om ent of revelation; G od 'speaks' this abiding
presence in and through the unique and non-repea table w ords of the
m anifold situations of our lives.

Furtherm ore, as God becomes present to us as the eternal Thou in and
th ro u g h our I-Thou encounters, these relations take on the character of a
sacram ent. T hrough the revelation and actualization of the Divine Presence
in dialogue, the w orld becomes a holy place. Thus, each and every relational
event in our lives is potentially not only the bearer of divine revelation; it
can also becom e sacram ent insofar as it is raised to the level of dialogue. For
Buber, this pansacram entalism lies at the heart of the H asidic notion of
"hallow ing the everyday." In the story cited in the Introduction to this paper,
Rabbi M enahem M endel of Kotzk teaches his learned audience that although
the entire w orld is full of God's glory, God is truly present am ong us only
insofar as w e "let God in" and m ake a dw elling-place for God in our lives.
For Buber an d the H asid, there is no time or place w here G od cannot be found
because the w hole w orld exists in G od.10 And yet, God is truly present w ith
us only as we m aintain "holy intercourse" w ith that p a rt of the w orld w ith
w hich w e have to do. Or, to put it another way, God, the eternal Thou,
becom es truly present am ong us - betw een us - in and through our
participation in I-Thou dialogue. According to Friedm an,
It is because God dw ells in the w orld that the w orld can be tu rn ed into
a sacram ent. But this does not m ean that the w orld is objectively
already a sacram ent. It is only capable of becom ing one through the
redeem ing contact w ith the individual. ... Sacram ental existence, like
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dialogical existence in general, involves a m eeting w ith the other in
w hich the eternal Thou m anifests itself (Life of D ialoeue 140).
Therefore, although our w orld is not holy in any static, essential sense, it can
becom e hallow ed through the sacram ent of dialogue, in and th ro u g h w hich
G od's presence is m ade actual and m anifest am ong us. A nd, as m entioned
earlier, there is no time or place, no relational event, that cannot becom e the
sacram ental 'host'; every aspect of our lives can become hallow ed to the
degree w e take up w ith our fellow creatures in the spirit of dialogue.
Speaking, again, of the Hasidic way, Buber writes,
O ne m ay and should live genuinely w ith all, but one should live w ith
it in consecration, one should hallow all that one does in his natural
life. N o renunciation is com m anded. One eats in consecration, one
savors one's taste of food in consecration, and the table becom es an
altar. O ne w orks in consecration and lifts the sparks that are hid d en in
all tools. One walks over the fields in consecration, and the silent
songs of all creatures, those they speak to God, enter into the song of
one's ow n soul. One drinks to one's com panions in consecration, each
to the other, and it is as if one studied together w ith them in the Torah.
O ne dances in consecration, and a splendor radiates over the
com m unity. A m an is united w ith his wife in consecration, an d the
Shekina [the indw elling Divine Presence or Glory] rests over them
(Origin and M eaning 55-56).
A nd, com ing from quite a different perspective, H enry Bugbee echoes m any
of the sam e ideas w hen he writes,
W hat is there that is native and natural in life that is not open to a
hallow ing? that, indeed, m ay not call for it? By virtue of w h at are
things m ade holy and how is it that we m ay come to participate and
partake in this? Are we the initiators? N o, surely not. For our p a rt in
it is enacted at its inception as an act of acknow ledgm ent an d of
sponsored recognition and com m itm ent occurrent w ithin the w ay in
w hich the natural is given us and received, brought to cum ulative
m aturity. One know s full well, furtherm ore, that there is nothing
autom atic or m atter-of-course about it. For the hallow ing of the
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natural occurs only in and through our being radically recalled o u t of
im m ersion in thoughtless ways, inadvertent cheapening of life, and
the oppressive incubus of things-taken-for-granted and threatening to
go stale ("Loneliness, Solitude" 9-10).
For Bugbee, as well as Buber and the H asidim , there is nothing in our lives
th at cannot be m ade holy; everything is potential sacram ent. A nd, as Bugbee
carefully points out, although we are not solely (or even prim arily)
responsible for the m anifestation of the Divine Presence in our w orld, our
genuine presence and engaged participation in dialogical existence is surely a
necessary condition for the actualization of the sacram ental character of each
e n co u n te r.11 For, as quoted earlier, "He w ho is not present perceives no
Presence" (Buber, Eclipse of God 126). If the w orld is to becom e sacram ent for
us, w e m ust rem ain open and available to the others w hom w e m eet and be
responsive to the divine address present in the situations given us; if God,
the C reator and eternal Thou, is to dwell am ong us, we m ust "let God in" by
m aintaining holy intercourse w ith our fellow creatures in the sacram ent of IThou dialogue.

Therefore, w e can speak of the dialogical encounter in an d through
w hich the eternal Thou is revealed and m ade m anifest am ong us as both
revelatory and sacram ental. A nd both revelation and sacram ent, as they are
traditionally understood, im ply a commission. That is, they are not term inal
events b u t rather sponsoring, initiating ones. We are sent forth from our
m eeting w ith the eternal Thou to em body the tru th an d m eaning of that
encounter in our daily lives. A ccording to Buber, "The encounter w ith God
does not come to m an in order that he m ay henceforth attend to G od b u t in
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o rd er th at he m ay prove its m eaning in action in the w orld. All revelation is
a calling and a mission" (I and Thou 164). As God addresses us in the
sacram ent of dialogue w e are called forth to actualize the divine w o rd in our
lives w ith our fellow creatures. As Robert W ood explains, ”[T]here is a
rh y th m here; m eeting and m ission, sum m ons and sending, alternate" (107).

H ere, we come to the decidedly ethical n ature of the divine-hum an
dialogue. As stated earlier, G od addresses us in and through the m ultitude of
events and situations that we face in our daily lives. These events, perceived
in their fullness and depth, have a divine w ord to speak to us. Furtherm ore,
this divine speech m akes dem ands upon us, claiming us w ith its pow erful
im perative force. In his "Afterword" to the second edition of I and Thou
B uber w rites,
G od's address to m an penetrates the events in all o u r lives and
all the events in the w orld around us, everything biographical
and everything historical, and turns it into instruction, into
dem ands for you and me. Event upon event, situation upon
situation is enabled and em pow ered by this personal language to
call upon the hum an person to endure and decide. O ften we
think that there is nothing to be heard as if w e had not long ago
plugged wax into our ow n ears" (182).
In so far as w e rem ain open to and receive the address of the eternal T hou as
it speaks to us in our everyday lives, w e find ourselves instructed and
claim ed by a divine com m and - a unique and personal "Thou shalt."

But how is this possible? Earlier I suggested that, for Buber, the core of
divine revelation w as not any particular content bu t rath er the m anifestation
of D ivine Presence. D oesn't the idea of a divine im perative present in the
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encounter w ith the eternal Thou im ply a content of som e sort? A ccording to
Buber, it does not, although he does elaborate on the nature of the "presence"
received in the m eeting w ith the eternal Thou.(12) In Part III of I and T hou
he explains,
M an receives, and w hat he receives is not a "content" bu t a presence, a
presence as strength. This presence and strength includes three
elem ents that are not separate but m ay nevertheless be contem plated as
three. First, the whole abundance of reciprocity, of being adm itted, of
being associated while one is altogether unable to indicate w h at that is
like w ith w hich one is associated, nor does association m ake life any
easier for us - it m akes life heavier bu t heavy w ith m eaning. A nd this
is second: the inexpressible confirm ation of m eaning. It is guaranteed.
N othing, nothing can henceforth be m eaningless. ... You do n o t know
how to point to or define the m eaning, you lack any form ula or image
for it, and yet it is m ore certain for you than the sensations of your
senses. W hat w ould it intend w ith us, w hat does it desire from us,
being revealed and surreptitious? It does not w ish to be interpreted by
us - for that we lack the ability - only to be done by us. This comes
third: it is not the m eaning of "another life" but that of this our life,
no t that of a "beyond" but of this our w orld, and it w ants to be
dem onstrated by us in this life and this w orld. The m eaning can be
received but not experienced; it cannot be experienced, bu t it can be
done; and this is w hat it intends with us. The guarantee does not w ish
to rem ain shut up w ithin me, it w ants to be born in the w orld by me.
But even as the m eaning itself cannot be transform ed or expressed as a
universally valid and generally acceptable piece of know ledge, putting
it to the proof in action cannot be handed on as a valid ought; it is not
prescribed ... The m eaning we receive can be p u t to the proof in action
only by each person in the uniqueness of his being and in the
uniqueness of his life. N o prescription can lead us to the encounter,
and none leads from it. Only the acceptance of the presence is required
to come to it or, in a new sense, to go from it. As w e have nothing b u t
a You on our lips w hen we enter the encounter, it is w ith this on our
lips that we are released from it into the w orld. That before w hich we
live, that in w hich w e live, that out of w hich and into w hich w e live,
the m ystery - has rem ained w hat it was. It has become present for us,
and through its presence it has m ade itself know n to us as salvation;
w e have "known" it, bu t we have no know ledge of it that m ight
dim inish or extenuate the m ysteriousness. We have come close to
God, bu t no closer to an unriddling, unveiling of being. W e have felt
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salvation but no "solution." W e cannot go to others w ith w h a t we
have received, saying: This is w hat needs to be know n, this is w hat
needs to be done. -We can only go and p u t to the proof in action. And
even this is not w hat w e "ought to" do: rather w e can - w e cannot do
otherw ise (158-160).
I have in d ulged in this extrem ely long quote not only because it show s Buber
at his m ost inspired but because it is so central to Buber's un d erstan d in g of
revelation, ethical action and the tenuous relation betw een the two. In the
encounter w ith the eternal Thou we are graced by the Divine Presence, which
bestow s u pon us the "abundance of reciprocity," the "confirm ation of
m eaning" and the charge to incarnate this reciprocity and m eaning in our
actions. Together, these three elem ents of the revelation of D ivine Presence
m ay in sp irit our actions w ith the direction, integrity and certainty inherent
in tru ly necessary, ethical action: we find ourselves called upon, directed to
act as w e m ust. A nd yet, the specific forms such actions will em body are
w e d d ed so intim ately to the situations in which we find ourselves addressed,
an d so irreducibly concrete, that we cannot possibly say in advance, or in
general, w hat we 'ought' to do in such and such a set of circum stances.

A nd it is here, at the point of deciding and acting, that we arrive at the
'h u m an side' of the dialogue betw een God and hum anity. For as G od reveals
- 'speaks' - God's presence in the everyday situations of our lives, it is
th ro u g h our various actions and non-actions that we answ er this address.
A n d although the divine address m ay carry w ith it a pow erful and
com pelling im perative, we rem ain free to hear and respond in an ethical
m anner. That is, although we respond to the em pow ering an d directing
ad d ress of the eternal Thou, we alone rem ain responsible for our actions,

93

again an d again confronted w ith new and unforeseeable situations of decision
an d choice. O ur personal responsibility to respond decisively and ethically to
the call of the Divine Presence cannot be abrogated. As Buber explains,
A nd he, the Single One[the person of dialogue], m ust answ er, by w hat
he does and does not do, he m ust accept and answ er for the hour, the
h o u r of the w orld, of all the w orld, as that w hich is given to him ,
entrusted to him. Reduction is forbidden; you are not at liberty to
select w hat suits you, the w hole cruel h o u r is at stake, the w hole claims
you, and you m ust answ er - H im (Between 66).
In o u r ongoing participation in creation, we are constantly faced w ith ever
n ew situations of choice to which we m ust venture to respond. In so far as
w e m eet these situations in a spirit of dialogue, in so far as these situations
becom e sacram ent and revelation for us, we m ay receive the direction and
'inspiration' present in the divine address. A nd yet, we are not relieved of
deciding and choosing again and again in favor of responsible, right action.
God com m ands, but we practice responsibility for hearing and responding in
a decisive, ethical m anner.

This, then, is the "rhythm" at the heart of divine-hum an dialogue:
G od m eets us - calls us and claims us - in the everyday situations of our
existence, and w e respond through our decisions and actions. Buber
sum m arizes this dynam ic in the follow ing way:
In the infinite language of events and situations, eternally changing,
b u t plain to the truly attentive, transcendence speaks to our hearts at
the essential m om ents of personal life. A nd there is a language in
w hich we can answ er it; it is the language of our actions an d attitudes,
our reactions and our abstentions. The totality of these responses is
w h at we m ay call our responsibility in the proper sense of the w o rd
(On Tudaism 215-216).
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A gain, for Buber, at the m ost fundam ental level, ethical responsibility, and
th u s ethical action, involves hearin g the address of our fellow creatures, the
ad d ress of our creaturely task, and the address of the C reator w ho speaks to us
th ro u g h creation, and responding w ith compassion and respect, integrity and
direction.

For som e readers, linking ethical responsibility w ith a personally
a p p reh en d ed divine address will appear as nothing m ore than a grasping at
straw s, a psychotic delusion, or worse, a specious apology for fanaticism .
W hose voice are we hearing - G od’s? the devil's? or som e psychological or
societal dem on's? Even Buber w arns that M oloch m ay im itate the voice of
G od (Eclipse of God 118). H ow can we be sure that our actions - let alone the
actions of others - are grounded in and em body the spirit of divine address?
For Buber, of course, we cannot be sure in any arguable way; w e cannot
em pirically and objectively 'prove' the rightness of our actions or justify
them . A nd although we m ay comm it ourselves w ith w holeheartedness and
certainty to a particular course of action, nothing can rem ove the degree of
insecurity and risk that accompanies our ethical responsibility. H ow ever, in
his essay "On the Suspension of the Ethical," in w hich he takes u p w ith
K ierkegaard's fam ous treatm ent of the story of A braham and Isaac, Buber
offers the follow ing practical advice: "In contrast to this, G od H im self
d em an d s of this as of every m an (not A braham , His chosen one, bu t of you
an d m e) nothing m ore than justice and love, and that he 'w alk hum bly' w ith
H im , w ith God (Micah 6:8) - in other w ords, not m uch m ore than the
fun d am en tal ethical" (Eclipse of God 118). Buber never suggests th at w e
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d isreg ard such ethical injunctions as the one given in M icah or, say, the Ten
C om m andm ents (as a devout Jew and lifelong student of the Torah, it w ould
be very strange if he did). A nd yet, he insists that such m axim s are n o t
prescriptions for ethical action; they serve as guidelines and signposts. They
cannot substitute for our engaged participation in, and existentially gro u n d ed
response to, the situations in which w e find ourselves called upon.
A ccording to Buber and Friedm an, such ethical form ulations can only
becom e truly personal and m eaningful for us in so far as w e "rehear" them
again and again in each new situation of choice. As Friedm an explains,
The God w ho speaks to the people, correspondingly, is not a cosmic
G od w ho guarantees a universal moral order, b u t the God of the Ten
C om m andm ents w hose "Thou shalt" is apprehended by the
in d ividual person and by the group only in the unique, concrete
situation - the ever renew ed dem and of the present. It is only m odern
m an w ho has converted these com m ands into the im personal "one
m ust" of the social norm . The "ought" im plicit in the com m and can
be derived only from the responsibility of the person to w h at claims
him in the particular situation in w hich he finds himself. O ne does
not apply the Ten C om m andm ents to the situation: one rehears
them as utterly unique, present com m ands (T ouchstones 137).
For both Buber and Friedm an, ethical responsibility and action can never be
red u ced to the rote application of norm s and m axims. The im perative force
behind such m oral guidelines can only be realized as we open ourselves to,
an d place ourselves at the disposal of, the address of the situation in w hich
w e find ourselves and respond to the claims and exigencies present w ithin
th at threefold address.

But, by now , perhaps, I’ve said too m uch - and, undoubtedly, for som e
of m y readers, too little. My preceding analysis of the threefold claim presen t
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in the I-Thou dialogue show s the strain of dissection and burdens these holy
relations w ith alm ost insupportable conceptual baggage. Clearly, our
involvem ent in these ephem eral an d evanescent I-Thou encounters does not
m atter-of-factly call up the range of thoughts and intim ations it has taken m e
the p ast twenty-five or so pages to outline. I adm it that such abstract
theorizing and conjecture are as likely to miss the point as they are to connect.
A n d yet, it seem s to m e that som ething of each of these three elem ents is
p resen t in the depths of our dialogical encounters w ith our fellow beings. In
the clarity and im m ediacy of these m eetings the m eaning, w o n d er an d n o n 
in stru m en tal value of these distinctly and independently other beings elicit
ou r respect, while, at the sam e time, our intim ate being-together evokes a
sense of com passion and even solidarity. And such respect and fellowfeeling, likewise, seem inseparable from self-respect and personal integrity.
For it is in our dialogues w ith our fellow creatures, as well as in our respectful
an d com passionate responses to them , that we come closest to finding
personal fulfillm ent and an intim ation of our potential; th at is, w e glim pse
w h at is best and m ost profoundly w orthw hile in ourselves as w e m eet others
honestly and openly and respond decisively and w hole-heartedly from the
very d ep th s of our person. Furtherm ore, over time our engaged participation
in such encounters engenders w ithin us a sense of coherence an d vocational
integrity. Finally, such m eetings are charged w ith an overw helm ing sense of
ultim ate significance and sacredness; a divine presence rests over them . It
seem s that a m eaning and a purpose inform these dialogical encounters that
are sp onsored in neither the 'I' nor the finite 'Thou' w hom it m eets; they are
p e rv ad ed by the m ystery of Som ething Other, M ore and Less, and this
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m eaning and m ystery cry out to be incarnated in the w orld of action. Viewed
as a w hole, then, it seem s that our engaged participation in I-Thou
encounters w ith our fellow creatures - and in the presence of the eternal
T hou - does, indeed, offer us a glim pse of the m eaning and tru th available to
us an d em pow er us to act in a m eaningful and truthful - an ethical - way.

Therefore, we can say that our capacity for truly ethical action is
g ro u n d ed in our finding bedrock m eaning in and through the situations in
w hich w e are placed. Or, to paraphrase H enry Bugbee, it is only as w e find
"finality" in the everyday events of our existence that our decisions and
actions are infused w ith the spirit of necessity and certainty and w e come to
know w hat is required of us. In his Preface to Inw ard M orning, Bugbee
w rites,
W hat I have called finality proves to be the unifying them e of the
w ork. By finality I intend the m eaning of reality as realized in true
decision. The vein in which it comes to us is the vein of w onder, of
faith, of certainty. It is the ground of ultim ate hum an concern w ith
w hich the will is inform ed (10).
A nd furtherm ore, the appreciation of finality comes to us as we encounter
o u r fellow creatures in their m eaning and dep th - as "presences," to use
Gabriel M arcel's term. Again, from Inw ard M orning. Bugbee explains,
O nly reality is given. But its givenness is consum m ated in the
reception of things as presences - as we find finality in them . There is
certainty in experience in w hich reality is given; b u t this does not seem
to be a certainty of know ledge about anything w e represent to ourselves
and describe. ...
G ivenness is decisive experience of reality, enabling decisiveness in
our thinking and in such action as is really decisive. ...
I w ould be content to speak of things as given, but given only in the
experience of them as presences, in their finality. They are, then,
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reality manifest. But you cannot capture reality m anifest in your
description of those things (175-176).
T hat is to say, the appreciation of finality is open to us in and through our
relations w ith the things and beings w ith w hom we share our existence, but
only in so far as we take up w ith them as presences and not m erely as objects
to stu d y , describe, classify and m anipulate. In other w ords, finality daw ns
u p o n u s through our engaged participation in dialogue, w here w e m eet our
fellow creatures as Thous, not Its.

In turn, finality comes to us as both dem anding and em pow ering; it
carries w ith it a call to em body the m eaning received in our decisions and
actions. According to Bugbee, "Every appreciation of finality is charged w ith
im perativeness for an active being, and becomes a liability to him in so far as
he fails to fulfill its potential in active com m itm ent" (Inw ard M orning 206).
To realize finality in the particular situations of our lives is to recognize
ourselves as being placed in a position of obligation and responsibility. A nd it
is th ro u g h our participation in these particular events that we com e to
appreciate the responsible character of our lives - w rit large; w e exist as
responsible beings. Or, as Bugbee puts it, ”[W]e are u nder obligation" (Inw ard
M o rn in g 68).

At the sam e time, how ever, the apperception of finality also em pow ers
us to fulfill the obligations of responsible existence; we come to realize w hat is
required of us - w hat is necessary. According to Bugbee, necessary action
grow s out of our aw areness of the finality of things.
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W hat I w ish to suggest is that true realization of finality is ever the
spring of necessary action, and not an achievem ent w hich ren d ers
action necessary as a m eans to it. Present realization of finality inform s
the will w ith concern in the im perative m ood, a n d necessary action is
the w orking out of the im plications of inform ed w ill, ever renew able
an d subject to clarification in further realization of finality. A n d true
realization of finality is to be m arked in the readying of the w ill for
w h at is yet to come - come w hat m ay - and for w hat yet needs to be
done, as long as one m ay live (Inw ard M orning 207).
The realization of finality is not the term inus of our activities an d
involvem ent in reality but rather the underlying source of our capacity to act
as w e m ust. In fact, unless we find finality in our lives, w e will be incapable
of finding m eaning and purpose in any action at all. As Bugbee explains,
If w e fail to find finality in the w orld w e will ultim ately fail to find it
necessary to do anything; and all that w e have done w ill come to seem
senseless. But if we can act on faith that is an appreciation of the
finality of things, w e m ay come to u n d erstan d th at neither ourselves
nor any finite being should be counted at naught. W e all stan d only
together, not only all m en, but all things. To abandon things, and to
abandon each other, is to be lost (Inw ard M orning 159).
N ecessary action, then, is dependent upon our realization of the finality of
things. In turn, as w e venture to respond to our recognition of finality and
com m it ourselves in necessary, decisive action, w e come to a renew ed and
deep en ed aw areness of the finality of things and our co-existence w ith them .
T hat is, to act out of necessity m ay be a deliverance of finality, an d w e find our
lives inform ed w ith m eaning through acting decisively and w hole-heartedly.
T hus, there is a reflexive rhythm here as well, as ever new realizations of
m ean in g an d finality sponsor and bring to fruition ever new an d
unforeseeable form s of m eaningful and necessary action - an d vice versa.
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W hat necessary action m ay look like, specifically, how ever, cannot be
said ap art from the situation in which w e are called upon to act. Like finality,
necessity is an experiential category and cannot be divorced from, or distilled
o u t of, the particular situations of our ongoing involvem ent in reality.
A ccording to Bugbee, "Both [necessity and finality] are experiential ideas,
there is no conclusive m eaning in the situation in w hich we live and m ove
an d have our being. A nd there is no dem onstrable necessity about any course
of action we can represent to ourselves" (Inw ard M orning 152). We search in
vain if w e look for finality and necessity exclusively from the standpoint of
abstract and detached objectivity. "Nothing is necessary that is merely looked
a t " (Bugbee, Inw ard M orning 116). And yet, finality and necessity can and do
grace our lives through our engaged participation with, and em beddedness
in, the w orld in w hich we live. As we open ourselves to an d receive the
beings and things w hom we m eet along our way, we find ourselves affirm ed
and em pow ered. But, this affirm ation (the realization of finality) and
em pow erm ent (the capacity and direction to comm it ourselves in necessary
action) d epend precisely upon such unreserved im m ersion in reality and
cannot be realized apart from it.

Therefore, we cannot say in advance of our involvem ent in a
p articu lar situation w hat we m ust do. If necessary action is an experiential
category, then it is also a non-prescriptive one. As Bugbee m atter-of-factly
p u ts it, "We cannot know in advance w hat we m ust do" (Inw ard M orning
224). G enuine responsibility m eans responding to the address of the
situation at hand. If we are to receive the experiential m eaning and
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im perative th at sponsors our ethical response, we m ust rem ain open and
attentive to the present situation; each one carries w ith it a unique an d
unforeseeable w ord of address. A ccording to Buber,
In spite of all sim ilarities every living situation has, like a new born
child, a new face, that has never been before and will never come
again. It dem ands of you a reaction w hich cannot be p repared
beforehand. It dem ands nothing of w hat is past. It dem ands presence,
responsibility; it dem ands you (Between 114).
For both Buber and Bugbee, ethical action - and ethical theory - can never be
red u ced to prescribing and applying abstract and general m oral m axim s an d
p rinciples to the concrete and particular situations in w hich w e find
ourselves obliged to act in an ethical m anner. A nd while we m ay, at tim es,
rely u p o n such norm s as useful and helpful guidelines, they cannot substitute
for o u r presence in, and attentiveness to, the situations them selves. Every
u n ique situation addresses us in a w ay that dem ands our presence an d
genuine response; w e practice responsibility in so far as we g ro u n d our
response upon that address, received in its uniqueness and m eaning.
C oncerning the relationship betw een m oral guidelines and ethical
responsibility, Robert W ood writes, "To serve hum an fulfillm ent, these
norm s all have to be recast again and again in the fire of m eeting. ... M orality
has to be grounded ever anew in presence" (104). Ethical responsibility alw ays
involves h earing and responding to the claim s of the present m om ent; only
then do we find the strength and certainty to act in a decisive an d nonarbitrary way.
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H ow ever, certainty, like finality and necessity, is not subject to
objective analysis or verification. For Bugbee, w e m ay find certainty in w hat
w e do and, at the same time, be unable even to articulate, let alone prove, that
of w hich we are certain. N ear the beginning of Inw ard M orning Bugbee
suggests that we
... consider certainty, not as som ething quested for, like a po t of gold for
w hich longing search is undertaken, and not as som ething that hangs
on the fate of isolated truth-claim s or of structures of hypothesis, an d
n o t as very strong conviction, but rather as pertaining to that
anim ating base on w hich hum an enterprise becom es sound.
I w ould w ish to say that certainty lies at the root of action that m akes
sense. It is connected w ith the ultim ate p u rp o rt of our lives. Perhaps
the last thing we should dem and of an interpretation of certainty is
that it show how w e are entitled to som e credo, once-for-all,
incontrovertibly. ...
C ertainty m ay be quite compatible w ith being at a loss to say w h at one
is certain of. Indeed, I seriously doubt if the notion of 'certainty of,’ or
'certainty that' will take us accurately to the heart of the m atter. It
seem s to me that certainty is at least very m uch akin to hope an d faith
(36).

If w e cannot say w hat it is of which we are certain or prove the.necessity of
actions sponsored by that certainty, it is because our certainty cannot be
red u ced to objective, or even referential, terms. It involves a kind of
know ledge that defies reduction to the categories of objective know ing. Like
the know ledge received in the I-Thou encounter, it is an im m ediate and
p articip ato ry know ing that is not a ’know ing about' anything. A nd w hile it
m ay lack any objective content or referent, we come to know certainty in our
lives and actions at the level of our m ost basic attitudes and dispositions; it is
b o u n d u p w ith the faith that gives us the capacity to affirm the irreducible
im p o rt of our being-w ith-others and em pow ers us to com m it ourselves in
decisive action.
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It appears, then, that w e can give no accurate account of ethical action,
in term s of our ethical responsibility, if we approach the subject exclusively
from the stan d p o in t of spectatorial objectivity. The fundam ental gro u n d of
o u r capacity to act in an ethical m anner lies at a level that Bugbee refers to as
the "meta-objective." In Inw ard M orning he w rites,
H ere w e m ay p u t the point by availing ourselves of a term of Marcel's:
Action and reflection on the point of action are both meta-technical,
over and above w hatever technique m ay enter into them. A nd for
convenience let us use a sim ilar term, and say that both are meta
objective in the sense that they m ove in a dim ension of m eaning over
w hich w e cannot exercise the pow er of representation and control that
obtains w ith respect to things in taking them as objects (55).
For Bugbee, ethical responsibility is intim ately bound u p w ith and rooted in
our realization of finality, necessity and certainty, all three of w hich inform
our lives at the m eta-objective level. Therefore, although we m ay offer
objective reasons and lucid, com pelling argum ents in attem pting to justify
ou r actions, such discourse is alw ays secondary and at som e distance rem oved
from the fundam ental, meta-objective sources of genuinely responsible
action. In his Introduction to Inw ard M orning, M arcel p u ts it this way:
O ur reasons for acting, w hatever they m ay be, cannot substitute for true
affirm ation in its depth. This is not to suggest the slighting of reasons
w hich w e m ay have for acting, but rather to point out that these
reasons are derivative and bring us only abstract versions of a
responsibility in depth from which the philosopher needs to derive his
ow n fundam ental im pulse (25).
H ere, Marcel returns us to the central and constant them e of this entire
discussion: responsibility. Ethics is, above all, a responding to w hich
involves, at the sam e time, a responding fro m . A nd, as I have tried to
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suggest, w hat we respond to - the call of our fellow creatures received no t as
objects of analysis, m anipulation and use, Its, but as presences, Thous, an d the
holy voice of the ineffable m ystery in and out of w hich we exist - and w hat we
resp o n d from - those basic attitudes and faith postures that enable us to find
an d affirm m eaning and finality in our co-creaturely situation - can only be
received and realized through engaged participation in the concrete situations
of our day-to-day lives. The address of these situations, in w hich this
threefold address comes to us in a singular evocation, cannot be heard in so
far as w e take up w ith things from a detached and 'distant' view point. N or
can this address be translated and represented in abstract and objective terms;
it comes to us w ith an untranslatable and irreducible im m ediacy and
concreteness.

Because of this, we m ay be unable to articulate any justification for our
actions in objective terms, even though we are quite certain of w hat we m ust
do - cannot but do. H ow ever, neither Bugbee nor Buber view our inability to
justify ethical action in explicit term s as a failure (although, at times, it m ay be
m ost unsettling). This is because, according to Buber, as quoted earlier, the
m eaning received in the situation of dialogue, "does no t w ish to be
interpreted by us - for that we lack the ability - only to be done by us" (I and
T hou 159). Finality, necessity and certainty come to us so that we m ay
incarnate them - "put [them] to the proof in action," as Buber says - in the
w o rld of action. In Inw ard M orning Bugbee expands on this them e w hen he
w rites,
Perhaps our truest actions, as M eister Eckhart suggests, are those for
w hich w e can give no justifying reasons at all, there being no
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separation of m eaning from the act in w hich it is realized. If you
believe profoundly in w hat you are doing, this doing itself is the m ode
of being relevant, and it constitutes your m anner of being articulate
(53).
A n d later on, he explains it this way:
Yet w hen you come right dow n to it, is it not clear that really believing
in the categorical (i.e. genuine) im perativeness of w hat one is doing, or
better, really believing in w hat one is doing, carries w ith it the
realization that one has not proven, and could not p rove the necessity
of doing w hat he does? We can only bear w itness to the necessity of
w h at we do, and through that action w hich is necessary, rather than
through show ing how w hat we do fulfils specifiable conditions by
virtue of which it m ust be acknow ledged as necessary. A ppreciation of
necessity cannot be forced (153).
O u r ethical responsibility, then, finds its fulfillm ent an d realization, not in
o u r ability to prove the ethicality of our actions to ourselves or our w ould-be
judges, b u t in our capacity to em body the m eaning received in acting as we
m ust. The address of the situation m akes claims upon us, an d w e fulfill
those claims through responsible, ethical action - not by offering cogent
arg u m en ts in defense of those actions.

Claim and response. As m entioned earlier, this dynam ic rhythm lies
at the heart of our ethical responsibility. A nd, in case w e should forget (as is
so often the case), we do not m ake the claims; rather, w e are claim ed - in the
m om ent and from the root of our very being. A ccording to Bugbee, "[Olur
true position in action w ould seem to be this: that it is one of being called
u p o n to act, and not one of calling the moves" (Inw ard M orning 71). As such,
ethical responsibility presupposes a spirit of attentiveness and availability on
o u r part, a readiness to receive and respond to the call of each new situation.
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For, unless we open ourselves to receive that call, how can we respond truly?
Surely, w e cannot practice ethical responsibility w hen w e shout d o w n the
claim s m ade upon us in our desire to stake a claim; w hen w e neglect the
com m and present in the situation in our attem pts to take com m and; w hen
w e ignore the charge of the m om ent in our need to be in charge. In such
cases, w e im pose our ow n will upon the situation forcefully and to such a
degree th at w e can no longer hear that address to w hich w e m ay have
resp o n d ed directly and decisively - ethically. A ccording to Bugbee, our
forcefulness, assertiveness and insistence prevent us from practicing
responsibility and acting w ith necessity. In Inw ard M orning he w rites,
I w ould be inclined to say that w here the use of force is to the fore the
appreciation of necessity is absent. Thus, for exam ple, w hen w e are
im perious, reality w ithholds its instruction from us. W e learn of
necessity in all gentleness, or not at all. ... It m ay be of help to bear in
m in d that the im perative m ood is not the m ood of assertion. It is the
m ood of affirm ation, the m ood in which we truly respond. It seems to
m e that I have to discover over and over again that I am w ro n g w hen I
insist; decisiveness is quite other than insistence. O nly reality in its
necessity can give finality to w hat w e say or do (117).
W e cannot respond truly to things in so far as we attem pt to take the w orld an d the things in it - by storm ; conversely, passive non-participation is
equally bankrupt. A nd yet, if we m eet the w orld in a spirit of openness and
availability, we m ay find ourselves addressed and receive the gift of m eaning
along w ith the com m and and the capacity to em body that m eaning in our
decisive and ethical response.

In closing, there rem ains a series of questions that cannot be ignored.
W hat ab o ut the ap p aren t m uteness of the things aro u n d us? W hat about our
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isolating deafness? H ow are we to respond in these situations of paralyzing
silence? A dm ittedly, there are tim es (m any times) w hen we do not feel
ourselves called upon, com m anded, directed, and yet we m ust still v enture to
decide an d act. A nd if, under these circum stances, we m ust fall back u p o n
certain general ethical principles, let us act w ith hum ility and acknow ledge
the lim itations of such a 'response.' Even 'responsibility' can be tu rn e d into
an abstract ethical ideal that we em ploy to guide our actions; how ever, in
doing so, w e no longer respond to the utterly unique and irreducibly concrete
ad d ress of the particular situation. G enuine responsibility cannot be divorced
from the call to w hich we respond; our capacity for responsible action
d ep en d s upon our ever-renew ed participation in dialogue. As M aurice
Friedm an explains,
A lthough I do not necessarily cease to deal lovingly w ith another even
w hen I am no longer in dialogue w ith him, it is just in the concrete
th at I m eet reality, and it is this which prevents dialogue from
degenerating into "responsibility" to an abstract m oral code or
universal idea (Touchstones 267).
In the m om ent of dialogue, we receive the address of the Thou in all its
otherness and co-creatureliness, and this address elicits our respectful and
com passionate response. A nd, in general, our recollection of our fellow
creature as Thou, and the aw areness that each being and thing we encounter
m ay potentially become Thou for us, will suggest that we treat everyone and
everything w e m eet respectfully and com passionately. H ow ever, even our
recognition of the potential Thouness of all things cannot su b stitu te for the
dialogical encounters in which we m eet them , in all actuality, as Thou. As
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M anfred Vogel points out, genuine ethical responsibility, for Buber, cannot be
based upon such abstractions.
Yet, enticing as this answ er m ay be, it is not open to us in the context of
Buber's thought. For w ere we to follow it, we w ould fall straight into
the trap of the It, in as m uch as "thouness" is a predicate, an aspect, and
as such an abstraction, a principle, but not a concrete being, a person
( 180 ).
Ethical responsibility m eans responding to the call of the situation in w hich
w e find ourselves. In so far as we hear this call, we m ay receive m eaning and
direction and the capacity to respond in an ethical m anner.

A dm ittedly, this is a huge task and we fail regularly. It w ould be
tem pting to suggest that we m odify our expectations a bit, provide a bit m ore
security, m inim ize the risks w herever possible. A nd yet, in doing so we do
an injustice to the m eaning inherent in the m om ent, as well as the
independence, uniqueness and value of our fellows, the integrity of our
personhood, and the enduring and gracious presence of the divine m ystery.
All of these seem to beckon to us, or from w ithin us, and dem and that w e
acknow ledge and respond to them - here and now. This is the responsibility
that seem s inescapably - and liberatingly - ours and w hich w e m u st fulfill to
the degree we are able. And so, I'll close this chapter w ith one final quote
from Bugbee's Inw ard M orning:
If it be urged that m uch of the time we can do no better than a kind of
objective fairness in our relationships w ith one another, let us not
suffer the confusion of taking this as a paradigm of w h a t it m ay m ean
to be responsible by reason that "we cannot be held responsible for
m ore than this." Because a profound concern of m an for m an [sic]
cannot be legislated into us does not m ean that anything short of such
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concern can guide us into an adequate interpretation of the m eaning of
responsibility (210).
R esponsibility m eans responding - from the heart, to that w hich speaks to our
h eart.
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. EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - A gain, w hat follows m ust be qualified as a regional ontology. M uch of
w h at will be discussed here could be described as philosophical or theological
anthropology. In other w ords, I do not think a question like "Do rocks have a
'creaturely task'?" is relevant - let alone answ erable - here.
2 - A note on Deep Ecology here. It seems to me that the initial im petus
b eh in d w h a t’s loosely called Deep Ecology lies in a w holly justifiable rejection
of an exclusively objectifying approach to nature, w here all n o n h u m an beings
an d things are relegated to It-hood - m eans to hum an ends, resources to be
m an ip u lated and used. But, w ithin the lim ited fram ew ork of D eep Ecology’s
discourse, the only alternative to nature's It-hood is to have it becom e a p art
of the self, the I - hence their self-identification, self-realization approach.
T hat is, they attem pt to give the other its due by claim ing that the other and
the I are, at root, One. In doing so, however, any sense of genuine and nonnegotiable otherness and independence is trivialized or lost entirely, and
d ialogue becom es m onologue. Jim C heney’s articles "Eco-Feminism and
D eep Ecology" and "The NeoStoicism of Radical Environm entalism " critique
D eep Ecology along these lines (see the List of W orks Cited for full citationsof
C heney's articles). Several years ago I took up w ith this topic in som e detail
in a p ap er I w rote for Tom Birch entitled, "The M onological self/S elf of
Identification: A C ritique of Deep Ecology Based on the W ork of M artin
B uber."
3 - Buber's translation of Lev. 19:18, as given a few sentences above, is
translated into English by Friedm an in "The Q uestion to the Single One" as
"Love y o u r neighbour as one like yourself." Such an unusual translation is
com m on for Buber, w ho, along w ith Franz Rosenzweig, com pleted a rather
unorth o d o x translation of the H ebrew Bible from H ebrew to G erm an. In a
translator's note to Between M an and M an. Friedm an explains this particular
tran slatio n as follows:
"Love your neighbour as one like yourself": this d e p artu re from the
custom ary rendering of the A uthorized Version is again an effort to
ren d er the original m ore precise (In this case the H ebrew of Lev. xix. 18)
in o rd er to keep before the reader the stark objectivity of the com m and
- the other w hom you are required to "love" being one w ith a real life
of his ow n, and not one w hom you are invited to "acquire" (208).
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A n d yet, in the passage from Touchstones of Reality I quoted in the text,
F riedm an interprets the verse in term s of "equality." In the context of m y
p ap er, this seems unfortunate and potentially confusing, especially in the
realm of environm ental ethics w here the notions of "equality" an d "equal
rights" have been m ore troublesom e than helpful. I prefer B uber’s original
translation then, w hich em phasizes our alm ost familial affinity w ith our
fellow beings rather than the m ore abstract and legalistic idea of equality. The
respect of which I am speaking hear grow s out of a kinship relation, and the
notion of equality, although useful and perhaps even essential in another
context, seem s rather beside the point here.
4 - For Bugbee, the answ er is less clear. His understanding of creation does
n o t im ply any notion of a creator, m uch less a theistic one. In fact, he sees
such a designation as potentially dangerous in several ways. First, it
introduces a m oral heteronom y to hum an agency, especially w hen
in terp reted in its m ore predestinarian forms - a danger I tried to address in
the previous section concerning our created task as a destiny as opposed to
fate. H e discusses these ideas in his entry of Friday, October 25 in In w ard
M orning, w hich covers pages 221-226). Secondly, the notion of a divine
creator also im plies the designation of the religious object - som e object,
entity, or being that referentially corresponds to our w ord God. A nd for
Bugbee, such "object-mindedness" is the exact opposite of the "religious
attitude" he regards so highly. Here, I will quote Bugbee at length - again
from In w ard M orning - on this subject, if for no other reason than to show
just ho w closely he comes to Buber’s theistic u n d erstanding of m any of these
sam e them es.
I recall som e com m ents of Richard N iebuhr’s near the close of his
course last fall in 19th and early 20th century religious thought. He
question the tendency m arked, for exam ple, in W illiam Jam es'
Varieties of Religious Experience, to concentrate upon religious
attitude to the exclusion of its 'objective basis' as I believe he p u t it.
H ow can the religious attitude be understood properly w ith o u t placing
it in orientation to God? - that seem ed to be his question; and he also
seem ed disposed to dem and a conception of God, w ith w hatever
necessary qualifications about its analogical or symbolical character, as
object upon which religious attitude m ust depend, if religious attitude
is not to degenerate in the end into som ething subjective and
gratuitous.
M uch as I concur against the psychologizing interpretation of religious
attitude, and w ith the belief in the possibility of religious attitu d e of a
non-gratuitous character; m uch as I think such attitu d e m u st be
interpreted as having relevance, and relevance to w hat can be referred

112

to; I cannot but think that the very notion of object incorporates a
m ode of thinking with respect to reality which is cut loose from
religious attitude. N o 'object' can serve to explicate the n o n 
arbitrariness of religious attitude. If it could, there w ould be no
elem ent of faith requisite in religious understanding; and I m ean, for
exam ple, that elem ent of faith in the experience of finite things w hich
has led m e to consider 'the object’ as abstract, and to attem pt
reevaluation of the conception of things in distinction from the
conception of objects. Thus, too, I have questioned the in terpretation
of the 'otherness' of other finite beings in term s of the 'standing-overagainstness' which seems inherent in the notion of objectivity. W hat I
should w ish to call religious attitude challenges the ultim acy of any
interpretation of reality w hich is ’objective’ in the sense of abstracting
from the depth of our experience as responsible beings. T hus to the
d em an d that we conceive the groundedness of religious a ttitu d e w ith
reference to the objectively conceived, no m atter w hat qualifications
are placed on the possibility of an adequate conception of the religious
object, seem s to m e tantam ount to a request that religious th o u g h t be
u n d ertaken from a standpoint not m erely in d ep en d en t of religious
attitude but also tending to oppose it (217-218).
Like Buber, Bugbee rejects both subjectivism and objectivism as m eaningful
an d 'accurate' w ays of taking up w ith and interpreting our w orld; both
attem p t to describe m eaningful existence in term s of the know ledge (which is
no t a know ledge about anything) and truth received through our engaged
participation in dialogue. As such, both thinkers reject the either-or of
subject-object m indedness w hen applied to our religious sensibility. This is
the basis of Buber's notion of God as the eternal Thou - w ho, by its very
nature, can never become an It, an object. As such, we can never know
anything about God in any objective sense. A nd yet, for Buber, this G od is a
G od w hom we can meet and w ith w hom we can enter into I-Thou dialogue
(for Buber, his entire religious tradition - biblical, talm udic, m ystical,
rabbinical, hasidic - is a testim ony to the reality of the ongoing dialogue
betw een God and hum anity). Therefore, Buber, like Bugbee, refuses to reduce
G od to the object of religious attitude, w hile at the sam e time bearing w itness to the reality of G od's enduring Presence in the w orld.
5 - The reference here is, m ost obviously, to the book of Genesis, w here God
calls to A dam following the fall. H ow ever, the full m eaning of F riedm an’s
explanation is rooted in the Hasidic legend attributed to Rabbi Schneur
Zalm an of Ladi. According to the story, the rabbi was in jail and aw aitng trial
for being a political agitator. W hile in his jail cell, the chief of police cam e to
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visit him , and they began to talk about various religious m atters. The tale
culm inates as follows:
Finally he [the chief of police] asked: "How are w e to u n d erstan d that
God, the all-know ing, said to Adam : 'W here art thou?'"
"Do you believe," answ ered the rav, "that the Scriptures are eternal
an d that every era, every generation and every m an is included in
th e m ? "
"I believe this," said the other.
"Well then," said the zaddik, "in every era, God calls to every man:
W here are you in your w orld? So m any years and days of those allotted
to you have passed, and how far have you gotten in your w orld?' God
says som ething like this: 'You have lived forty-six years. H ow far along
are y o u ?’"
W hen the chief of gendarm es heard his age m entioned, he pulled
him self together, laid his hand on the rav's shoulder, and cried:
"Bravo!" But his heart trem bled (Buber, Tales of the H asidim : Early
M asters 268-269).
H ere, the em phasis is placed upon practicing responsibility for the unique
creaturely task for which each one of us is created - for one's ow n destiny,
authenticity. H ow ever, the question also comes to us in each new m om ent of
relation and decision, with the finite being w ith w hom we have to do
echoing this sam e call. In "What is Man?" Buber writes,
Life is not lived by my playing the enigmatic game on a board by
m yself, but by my being placed in the presence of a being w ith w hom I
have agreed on no rules for the game and w ith w hom no rules can be
agreed on. This presence before which I am placed changes its form , its
appearance, its revelation, they are different from m yself, often
terrifyingly different. If I stand up to them , concern m yself w ith them ,
m eet them in a real way, that is, with the truth of m y w hole life, then
an d only then am I "really" there: I am there if I am there , and w here
this "there" is, is always determ ined less by m yself than by the presence
of this being which changes its form and its appearance. If I am not
really there I am guilty. W hen I answ er the call of present being "W here art thou?" - w ith "Here am I," but am not really there, that is,
n o t w ith the truth of m y whole life, then I am guilty. O riginal guilt
consists in rem aining w ith oneself (Betw een 166).
T hus, for Buber, this biblical call of "Where art thou?" speaks unisonously of
the threefold calling to which we m ust respond in our lives - the call of God,
the call of our creatureliness, and the call of the present other.
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6 - Buber's sense of m ystery, as he presents it here, is very sim ilar to Ray
H a rt's notion of "problem atic" and Gabriel M arcel's "m eta-problem atic."
7 - This, how ever, does not m ean that, for Buber, we cannot also m eet the
eternal Thou in an exclusive I-Thou relation occurring betw een the hu m an
being an d the Divine Presence. A dm ittedly, though, Buber's w ritings on this
subject can be confusing. For example, in his essay "Buber's Philosophical
A nthropology," Philip W heelright suggests that for Buber there is no relation
to G od in dependent of one’s relation to "other finite selves" (78). Buber
him self, how ever, in his "Replies to My Critics," confesses th at he "read this
w ith som e surprise" and goes on to say that the "essential relation to m an"
an d the "essential relation to God" are com plem entary and that this
com plem entarity in no way contests "the direct relation to G o d ” (710).
8 - H ere, I w ant to stress the H asidic notion of "m aking holy" so I have chosen
Sm ith's translation over Kaufm an's ”[W]hen you consecrate life you
encounter the living God" (128). The close association betw een "hallow ing
this life" and entering holy intercourse w ith one's fellows m aintains and
em phasizes Buber's inescapably dialogical m eaning. A nd since, as Charles
H artsh o rn e writes, this hallow ing is "our proper vocation"(51), the charge to
hallow the everyday carries the full force of the threefold call under
discussion in a singular and unified way.
9 - Again, Buber's biblical translation is a bit unorthodox. Buber translates the
H eb rew Ehyeh asher ehyey in Exodus 3:14 to the G erm an Iclt bin da als der
ich da bin, w hich K aufm ann translates in the English I and Thou to "I am
there as w hoever I am there," and Friedm an translates in other texts as "I
shall be there as I shall be there." In each case, the em phasis is placed upon
G od's en d uring (although ever-changing) presence as opposed to G od’s
essence or Being. A ccording to Friedm an, "The Biblical verb does not include
this shade of m eaning of pure being" (Life of Dialogue 246).
10 - This is w hy I referred to Buber's theological position as a panentheistic
pansacram entalism in the Introduction. According to Buber, the w orld exists
in God, w ho is both w holly transcendent and w holly im m anent. As he
w rites in I and Thou. "God embraces but is not the universe; just so, God
em braces but is not m y s e lf (143). For Buber, God transcends both the w orld
an d the self, and any attem pt to lim it God to this w orld, as in pantheism , or to
m y self, as in panpsychism , denies God's radical transcendence and
O therness. For Buber, a totally im m anent a n d /o r internal G od is no God at
all. A nd yet, neither is God exclusively transcendent for B uber(and, in fact,
Buber's critics have often accused him of being a pantheist). "For,” as
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F riedm an w rites, "if God w ere sim ply transcendent w e could have no
relation to him at all" (Life of Dialogue 228). A nd w hatever else Buber says or refrains from saying - .about God, he insists that God, as the eternal Thou,
can be m et as a partner in relation. Therefore, Buber m aintains the tension
betw een G od's transcendence and G od’s im m anence by placing the w o rld in
G od [draw ing, at times, on the vivid im agery of Lurianic K abbalism , in w hich
the w orld is created through the self-limitation, w ithdraw al, or contraction
(tsim tsum ) of the G odhead (YHVH) and the consequent em anation of the
D ivine into the w orldly rungs or spheres]. In I and Thou. Buber sum s u p his
panentheistic position as follows:
Looking aw ay from the w orld is no help tow ard God; staring at the
w orld is no help either; but w hoever beholds the w orld in him stands
in his presence. "World here, God there" - that is It-talk; and "God in
the world" - that, too, is It-talk; but leaving out nothing, leaving
nothing behind, to com prehend all - all the w orld - in com prehending
the You, giving the w orld its due and truth, to have nothing besides
God but to grasp everything in him, that is the perfect relationship.
O ne does not find God if one rem ains in the world; one does not find
G od if one leaves the w orld. W hoever goes forth to his You w ith his
w hole being and carries to it all the being of the w orld, finds him
w hom one cannot seek.
O f course, God is "the w holly other”; but he is also the w holly same:
the w holly present. Of course, he is the mysterium tremendum that
appears and overw helm s; but he is also the m ystery of the obvious that
is closer to m e than m y ow n I (127).
For Buber, God is neither w holly other than the w orld, nor is G od exclusively
lim ited to this world. God is the all-encom passing, all-inclusive God who
nonetheless m ay m eet us and speak to us in and through the m ost seem ingly
com m onplace events of our lives.
11 - As in the discussion of the character of I-Thou relations in C hapter 1, the
qualifications are necessary here. Sacram ental and dialogical relations are
alw ays a m atter of "will and grace." Just as we are graced by the fundam ental
givenness of our being-together-w ith our fellows and the reciprocal
involvem ent of the others w hom we m eet in dialogue, so, too, w e are graced
by the unprocurable m anifestation of the Divine Presence in the sacram ental
encounter. Therefore, in speaking of "letting God in" or "hallow ing the
everyday," we m ust not assum e an activism in which w e have the pow er or
capacity, in and of ourselves, to m ake the w orld a sacram ent; there is no
m agic here, and the Divine Presence cannot be conjured up th ro u g h hu m an
action (It is interesting to note that some Kabbalists and H asidim occasionally
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fell prey to the dangers of such an activism, resorting to various m agical
practices involving num erology and mystical kavanots - incantations or
spells. M ost often they did this in an attem pt to force G od's hand in hum an
affairs, influence history or bring about the m essianic age. Buber's "historical
chronicle" entitled For the Sake of H eaven insightfully points o u t these
excesses, even in as great a spiritual leader as the Seer of Lublin.). Like
dialogical existence in general, w e have an im portant role (but not the only,
or even leading, role) to play in m aking the w orld a sacram ent - b u t alw ays as
priests, not m agicians or sorcerers.
12 - The long quote that follows is taken from Buber’s discussion of the
exclusive relation betw een a finite I and the eternal Thou(w hich,
parodoxically, includes and encom passes all finite I-Thou relations in its
halo-like glow). As discussed earlier, Buber acknow ledges the possibility of
such relations; w hat he dism isses entirely is the rejection of finite relations in
o rd er to devote oneself to God alone (His frequent discussions and critiques of
K ierkegaard in this context are illum inating.). A nd yet, the ethical im p o rt of
the quote should be obvious; even the exclusive encounter w ith God returns
us to active participation in finite existence w ith our fellow beings.

DIALOGUE AND RESPONSIBILITY IN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

I. INTRODUCTION

So, w hat about the m artens and m ountains, the ospreys and rivers,
sequoias and bears? Having outlined, rather generally and abstractly, the m ain
tenets of a philosophy of dialogue and its correlative ethic of responsibility in the
tw o previous chapters, I now wish to return to the concrete, lived encounters
w ith the nonhum an beings and things of nature described in the Introduction
and attem pt to interpret their sense and m eaning w ithin this theoretical
fram ew ork. A nd yet, it seems unnecessary - and painfully red u n d an t - to
reconstruct this fram ework, in all its detail, as I narrow m y focus to our relations
w ith nonhum ans and our ethical responsibilities tow ard such creatures. As
stated at the outset of this paper, insofar as I have carried out this investigation of
our relationality and ethical responsibility in general, noetic term s, from which
no species of noema or relata has been a priori excluded, then it already includes
an eidetic description and interpretation of hum an-nonhum an relations and an
im plicit environm ental ethic. Therefore, given the scope and purpose of this
p aper, I hope that m y audience has read the two preceding chapters w ith moose,
w ildflow ers and seacoasts - am ong others - in m ind.

A dm ittedly, however, such an implicit account of our relations with, and
responsibilities tow ard, nonhum an creatures is, in itself, insufficient; in fact, it
seem s to raise at least as m any questions as it answers. In the second half of this
p ap er I will try to sketch out some of these implications a bit m ore explicitly and
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attem pt to answ er several of the m ore obvious a n d /o r serious questions that
need to be addressed. Due to its excessive length, I have broken dow n C hapter
Three into five separate sections. Following this brief introduction and forecast, I
w ill exam ine w hat Buber and his interpreters have to say, specifically, about our
relations w ith nonhum an beings and conclude by stating three general prem ises
affirm ing the possibility, actuality and m eaning of our dialogues w ith nonhum an
creatures. In the following section - section III - 1 will subm it these basic
prem ises to critical scrutiny by outlining two potential sources of criticism and
testing the validity and veracity of m y prem ises in light of these challenges.
T hrough analysis and argum ent as well as a basic re-affirm ation of the prim acy
and m eaning of lived experience, I will attem pt to respond to these challenges w hich m ight be labeled as the challenge of the noematic prejudice and the
challenge of technology - and emerge from the fires of critical evaluation with
these general prem ises intact - validated and, I hope, reforged, strengthened. In
the two rem aining sections of this chapter I will explain and then attem pt to
illustrate w hat the practice of ethical responsibility m ight look like in our
relations w ith nonhum an creatures. Section IV will re-examine, in general terms,
the rhythm ic interplay between dialogue and responsibility - claim and response
- as it informs our decisions and actions regarding nonhum an beings and things;
section V will serve as the culm ination of this entire chapter (and this entire
p ap er u p to this point), as I explore how we m ight properly reflect upon and
speak about the way our particular, concrete encounters w ith creatures like
m artens and m ountains sponsor, inform and direct our equally particular,
concrete ethical responses to them - and to others.
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Given the theoretical fram ework and style of discourse suggested at the
end of C hapter Three, I w ould like to conclude this essay, in C hapter Four, by
offering a few rem arks on dialogue, responsibility and w ilderness in the m ore
narrative, testim onial and reflective m anner appropriate to the interplay betw een
these topics. I will suggest that w ild places, for both conceptual an d practical
reasons, offer us a few rem aining places where, despite our relational
im poverishm ent, dialogue can flourish - a home of dialogue and a sabbath place
of prayer and play. Of course, to say that we ought to preserve w ilderness as a
church or playground w ould be just another variation on an 'ethic' of hum an selfinterest. Rather, because wild places are so overw helm ingly eloquent and
evocative and also because, as we imm erse ourselves in their gracious presence,
w e m ay be m ore ready to avail ourselves to the self-speaking voice of the others
w e m eet therein, we find ourselves called forth and claimed by w ilderness in a
w ay that invites our most respectful and compassionate response. A nd in our
respect and concern for wild places and wild creatures, engendered in intim ate,
know ing contact w ith them, we find ourselves obligated to protect an d preserve
the few rem aining wild places left on this continent. A nd so, I'll conclude this
final chapter, and this paper, by advocating a particular course of ethical - even
legislative - action. In endorsing the N orthern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act
(NREPA) as a respectful and appropriate response to the gloriously eloquent and
soul-stirringly evocative voice of w ild nature in our region of the w orld (as well
as the eloquent, evocative voice of each particular roadless area included in the
proposal), I w ish to express both m y w holehearted support for the Act and, at
the sam e time, show that the rhythm of dialogue and responsibility inform ing
our relations w ith nonhum an creatures> while perhaps seem ing so ephem eral
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and 'im practical' to some of m y readers, can and does lead to specific, concrete
courses of action. In other w ords, I wish to show that the ethical position pu t
forth in this essay, while not ’applicable,’ is both em pow ering and relevant.

II. DIALOGUE WITH NO NHUM AN CREATURES

I find it reassuring, especially given the purposes of this paper, that
M artin Buber's most detailed description of an I-Thou encounter in his book I
and Thou is of a m eeting that occurs between himself and a tree. In fact, given its
placem ent at the beginning of the book and Buber’s use of the account to
introduce so m any of the central themes that he develops later on, I w ould argue
that this description is intended to serve as the paradigm of w hat the I-Thou
relation is - and is not. In presenting the passage here in its entirety, I w ish to
em ploy Buber’s account as both an experiential starting point (albeit once
rem oved) for the second half of the paper and the basis of a general m odel of
hum an-nonhum an, I-Thou relations around which to gather up and explicate
several of the m ain themes of the first half of the paper.
I contem plate a tree.
I can accept it as a picture: a rigid pillar in a flood of light, or splash
of green traversed by the gentleness of the blue silver ground.
I can feel it as movement: the flowing veins around the sturdy,
striving core, the sucking of the roots, the breathing of the leaves,
the infinite commerce w ith earth and air - and the grow ing itself in
its darkness.
I can assign it to a species and observe it as an instance, w ith an eye
to its construction and its way of life.
I can overcome its uniqueness and form so rigorously that I
recognize it only as an expression of the law - those law s according
to w hich a constant opposition of forces is continually adjusted, or
those law s according to w hich the elements mix and separate.
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I can dissolve it into a num ber, into a pure relation betw een
num bers, and eternalize it.
T hroughout all of this the tree rem ains my object and has its place
and its time span, its kind and condition.
But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I
contem plate the tree I am draw n into a relation, and the tree ceases
to be an It. The pow er of exclusiveness has seized me.
This does not require me to forego any of the m odes of
contem plation. There is nothing that I m ust not see in order to see,
an d there is no knowledge that I m ust forget. Rather is everything,
picture and m ovem ent, species and instance, law and num ber
included and inseparably fused.
W hatever belongs to the tree is included: its form and its
m echanics, its colors and its chemistry, its conversation w ith the
elem ents and its conversation with the stars - all this in its entirety.
The tree is no impression, no play of my imagination, no aspect of a
m ood; it confronts me bodily and has to deal with me as I m ust
deal w ith it - only differently.
O ne should not try to dilute the m eaning of the relation: relation is
reciprocity.
Does the tree then have consciousness, similar to our own? I have
no experience of that. But thinking that you have brought this off
in your ow n case, m ust you again divide the indivisible? W hat I
encounter is neither the soul of a tree nor a dryad, but the tree itself
(57-59).
In this account, Buber testifies to, and describes, the twofold way in w hich we
m ay relate to nonhum an creatures such as trees. According to Buber, we m ay
experience the tree as an It - the object of artistic appreciation a n d /o r scientific
investigation. We can observe it in term s of color and light, and w e can also
analyze it w ithin the fram eworks of biology and chemistry, studying its various
biochemical and physiological processes, examining its anatom y and taxonom y,
or determ ining its niche within an ecological community. Or, m oving to
increasingly higher levels of abstraction, we m ay subm it the tree to study under
the law s and principles of physics and mathematics. Through all of this, the tree
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rem ains an It - an object of experience, som ething to observe and study, represent
an d classify, analyze and dissect.

H ow ever, Buber also says that we can relate to this sam e tree in an entirely
different w ay - as a Thou, a partner in dialogue. In the I-Thou encounter we
m eet the tree in its wholeness and integrity, w ithout the fragm entation of
analysis and dissection. Likewise, the encounter is im m ediate an d present; no
conceptual fram ew ork intervenes, and no re-presentational placem ent w ithin
interpretive or experiential grids relegates the encounter to the past. Lastly, and
perhaps m ost im portantly, the I-Thou meeting w ith the tree is reciprocal; both I
an d Thou are actively involved. And although this reciprocity occurs at an
other-than-conscious level and contains an element of inescapable and ineffable
m ystery, Buber is adam ant in his conviction that the tree does, in fact,
reciprocate.

But how?. In w hat sense do w e meet with reciprocity in our encounters
w ith trees - or buzzards or creeks, for that m atter? To answ er this question we
need to re-examine the fundam ental nature of the I-Thou dialogue. For Buber, IT hou relations are not m ental acts that necessitate conscious awareness. They
occur at the prim al level of our very being. According to M aurice Friedm an, "We
address others not by conscious m ind or will but by w hat w e are. W e address
them w ith m ore than we know, and they respond - if they really respond - w ith
m ore than they know. A ddress and response can never be identified m erely
w ith conscious intent or even with 'intentionality'" (Touchstones 324). In a
sim ilar vein, Robert W ood writes, "[I-Thou] relation, [Buber] insists, is not
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psychological so m uch as it is ontological, i.e., a relation to the being of the
Other" (41). Since dialogue does not occur at the level of (hum an) consciousness,
b u t at the m ore fundam ental level of being, its m anifestation does not d e p en d on
both partners' conscious awareness, or even that both partners have a
consciousness at all.1

Therefore, reciprocity should not be understood as som e kind of conscious
act or posture; it, too, is som ething ontic. And while, theoretically speaking, this
position is consistent enough, it is a notion that, adm ittedly, contains an elem ent
of m ystery. Acknowledging the potential for confusion and m isunderstanding,
Buber directly confronts the question posed at the beginning of the previous
parag rap h w hen, in his "Afterword" to I and Thou, he asks himself,
[I]f the I-You relation entails a reciprocity that embraces both the I
and the You, how can the relationship to som ething in nature be
understood in this fashion? Still m ore exactly: if we are to suppose
that the beings and things in nature that w e encounter as our You
also grant us some sort of reciprocity, w hat is the character of this
reciprocity, and w hat gives us the right to apply to it this basic
concept (172)?
A nd since Buber asks himself the exact question I have raised, we m ight as well
let him answ er it in his own words. After discussing the matter-of-fact
differences betw een our relations w ith plants and our relations w ith anim als, he
w rites, "It is p art of our concept of the plant that it cannot react to our actions
u p o n it, that it cannot 'reply.' Yet this does not m ean that w e m eet w ith no
reciprocity at all in this sphere. We find here not the deed of posture of an
individual being but a reciprocity of being itself - a reciprocity that has nothing
except being" (173). A dm ittedly, this answer is not terribly satisfying. A side

124

from the questionable science (which has no real bearing on the basic issue here),
Buber's response is, to put it m ildly, vague. To be sure, the reciprocity we
encounter in our m eetings w ith trees and other nonhum an things carries an
elem ent of m ystery and ineffability, and I believe Buber’s insistence on its
presence in such relations, despite his relative inability to articulate it, testifies,
above all, to his im m ediate apprehension of its experiential reality. That is,
Buber m aintains his position that trees and the like reciprocate, despite the fact
that it m ight have been easier for him to equivocate on this point, because he had
m et w ith and know n the force of their reciprocity as a fact of experience.

In our meetings with trees and the like, as we attend to them , w e find
ourselves attended; as we m ake ourselves available, they avail them selves to us;
and, as we become present, they reveal to us their gracious presence. A nd while
I rem ain som ew hat uncertain about w hat I could possibly give a tree that w ould
be of any real value to it, I have no doubt concerning the richness of the
un w arran ted gifts I receive from m y arboreal partners in dialogue. The tree that
I m eet as Thou meets me as an active co-participant in the I-Thou relation,
addressing me with its presence and responding to my address w ith the gifts of
its being - and our m utual being-together. A lthough speechless, even
'thoughtless,' such m utual address and response is, m ost fundam entally, a form
of reciprocity.

So, for Buber, trees, like our fellow hum an beings, m ay be either
experienced as Its or encountered as Thous. And not just trees. In I and Thou,
Buber also bears witness to the reality of I-Thou encounters occurring betw een
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him self and a cat (144-146) and between himself and a "fragm ent of mica" (146147). Also, in his essay entitled "Dialogue," Buber recounts an I-Thou encounter
from his childhood occurring between himself and a horse (Between 22-23).

Rather than being exceptional or aberrant, the experiential reality of these
I-Thou relations w ith creatures like trees, cats, rocks and horses is w holly
consistent with Buber's understanding of the fundam entally dialogical character
of existence. If, as I quoted Buber earlier, "[L]iving m eans being addressed"
(Between 10), then it follows that, "Nature 'says' som ething to m an" (W ood 116).
I-Thou dialogue w ith the nonhum an beings and things of nature is possible, first
and forem ost, because, at the m ost prim al level, these creatures address us; they
speak to us out of the very depths of their being - in all their unrepeatable
uniqueness, indivisible integrity, irreducible otherness and co-creaturely
independence. More simply, they 'speak' themselves.

In turn, insofar as we hear and respond to this self-spoken, self-speaking
address, received as such, we m ay m eet these beings and things as Thous,
m utually participating partners in m eaningful and decisive dialogue. As such,
the possibility of I-Thou dialogue occurring between a hum an being and a tree,
depends - from the hum an side, at least - upon the recognition of our existential
situation as one of being-called-upon and our capacity to open ourselves to the
voice of such creatures as they address us in the particular and concrete
relational events of our lives w ith them. As I discussed in C hapter One, Buber
describes this recognition and readiness - this disposition or posture of the life of
dialogue - as "becoming aware". A nd, according to Buber, we cannot draw
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artificial boundaries or arbitrary limits upon this awareness. In "Dialogue" he
writes,
But in each instance a w ord dem anding an answ er has h appened to
me.
W e m ay term this way of perception becoming aware.
It by no m eans needs to be a m an of w hom I become aw are. It can
be an anim al, a plant, a stone. N o kind of appearance or event is
fundam entally excluded from the series of the things through
w hich from time to time som ething is said to m e .... The lim its of
the possibility of dialogue are the limits of aw areness (Between 10).
A lthough dialogue is always a m atter of will and grace, unless we becom e aw are
of ourselves as addressed by trees and the like, how can we hear them speak to
us? A nd, in turn, how can we truly respond? A necessary pre-condition of IThou dialogue is hearing the address of the other as Thou, and this hearing
seem s potentiated in our readiness and capacity to listen - to w hom ever may,
perchance, speak to us.2

A nd yet, for the m ost part, we lack this awareness of ourselves as called
upon. Oftentim es, we do not - cannot - hear the address of our fellow beings,
including our fellow hum an beings. They seem to have nothing m eaningful or
com pelling to say to us, and we, in turn, take up w ith them as speechless and
inert objects - things to experience or scrutinize, contend w ith or avoid,
m anipulate or use. In such a silent 'society,' m onologue, rather than dialogue,
seem s to be the dom inant pattern of speech. Consequently, speaking of things
like trees addressing us and engaging us in reciprocal, I-Thou dialogue sounds
rather far-fetched, perhaps even ludicrous (after all, as m y m ore literal-m inded
readers will quickly point out, I'm coming perilously close to talking about
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talking trees here). Clearly, w ithin the exclusive fram ew ork of the It-world, a
tree has nothing to say to us; it exists as a silent object, w hich w e m ay
subjectively experience according to the interpretive grids w e project upon it,
a n d /o r a resource, a maleable thing that we m ay use according to our purposes
and intentions. As an It, the evocative self-speaking voice of the tree, arising
from the depths of its otherness, uniqueness and integrity, is silenced or ignored;
w hatever voice it has, it receives from the I of the I-It relation, according to the I's
categories of experience and use. As such, the entire relational event occurs as a
m onologue w ithin the m ind of the I. Concerning our m onologue w ith nature,
Buber writes,
H e w ho is living the life of m onologue is never aw are of the other
as som ething that is absolutely not himself and at the sam e time
som ething with which he nevertheless communicates. N ature for
him is either an c'tnt d ' nine, hence a "living through" in himself, or
it is a passive object of knowledge, either idealistically brought
w ithin the soul or realistically alienated. It does not become for
him a w ord apprehended w ith senses of beholding and feeling
(Between 20).

According to Buber, it m akes little difference w hether we appropriatively
identify w ith nature (The Deep Ecology approach), subjectively rom anticize
nature, or 'objectively' reduce nature to simple, lifeless "matter in m otion." Each
approach bears the m ark of the I-It m onologue, w here we fail to acknowledge,
respect an d honor the non-negotiable, irreducible otherness of nature's creatures,
w ho, despite - and because of - their otherness, we m ay encounter as partners in
I-Thou dialogue.
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Given the im poverished state of our relational lives, I w ould be the last
person to suggest that I-Thou encounters w ith nonhum an beings and things are
com m onplace occurrences, although I do believe w e often fail to recognize such
encounters because of their fleeting, often unspectacular, nature and lack of
consciously perceived content. Or, if we acknowledge them at all, oftentim es we
dism iss them as superfluous, inconsequential or rom antic, overly sentim ental or
subjective responses to seemingly ordinary events.3 But, just because they m ay
be infrequent, ignored or explained away, that doesn't m ean that they can't or
d o n 't happen - or that they aren't im portant.

W hat I w ish to suggest concerning the possibility, actuality and m eaning
of o u r I-Thou relations with nonhum an beings and things can be broken dow n
into three basic prem ises. First, despite the onerous obstacles and conceptual
baggage that m ay rise up and prevent the actuality of I-Thou dialogue betw een
hu m an and nonhum an creatures, such encounters are, indeed, possible. Emil
Fackenheim articulates this first prem ise very clearly w hen he writes,
I-Thou. relations are possible not only with other hum an beings, but
w ith anything whatever. This is not to say that such relations are
easy or possible to anyone, or possible at any time. It is m erely to
say that there are no a priori limitations to the possible partners I
m ay have in an 1-Thou relationship (279).
Secondly, not only are such I-Thou encounters a theoretical possibility but, on
occasion, they m ay also become actual, and it is w holly legitim ate to speak of our
engaging and compelling encounters with m artens, m ountains, bears and trees as
I-Thou relations and attem pt to interpret their sense an d m eaning according to
the tenets of a philosophy of dialogue. As these creatures address us in their
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ow n right, as they 'speak' themselves from the depths of their being, their speech
m ay resonate w ithin the available (disponible ) and responsive soul, and the
possibility of dialogue may, in such m iraculous instances, become incarnate
am ong us.4 A nd thirdly, as the possibility of dialogue w ith nonhum an creatures
becomes, on occasion, actual for us, we find our lives graced beyond all m easure
or possible merit. We receive the gift of the present other as w e come to know it
- this stretch of seashore, that stand of forest - in an altogether fresh an d intim ate
w ay, and, at the sam e time, we receive the gift - and consequent responsibility of o u r ow n existence, recognized as meaningful, even vocational. T hrough our
sacram ental co-participation in such dialogue, we find the capacity to affirm both
these nonhum an others and ourselves as well as the strength and direction to
em body this m eaning and m utual affirmation in respectful and com passionate genuinely responsible - action.

III.

CRITICAL SCRUTINY: THE CHALLENGE OF THE NOEMATIC

PREJUDICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY

A nd yet, I cannot sim ply state these three prem ises and then naively move
on to a discussion of their ethical im port for our relations w ith nonhum an
creatures w ithout first acknowledging and responding to several challenges that
these prem ises m ay prom pt. Two challenges, in particular, come to m ind, and,
w hile I’m sure there are others, I will limit my discussion here to these two: the
challenge of the noematic prejudice as presented in - and articulated in the very
title of - John Kultgen's article entitled "Saving You for Real People" and,
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secondly, the challenge of technology. In very different ways, both of these
challenges question the veracity of the first prem ise I presented above, regarding
the very possibility of I-Thou dialogue occurring between hum ans and
nonhum ans. Similarly, I have chosen to respond to these two challenges for very
different reasons. Technology, as the widely and deeply instantiated paradigm
that inform s and defines the w ay we take up w ith reality at the m ost prim ary
level, seems to present the m ost serious challenge to the possibility of hum ann o nhum an dialogue. On the other hand, Kultgen’s argum ent, w hile not terribly
com pelling or persuasive, offers an exem plary illustration of the noem atic
prejudice discussed throughout this paper.

To set the context a bit, Kultgen's article comes as a critical response to an
earlier essay by John Tallmadge entitled "Saying You to the Land." In his article,
Tallm adge "use[s] Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue, as expounded in I and
Thou, to shed light on the spiritual roots of our environm ental crisis and show
how we can appreciate beings in nature if we encounter them as persons rather
than things" (Tallmadge 351). He suggests that this appreciation can instill
w ithin us - each of us - the enlarged understanding of com m unity prerequisite
for practicing Aldo Leopold's "land ethic." And finally, Tallm adge offers
som ething like a dialogical tao of backpacking as a m ethod by which
"individuals develop habits of m ind conducive to 1-You relations, thereby
enhancing our life w ith other people as well as our natural environm ent" (351).
A lthough I find his analysis lacking in a num ber of ways, I am, quite obviously,
sym pathetic to the spirit and sensibility of Tallm adge's article. H ow ever, my
purpose here is not to defend his essay against Kultgen's criticisms, a few of
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w hich I even find justified. Rather, I w ant to address the basic presuppositions
underlying Kultgen's critique and illustrate how these presuppositions distort
an d prejudice his understanding of relationality and dialogue.

In the short abstract preceding his article, K ultgen describes the general
purpose and intent of his article as follows: "I critique John Tallm adge's attem pt
to derive an environm ental ethic from Buber's suggestion that we can enter into
I-Thou relations w ith nature. 1-Thou relations flourish only w ith beings who
enter into dialogue with us, viz. hum an beings, and we can value other natural
kinds w ithout anthropom orphizing them" (59). According to Kultgen, M artin
Buber is sim ply w rong to say that I-Thou relations can "flourish" between
h um ans and nonhum ans. U pon even slight reflection, this seems to be a rather
odd accusation to make. After all, it w as Buber w ho first articulated the
understanding of I-Thou dialogue under discussion here and w ho described and
defined such relations to include our imm ediate, present, integrated and
reciprocal encounters w ith nonhum an creatures. It’s sort of like telling the home
plate um pire - or even the head of the official rules com m ittee - that h e /s h e
doesn't u nderstand the strike zone because sh e /h e insists that a w aste high pitch
dow n the m iddle falls within the category of a strike. Given the term s agreed
upon to determ ine w hat constitutes a strike (an I-Thou relation), one cannot fault
the um pire for reasoning that such a 'pitch-event' (an I-Thou relation occurring
betw een hum ans and nonhum ans) falls into the class of things we call strikes.
O ne can argue that the strike zone be redefined to exclude waist high, dow n the
m iddle pitches from being called strikes, but to continue playing by the current
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rules w hile insisting, ’’Those aren't strikes,” seems to be an odd position to
m aintain.

Of course, w hat Kultgen is really doing is, in fact, redefining the rules
u n d e r w hich he chooses to play the game. Kultgen, while still em ploying the
language of dialogue and I-Thou relationality, simply redefines w hat constitutes
an I-Thou dialogue in accordance w ith the noematic prejudice he brings w ith him
to the ballpark. By saying that "I-Thou relations flourish only w ith beings w ho
enter dialogue with us, viz. hum an beings," Kultgen chooses to predicate his
definition of I-Thou relations upon the type of relata involved; for him, I-Thou
dialogue can occur if and only if the participants are hum an beings. H ere, the
possibility of dialogical relations depends, not upon the nature of the relations
them selves, but upon the nature (species) of the participants. As such, any
relations w ith nonhum ans, regardless of the nature of these relations, are a priori
excluded from consideration as I-Thou dialogues. Phenom enologically speaking,
K ultgen interprets our relationality strictly in terms of the noem a involved in the
relation and, because of this, falls prey to the noematic prejudice this entire paper
is intended to overcome - or at least thoughtfully and actively bracket.

In addition, because this prejudice is so deeply entrenched, K ultgen m akes
several other groundless accusations. First, in the passage from his abstract
quoted above, he suggests that by calling nonhum an creatures Thou, we - Buber,
Tallm adge and I - are som ehow anthropom orphizing them. This is a gross
m isunderstanding. For Buber, as I have plainly shown, all sorts of beings - trees,
horses, hum ans, divinities - m ay become a Thou for us. A nd furtherm ore, this

133

potential has nothing to do w ith their nature, so to speak; it has to do w ith the
nature of the relations in which we encounter them. Again, I-Thou is a noetic
description of a certain form of relational event. To call som eone/som ething a
Thou m eans that we have encountered - or m ay yet encounter - that being in
such a relationship. Clearly, there is nothing inherently anthropom orphic about
such relational descriptions - not until the I-Thou relationship is redefined in
noem atic term s, w here hum anness has become the necessary condition of
participation in these relationships. Only when "Thou" is read and understood
exclusively as "human-Thou" does a philosophy of dialogue become
anthropom orphic.

Similarly, Kultgen's noematic prejudice fosters great confusion in his
u nderstanding of personhood. For Kultgen, person can only m ean one thing:
hum an person. Therefore, he argues that, "His [Tallmadge’s] central proposal,
that we treat beings of 'wild nature' (and eventually of 'hum anized nature,' too)
as persons, is a theoretical and ethical disaster" (59), and he concludes his essay
by stating that, ”[I]t is a blind alley to m isrepresent things as persons and deny
the precious difference betw een the two. This is an injustice to the things as
m uch as to the persons" (67). Here, Kultgen sets up a firm noem atic duality
betw een tw o kinds of beings: persons (hum an) and things (nonhum an). But
w h at if we look at personhood and thinghood noetically, as Buber and Kohak
w ould have us do? From a noetic perspective, a person is a being w hom w e
encounter as a Thou, while a thing is an object experienced as an It. The term s
d ep en d upon the nature of the relational event in which the relata are
apprehended, and all finite creatures - hum an as well as, say, feline or m ineral -
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can be encountered as Thous or experienced as Its. According to Kohak, "A
person is a being who meets you as a T h o u .... H um ans are beings capable of
being persons. The category of Person, though, is both higher and deeper - and
broader" (Embers and Stars 122). Here, Kohak defines personhood noetically, in
term s of the I-Thou relations in which w e come to know our fellow beings - no t
just hum an beings - as persons, Thous. And clearly, by saying this K ohak does
not "deny the precious difference[s]" between hum an beings and cats and rocks
(let alone the very real differences between my nephew and the born-again Bible
thum pers at m y door earlier today). Rather, he simply acknow ledges the rich
diversity and illimitably w ide scope of our relational lives. Further dow n the
sam e page, in fact, Kohak details the textured plurality of our 'interpersonal' lives
w hen he concludes, "I w ould not apologize for m y distinctiveness: I cherish the
millenia of humnnitns whose heir I am. There are, though, the cellar holes; there
are the raccoons and the birches, there is the moon and the spirit of G od, ever
p resent am id the hum of the sun-w arm forest and the ageless boulders" (122123). Cellar holes, raccoons, birch trees, the m oon and God are, obviously
enough, radically other than, and different from, hum an beings; w ho w ould
w ant to argue otherwise? And yet, like hum an beings, they, too, can be
encountered as persons. Only when "person" is equated with "hum an person" as it is w ithin the fram ework of Kultgen's noematic prejudice - does this shared
personhood cause m isunderstanding.

R ather than creating a "theoretical and ethical disaster," as K ultgen w ould
have us believe, our experiential knowledge and reflective recognition of the
actual a n d /o r potential personhood of our nonhum an fellow creatures provides
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a fertile ground in which our respect and compassion for such creatures m ay be
sow n a n d /o r cultivated. To know our fellow beings as persons, and not merely
things, opens up the possibility of treating them in a respectful and
com passionate - ethically responsible - m anner. According to Kohak,
In the encounter of persons, categories of respect - moral categories
- are in order. N ot sim ply categories of purpose: purpose can also
be mechanical and pointless. N or categories of causality. Rather it
is the categories of respect, of good and evil, of right and w rong,
that govern the encounters of perso n s.... That is the fundam ental
sense of speaking of reality as personal: recognizing it as Thou, and
our relation to it as profoundly and fundam entally a moral relation,
governed by the rule of respect.
It is in that sense that any consistent ethic m ust needs be
personalis tic, and doubly so - according to all beings the respect
d ue to persons and recognizing the m odel of a com m unity of
persons which Kant described as the "kingdom of ends" as the root
m etaphor for understanding the moral sense of reality. For a
person, ultim ately, is not just a being who possesses a psyche or
m anifests certain personality traits as m uch as a being w ho stands
in a m oral relation to us, a being we encounter as a Thou (Embers
and Stars 122 & 128-129).
O ur respect - and com passion - for our fellow beings is rooted in our encounters
w ith them as persons recognized as such; ethical responsibility involves, above
all, treating our fellows as persons, respectfully and compassionately. Rather
than an ethical disaster, this seems to provide a prom ising, although necessarily
contextual and am biguous, fram ework within which to pose our m oral questions
and enact our ethical responses.

H ow ever, such a personalistic understanding of ethical responsibility is
incom patible w ith Kultgen's moral vision; and it is here, as he outlines his own
m oral agenda, that Kultgen reveals the source of his stubborn adherence to the
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noem atic prejudice and his consistent m isreading of Buber’s ideas. In Kultgen's
ow n w ords,
The core of m orality in m y view consists in respect for persons as
persons and the consideration of their interests on a par w ith one’s
own. The m oral person also cares in a lesser way for the interests
of creatures other than persons w hen they have interests. A nd
lastly he or she accepts responsibility for the environm ent insofar as
his or her actions affect it and it in turn affects the interests of
persons and other creatures w ith interest (63).
Two m utually informing engines drive Kultgen's ethical vision: an im plicit
definition of personhood and an acknow ledgm ent of, and respect for, the
interests of persons - and, to a lesser degree, of other interest-holders. Both
engines are fueled by a noematic and atomistic understanding of relationality and thus, reality - in which certain beings are (or are not) persons and certain
beings have (or do not have) interests. With these categories in place, K ultgen’s
next step involves setting up criteria to distinguish the persons from nonpersons
and the interest-holders from those who lack interests. And this he does w ith
am azing ease and confidence. "As far as we can tell with any certainty, only
hum ans are true persons and perhaps not all of them" (64). W hile K ultgen insists
that his "conception of ethics makes it fundamentally dependent on science,
technology, and social engineering" (63), the scientific bases for such claims
escape me. One criterion for evaluating personhood, however, seems to be the
ability to articulate one's interests. Later on he writes,
The m ost distinctive thing about persons is that they speak w hen
spoken to. They tell us things about the w orld and especially about
them selves which we could not otherwise know. Most relevant to
ethics is that they tell us that they have interests which we should
take into consideration in interacting with them. C ontrapositively,
a being who does not speak about its interests is, taking it for w hat
it presents itself to be, a nonperson (68).
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H ow ever, Kultgen adm its that some "nonpersons" also have interests even
though they can't articulate them. "Higher anim als are not persons, b u t they
have interests that deserve our consideration. O ther organism s m ay have
interests, though personally I find it impossible to feel m oral obligations tow ard
m icrobes, m ildew and the like. I can see no reason at all to attribute interests to
inorganic objects or obligations tow ard them to ourselves" (64). In sum , it seems
that in order to w arrant ethical consideration a being m ust have interests (a
determ ination which we presum ably make through rigorous scientific
investigation), and in order to be a person, that being m ust be able to
com m unicate those interests. More simply, person = hum an person. And since
the com m unication of interests assumes that one has an understandable and
acknow ledged voice am ong the arbiters of personhood, it will rem ain an issue
open to debate w hether or not the very young, the comatose and those w ith
severe developm ental disabilities/challenges, as well as blacks, w om en, Jews,
Catholics, N ative Americans, homosexuals, the homeless and very poor - nam e
any group of hum an beings that is or has been denied full personhood w ithin the
dom inant discourse of the times - qualify as persons.

A nd while I find absolutely nothing "scientific" about Kultgen's analysis,
the narrow scope and rigid inflexibility of his m oral agenda do, in fact, allow him
to m eet his other prim ary criterion for a viable ethic: efficacy. On page 64 he
writes,
Furtherm ore, the moral person not only w ants to be m oral, but he
or she also w ants m orality to work - that is, for m oral attitudes and
practices to be widely shared and effective in prom oting the
interests of beings that have interests. But for m orality to w ork,
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then, we m ust distinguish persons rigorously from subpersons, and
both from nonpersons. Saying "You" to everything, far from
nourishing You-saying to those who really count, trivializes it and
m ay even in the end sap our appreciation for the distinctive nature
of nonpersons.
Indeed, once we know who the interest-holding persons are (and w ho they are
not), our ethical decisions become m uch simpler, less am biguous, and their
legislating and adm inistering become fairly straightforw ard affairs. Of course,
w hether or not such a 'm orality' rings true to experience, is at all just, or can even
be called m oral in any real sense, are questions left unansw ered by Kultgen's
search for efficacy; cam paigns of genocide and wholesale exterm ination - not to
m ention the countless individual cases of brutality, violation and victim ization are often carried out with extreme efficiency once the perpetrators have
effectively denied the potential personhood of their victims and relegated them
to the exclusive status of nonpersons or subpersons (I have no idea to w hat this
latter designation refers; Kultgen never defines it. From the context in w hich he
uses it, it appears to be another category of beings who aren’t full-fledged
interest-bearers able to tell us about their interests.). A workable ’ethic,’
purchased at the price of narrow definitions, lim ited scope and the wholesale
exclusion of so m any beings from ethical consideration, is, at best, a fanciful pipe
dream and, at w orst, a license for brutality. Despite our desire to sim plify the
complexities attendant to our moral decisions and actions, am biguity and risk an d the uncertainty and doubt that (fortunately, at times) accom pany them m ust rem ain. This seems especially so when we recognize the potentially
universal scope of our ethical responsibility, where any creature m ay address us
as a Thou - a person - and call forth our ethical response. And yet, to deny
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categorically this possibility and the claims it may m ake upon us, sim ply for the
sake of efficacy, is nothing less than a failure of moral courage.

Kultgen, then, in his desire to articulate a workable, interest-based
environm ental ethic, has defined personhood in such a narrow and noem atic
w ay that his entire understanding of relationality - and, consequently, I-Thou
relations - is skewed by the noematic prejudice through which his analysis is
filtered. Given his definitions, where Thou = person = hum an, and his
exclusively noem atic understanding of dialogue, Kultgen is quite correct to say
that hum an beings cannot encounter nonhum ans in I-Thou relations. And, in
tru th , w e cannot - as long as such a vision impairs our capacity to see things
otherwise. For if we insist that nonhum an beings are exclusively Its, then this
insistence will define our relations with them, and Its they will be - objects to
experience and use, resources to develop (or perhaps even m anage and conserve)
for the good of hum an persons of intelligible voice. How ever, once the noematic
prejudice is bracketed and we once again define personhood in noetic terms,
w here a person is a being whom we m ay encounter as a Thou, a very different
conclusion emerges - one that is not only phenom enologically correct b u t also
true to our experience of nonhum an creatures as Thous. Liberated from arbitrary
definitions and prejudicial projections, we are free not only to entertain the
possibility of I-Thou relations betw een hum ans and nonhum ans, but we are also
free to testify to their actuality in our lives as well as their com pelling im perative
pow er as they inform and guide our ethical decision-making an d action.
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W hat about the more form idable and fundam ental questions posed by
m odern technology? Understood as the deeply entrenched and w idely pervasive
p attern that inform s and shapes the way we live in, and take up w ith, o u r world,
technology presents a serious challenge to the very possibility of I-Thou dialogue
occurring betw een hum an and nonhum an beings.5 W ithin the fram ew ork of
m odern technology, our relational life w ith nature and nonhum an creatures loses
its vocative character. These creatures do not speak to us of them selves; we do
not hear or acknowledge - let alone respond to - their self-speaking address. In
such a silent w orld, any talk of dialogue with nonhum an beings sounds absurd
or, at best, nostalgic, primitivist. Consequently, ethical responsibility, as outlined
in the previous chapter, becomes impossible with regards to such creatures. As
such, I believe the challenge of technology poses a fundam ental threat to the
relevance of my essay and requires both a serious examination and a thoughtful
response.

A ccording to M artin Heidegger, our relations with nature - indeed, reality
- are set w ithin the fram ew ork of m odern technology, the essence of w hich
H eidegger calls "Enframing"(Ge-steJ/) (The Question 19). In his essay entitled
"The Q uestion Concerning Technology," H eidegger defines Enfram ing as "the
gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon m an and
p u ts him in position to reveal the real, in the m ode of ordering, as standing
reserve" (The Question 24). From this definition of Enfram ing it is clear that, for
H eidegger, technology, in its essence, is no mere hum an instrum ent or tool.
Instead, Enfram ing comes to us as a "destining" (Geschick) out of Being that
challenges us to take up with reality as standing reserve. As challenged out of
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Being, we, in turn, challenge reality - probing it, ordering it, securing it for our
ow n use.

Experienced within the fram ework of the dual challenge of Enframing,
nature, too, is revealed to us as a standing reserve or resource (Bestand ).
According to Heidegger, "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be
im m ediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it m ay be on call for a
further ordering" (The Q uestion 17). We, in turn, respond to nature-as-standing
reserve by ordering it, m aking it available, procuring it for our use; in other
w ords, we respond to nature-as-resource by developing it. H ere, the challenge
and the response go hand in hand. As Henry Bugbee observes, "Why, the very
category of resource commits one by implication to developm ent of it"
("Wilderness" 8). As a resource, nature is revealed - and has its being - only in
term s of its ordered and secured function. According to H eidegger, nature-asresource is no longer even an object standing over-against us, but rather,
"completely unautonom ous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the
orderable" (The Question 17).

W ithin the m ode of Enframing, then, the relations betw een hum an beings
and nonhum an, natural resources can never approach the character of a
dialogue. Challenged out of Being, we cannot meet or attend to nature's beings;
w e can only challenge them. A nd nature, as a wholly unautonom ous resource,
has nothing to say in its own right. Given this silent commerce, nature receives
its 'voice' according to the w ay it is revealed to hum an beings w ithin the
fram ew ork of technology. This projected voice says "standing reserve" or
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"resource," and w e respond to it by ordering, securing, developing. But such
com m erce is not a dialogue and carries none of the intimacy, m eaning and
know ledge that dialogue so graciously bestows. Instead, u n d er the rule of
technological Enframing, only truthless Being is revealed, and nothing is left
"free to be as it genuinely is" (Lovitt, Ed. note 13 in H eidegger, The Q uestion 45).

A sim ilar form of technological commerce betw een hum an and nonhum an
beings occurs w hen, according to Albert Borgmann, we take up w ith reality
w ithin the fram ew ork of the device paradigm . For Borgmann, the mechanical
device best illustrates the dom inant pattern m odern technology stam ps upon our
lives. "Positively speaking, the paradigm of the contem porary w orld is the
technological d e v ic e .... The technological device is the radical and increasingly
sh arp separation of m eans from ends" ("The Explanation" 110). In the
technological device, m eans and ends are clearly determ ined according to the
function of a particular device. For example, a "moving sidewalk" is a device
designed to m ove a person from point A to point B effortlessly. This is the
device's function - its end. All of the m achinery and energy required to make
such effortless m ovem ent possible are merely the m eans to procure that end.
Furtherm ore, the desired end is a very clearly defined and highly isolated
function of a far m ore complex event - walking. In this exam ple, one function of
w alking is highlighted while others are neglected or dism issed, and the m eans by
w hich this is accomplished - in effect, a giant conveyor belt for hum ans - is
h id d en a n d /o r m ade as unencroaching as possible. According to Borgm ann, "In
the progress of technology, the function increases in prom inence and purity
w hereas the m achinery shrinks and recedes" ("The Explanation" 111). Ideally, the
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goal of technology is the deliverance of the pure function unencum bered from
the m eans by which it is procured.

W hile this pattern of separating m eans from ends an d isolating functions
m anifests itself m ost clearly in mechanical devices such as m oving sidew alks,
television sets and m icrowave ovens, our relations w ith nature are sim ilarly
m arked by the stam p of the device paradigm . In Technology and the Character
of C ontem porary Life Borgm ann writes, "When we look at a tree accordingly, we
see so m uch lum ber or cellulose fiber; the needles, branches, the bark, an d the
roots are waste. Rock is 5 percent metal and the rest is spoils. A n anim al is a
m achine that produces so m uch meat. W hichever of its functions fails to serve
th at purpose is indifferent or burdensom e” (192). In these exam ples, Borgm ann
illustrates how we take up with nature's creatures within the device paradigm ,
w here m eans and ends are strictly separated. Here, the desired ends - lum ber,
m etal, m eat - are singled out as the sole (important) functions of the tree, rock
and anim al resources. Borgmann calls these isolated functions com m odities
(Technology 43). Lumber is the commodity desired from the tim ber resource;
m etal is the com m odity desired from the mineral resource; m eat is the
com m odity desired from the anim al (either game or livestock) resource. As
resources, n atu re’s creatures are perceived in term s of the com m odities they
deliver - the hum anly designated ends they serve; in turn, w e study, m anipulate,
control, even conserve, these natural resources for the purpose of procuring the
com m odities they offer us.
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Of course, defining these creatures solely in term s of a single, isolated
function is terribly reductive, and in so defining them, they become flat, one
dim ensional an d fragm entary. Accordingly, they can no longer address us in
their ow n right and speak to us of their richness, depth and integrity. U nder the
com m odious functionalism and instrum entality of the device paradigm , the self
speaking voices of the nonhum an beings and things of nature are silenced, and
n atu re becom es nothing m ore than a m ute and lifeless aggregate of natural
resources. As Borgmann explains, "The rule of instrum entality, in L angdon
W inner's expression, allows us to take possession of things and overpow er them.
But in the process we extinguish the life of things and lose touch w ith them ”
(Technology 59). In the language of dialogue, we can no longer m eet them in IThou intercourse. Instead, our relations w ith the beings and things of n ature are
lim ited to those occurring between a developer or consum er and a resource or
com m odity. Unable to speak of itself, and existing solely in term s of hum an
purposiveness and instrum entality, nature is revealed to us as an assem blage of
resources w hose function is to produce commodities for our consum ption. In
turn, we respond, as consum ers - or developers, of m anufacturers, or
distributors, or salespersons along the path traveled by a resource on its w ay to
becom ing a com m odity available for the final goal of hum an consum ption. But,
as w as the case within H eidegger’s technological Enframing, such com m erce is
not a dialogue, and any discussion of dialogical relations occurring w ithin this
comm ercial setting sounds absurd.

Both H eidegger and Borgmann attem pt to describe the dom inant pattern
by w hich w e take up with reality - including nature - under the rule of m odern
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technology. A nd while these patterns differ, certain sim ilarities exist. In both
cases, our relational life w ith nature is severely attenuated. W ithin the
technological paradigm , the deep and engaging voice of nature is reduced to the
flat, one-dim ensional utterance of a resource to be set upon, ordered, secured and
stockpiled, or w hose function is to be isolated and procured as a com m odity. In
turn, the range of appropriate responses available to us involve the enactm ent of
developm ent and consum ption. Framed within these patterns and defined by
our respective roles, dialogue - the reciprocal and m eaningful encounter between
an I and a Thou - seems unlikely, if not altogether impossible. Resources and
com m odities have no voice apart from that projected upon them according to our
needs and desires, and any capacity for attentive listening in us, as developers or
consum ers, is shouted dow n by the m andates of instrum entality, purposiveness
and com m odious intentionality.

I agree w ith H eidegger and Borgmann that the pattern of m odern
technology colors and informs every aspect of our relational lives - including our
relations w ith nature. For me, however, the crucial question rem ains: does this
pattern exclusively and exhaustively define our relations with nature's creatures,
or can we also take up w ith them outside of the technological paradigm ? If we
can only experience nature w ithin the fram ework of technology, then m y entire
project is doom ed from the very beginning. However, if we still have access to
reality outside the rule of technology, then it rem ains possible for the nonhum an
beings and tilings of nature to speak to us as other - both m ore and less - than
standing reserve, resources, commodities; in other w ords, dialogue - I-Thou
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dialogue - betw een attentive hum anity and eloquent, self-speaking n atu re m ay
indeed occur.

N either H eidegger nor Borgmann understands the technological pattern
he describes as exhaustively determ ining the possible ways hum an beings m ay
take u p w ith nature. According to H eidegger, at this point in hum an history we
are "destined" out of Being to set upon nature as a resource u n d e r the challenge
of Enfram ing, which is the essence of technology. This destining is neither a
m atter of hum an choice nor hum an activity. As H eidegger puts it, "Always the
destiny of revealing holds complete sway over man" (The Q uestion 25). And yet,
at the sam e time, this destiny is not simply fate but rather the potential birthplace
of freedom . In the sentence following the one just quoted, H eidegger explains,
"But that destining is never a fate that compels. For m an becomes truly free only
insofar as he belongs to the realm of destining and so becomes one w ho listens
and hears, and not one who is sim ply constrained to obey" (25). Freedom , for the
person living under the rule of technological Enframing, involves recognizing
oneself as destined out of Being in the m ode of Enframing and acknow ledging
this situation for w hat it is. In that recognition and acknow ledgm ent, one
becom es aw are of that destining as a great danger - but a danger that,
recognized, m ay also save. Enframing is the "suprem e danger" because, "As a
destining, it banishes m an into that kind of revealing which is an ordering.
W here this order holds sway, it drives out every other possibility of revealing"
(H eidegger, The Question 27). However, recognized as a danger, the danger is
one th at saves, for in our awareness of the danger, we allow for the possibility of
the "turning" of Being and the replacing of Enframing w ith a new m ode of
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revealing. In this turning, the truth of Being flashes into the truthless Being
revealed in the m ode of Enframing (Heidegger, The Q uestion 45); through such
an in-flashing, hum ans gain "insight into that which is" (Heidegger, The Question
47).

In his essay "The Thing," Heidegger describes a new m ode of revealing
that this turning or in-flashing m ay usher in to replace technological Enframing.
H ere, reality reveals itself not as standing reserve to be aggressively set upon,
ordered and stockpiled, but a place - a 'home' - of authentic h um an "dwelling,"
w here w e stand back and allow for the thinging of things in a w orlding world.
As Albert H ofstadter explains,
There is a w orld of difference between m an's present life as
technological being under the aegis of Gestell, frame, fram ing - in
w hich everything, including m an himself, becomes m aterial for a
process of self-assertive production, self-assertive im position of
hum an will on things regardless of their ow n essential natures and a life in which we w ould genuinely dwell as a hum an being
(Ed. Introduction to Heidegger, Poetry, Language. T hought xv).
As dwellers, we take up with and acknowledge things not according to the
interpretive grids of intentionality we impose upon them as resources, but as the
things they are.6 In letting things thing we let them speak of their being, and in
turn, such speech resounds w ith the truth of Being. A ccording to H eidegger, "If
w e let the thing be present in its thinging from out of the w orlding w orld, then
w e are thinking of the thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let
ourselves be concerned by the thing's w orlding being. Thinking in this way, we
are called by the thing as the thing" (Poetry, Language. T hought 181). In the
m ode of dwelling, hum ans are capable of vocative relations w ith things
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(including the things of nature), w here these things sp eak /en act them selves and
w e acknow ledge their self-articulating address.

A nd, as I've suggested throughout this essay, such vocative relations
im ply vocatio - a sum m ons or call to vocation, vocational response. A ddress and
acknow ledgm ent - speaking and hearing - invite response, and in and through
this dynam ic the possibility of truth, m eaning and authentic hum an existence,
w hich involves, above all else, hum ane action, graciously opens up to us.
According to H ofstadter, by authentic hum an dwelling - and thinking H eidegger m eans
... to exist as a hum an being in an authentic relationship as m ortal
to other mortals, to earth and sky, to the divinities present or
absent, to things and plants and animals; it means, to let each of
these be - to let it presence in openness, in the full appropriateness
of its nature - and to hold oneself open to its being, recognizing it
and responding to it appropriately in one's own being, the w ay in
w hich one oneself goes on, lives; and then, perhaps, in this ongoing
life one m ay hear the call of the language that speaks of the being of
all these beings and respond to it in a m ortal language that speaks
of w hat it hears (Ed. Introduction to Heidegger, Poetry, Language,
T hought x).
O bviously, I find this picture of hum an being as dweller very attractive; it
resonates deeply with the ideas of Buber and Bugbee that I have laid dow n as the
herm eneutical foundation of this essay. To think and dwell, in H eidegger's
sense, m eans to live am ong "the fourfold" and all that has being in som ething
akin to a spirit of dialogue.

Despite these affinities, however, two related question rem ain
unansw ered. First, how do we move from being enfram ers to becom ing
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dwellers? Or, in other w ords, how can we take up w ith things as things and not
resources? In "The Thing” Heidegger writes,
W hen and in w hat way do things appear as things? They do not
appear b\j menus of hum an making. But neither do they appear
w ithout the vigilance of mortals. The first step tow ard such
vigilance is the step back from the thinking that m erely represents that is, explains - to the thinking that responds and recalls.
The step back from the one thinking to the other is no m ere shift of
attitude. It can never be any such thing for this reason alone: that
all attitudes, including the ways in which they shift, rem ain
com m itted to precincts of representational thinking. The step back
does, indeed, depart from the sphere of m ere attitudes. The step
back takes up its residence in a co-responding which, appealed to
in the w orld's being by the w orld's being, answ ers w ithin itself to
that appeal. A m ere shift of attitude is pow erless to bring about the
advent of the thing as thing, just as nothing that stands today as an
object in the distanceless can ever be sim ply sw itched over into a
thing (Poetry, Language, Thought 181-182).
/

For Heidegger, the fundam ental way in which we take up with reality is not
exclusively - or even prim arily - dependent upon hum an consciousness or
volition. To suppose that reality is so plastic that by a conscious shift of attitude
w e can alter the nature of our relations with things is m erely another variation on
the them e of that setting upon characteristic of Enfram ing - another ordering, re
ordering of the order, another m anipulation of the m anipulanda. To say, for
exam ple, "I will shift the way I think in order to replace Enfram ing with
Dwelling," only m ires us deeper w ithin technology and distances us further from
any new m ode of revealing. For Heidegger, the way we take up w ith things is
inform ed at the level of Being. A nd just as we have been challenged out of Being
to set upon reality as standing reserve, so, too, the turning by w hich a new m ode
of revealing - characterized by dwelling, for example - comes to pass also occurs
w ithin Being.
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A nd yet, it also seems clear that in order for the turning to happen, hum an
beings do play a role. In the quote cited above, H eidegger talks about the
im portance of hum an "vigilance," which involves a "stepping back" (an im age
that contrasts strikingly with the setting upon of Enframing) from
representational thinking and its coincident ordering, m anipulating and
controlling. In fact, for Heidegger, vigilance seems to define the p ro p er essence
of the hum an being living under the rule of technology and recognizing the
dangers therein. As he explains in "The Turning," "Man is indeed needed and
used for the restorative surm ounting of the essence of technology. But m an is
used here in his essence that corresponds to tht su rm o u n tin g .... [M ]odern m an
m u st first and above all find his w ay back into the full breath of the space proper
to his essence" (The Question 39). Several pages later H eidegger describes that
essence as "the one who waits, the one who attends upon the com ing to presence
of B ein g ,... the shepherd of Being" (42). To recognize our role in the turning
w ithin Being to involve vigilant waiting, attending and shepherding (and
perhaps, above all, poetical thinking) is no easy task under the rule of
technology, w here a host of aggressive, purpose-laden activities like setting
upon, ordering, m anipulating and developing hold sway. So it appears that the
p ro p er essence of the person living within the technological fram ew ork involves
a subtle and patient subversion of the essence of technology - a subversion we
practice as w e aw ait the "granted gift" of the turning within Being and the
replacem ent of Enfram ing with a new m ode of revealing (Lovitt, Ed.
Introduction in H eidegger, The Question, xxxvi).
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But as we vigilantly aw ait this gift, w hat can we say about our relations
w ith nature's creatures? Until the advent of the turning w ithin Being, can these
creatures speak to us as som ething other than natural resources? According to
H eidegger, nature may, potentially, be revealed (indeed, has been so revealed at
other tim es in hum an history) as other than a resource, but still held in the
destining of Enfram ing, we cannot actually know nature as other than a resource.
Until Enfram ing is replaced by a new, more truthful m ode of revealing, our
comm erce w ith nature rem ains just that: the commercial interaction between a
resource and a developer. Technological Enframing does not completely and
exhaustively define all potential relations with nature in the future (so, in this
sense, H eidegger is not a determinist), but it does appear to inform and
determ ine all relations occurring under its present, all-encom passing rule. As
long as Enfram ing holds sway, things cannot thing; they cannot articulate
them selves independently of our imposed representations and projected
purposes.

A nd it is this seem ingly inescapable conclusion of H eidegger's description
and interpretation of the m odern technological paradigm w ith which I m ust take
issue. The basis of my disagreem ent w ith Heidegger is not theoretical, per se; for
the m ost part, I find his treatm ent of technology rem arkably compelling,
insightful and on the mark. And yet, for me, it fails the ultim ate
phenom enological test - the test that all paradigm atic explanations m ust pass if
they are to be truly illum inating and elucidating: the test of experience.7 A nd
here, instead of ringing true, it clanks sharply against m y ow n experiences and
those w itnessed to by others. Despite the pervasive im print of the pattern of
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m odern technology upon every facet of our lives, I cannot agree w ith H eidegger
th at this pattern exclusively and comprehensively determ ines our present
relational life w ith our fellow beings - hum an or otherwise. Experience suggests,
and I 'faith' ('believe' sounds too hollow and arbitrary here), that the things and
beings w ith w hom we share our existence can and do speak them selves to us,
and w e, in all our habituated, technologically-conditioned deafness, still retain
the capacity, how ever truncated, to hear their self-speaking address apart form
our purposes and intentions; and what's more, we can respond in a m anner
com m ensurate with their eloquent evocation. In other w ords, w e can not only
experience our fellow creatures as resources - Its - b u t also, on occasion, m eet
them as som ething more, less and other than resources - Thous; dialogue rem ains
a possibility that m ay be graciously actualized - here and now. For me, any
satisfactory account of technology, if it is not to m is-speak or betray the bedrock
"reality" of such encounters, m ust allow for their possibility and attem pt to
interpret their significance for the way we live our lives.

So now , let's return to Albert Borgmann's treatm ent of technology, w here
w e find a present and actual counterpart to the technological commerce
instantiated under the device paradigm . Clearly, for Borgm ann, the pattern of
technology dom inates; nature speaks to us (is given 'voice') prim arily as an
assem blage of resources and commodities, and we respond prim arily as
developers and consumers. But nature can also speak to us as a "focal thing," "a
unique and eloquent thing that addresses us in its own right" (Borgmann,
Technology 181). In fact, according to Borgmann, "On this continent n ature in its
pristine state is the focal pow er which is m ost clearly eloquent in its ow n right
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since it has, through definition as it were, escaped the rule of technology"
(Technology 182). For Borgmann, wild nature can speak to us as som ething
other than a resource; it can speak in its own right, and, presum ably, we can
receive and acknowledge its self-speaking address. W ithin B orgm ann’s
understanding of technology, dialogue with nature's creatures rem ains a
possibility that m ay be realized, not at some unspecified future time, w hen a
rather abstract and m ysterious turning w ithin Being ushers in a new m ode of
revealing, bu t here and now.

But how can we encounter the beings and things of nature outside the
device paradigm ? H ow is it that nature may also speak to us as a focal thing and
not m erely a collection of resources and commodities? Obviously, we cannot
hear the self-speaking voice of nature as long as we take up w ith nature's
creatures exclusively as developers and consumers. For Borgm ann, the
counterpart of these 'commerical' activities is active engagem ent and
participation in a focal practice comm ensurate w ith a focal thing. A ccording to
Borgm ann, "Such a practice is required to counter technology in its patterned
pervasiveness and to guard focal things in their depth and integrity" (Technology
209-210). If such practices are truly to "counter technology" and "guard focal
things," they m ust be practiced in a way that challenges the modus operandi of the
technological pattern. For example, w alking or backpacking is a focal practice
that corresponds to the focal thing of wild nature. But, w ilderness w alking is
not, of necessity, a focal practice that challenges the basic agenda of the device
paradigm . I m ay walk in a wilderness area (for an afternoon or two weeks) fully
entrenched w ithin a thoroughly technological fram ew ork - setting out in order to
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"bag a peak," get some exercise, find some solitude, or even have a w ilderness
experience, m eet God, engage in a focal practice or just have a few I-Thou
dialogues w ith the critters. In all this, the procurative intentionality and
instrum entality of technology rem ain firmly in place; I rem ain a consum er
shopping about the wilderness for commodities, regardless of the sublim e or
’spiritual’ nature of the goods I seek. A nd despite - and m aybe just because of the near-com ic loftiness of my intentions, encountering nature as a truly focal
thing will alm ost surely escape m y 'grasp.' For by definition, focal things,
experienced and acknowledged as such, cannot be reduced to comm odities; they
are unprocurable, and all our efforts to procure them only w ork to distance us
further from their gracious and m eaningful presence as focal things. As
Borgm ann explains,
Such [focal] experiences require openness on our part, but openness
cannot produce or guarantee them. They are essentially
unforeplanned and amazing. Even w hen they are preceded by
calculation and preparation, when they truly come to pass, we
acknow ledge them as surpassing our shrew dness and merit. W hat
is so experienced is the strict counterpart to the device. It is in
principle unavailable and it is so procured on pain of destroying it
as a truly focal thing or event ("The Explanation" 114).
W e come into contact with focal things, not simply because we are w ell-disposed
or open to such contact (although this does play a role), and surely not because
w e set o u t to m ake such encounters happen; rather, through participation in a
focal practice we place ourselves in the presence of, and engage ourselves (body
and m ind, heart and soul) with, focal things that are so staggeringly and
shatteringly eloquent.
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More than anything else, it is this evocative pow er of eloquent, focal
things to break through the silence of our technologically-conditioned deafness
that offers us access to reality - and nature - outside the device paradigm . So, to
retu rn to m y earlier exam ple of wilderness walking, in the process of
accom plishing my realizable backcountry goals ("bagging" m y peaks, exhausting
m y body, tem porarily escaping the societal dem ons that h aunt me), and even in
m y counterproductive striving after those other, essentially unprocurable, goods
(contact w ith wildness, intim ations of divinity, integrated engagem ent,
participation in dialogue), the eloquence of wild nature m ay still overw helm me
and bestow upon me a grace and fulfilment above and beyond any I so
hopelessly sought. A nd, perhaps with time and regular enactm ent, m y
w ilderness w alking m ay become a focal practice truly com m ensurate w ith w ild
nature as a focal thing. As a genuine focal practice, I no longer w alk in w ild
places in order to accomplish anything - although I m ay still do a n d /o r discover
all that I've listed above; focal practices are done for their own sake. So, I w alk in
w ild places to walk in wild places, to immerse myself in the inexhaustible
richness and abiding grace of this wild, focal thing - because, as John M uir so
beautifully put it, it's "the time that will not be subtracted from the sum of your
life" (Quoted in Kittredge 105-106).

W hat I believe M uir testifies to in this phrase is the life-bestowing, lifeaffirm ing and life-directing contact with what is real and w hat really m atters,
contact w ith that which offers m eaning for our lives, contact w ith that w hich
orients and guides us and w hose touch we abandon only at the risk of losing our
w ay - contact with, in Borgmann's terminology, "focal reality." For Borgm ann,
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The term "focal reality" in an essay such as this is sim ply a
placeholder for the encounters each of us has w ith things that of
them selves have engaged m ind and body and centered our lives.
C om m anding presence, continuity with the w orld, and centering
pow er are signs of focal things. They are not w arrants, however.
Focal things w arrant themselves. To present them is never more
than to recall them (Crossing 119-120).
To speak of focal reality and to testify to our participation in, or access to, that
reality, is to accept neither the naive and no longer tenable realism of m odernity,
in w hich reality readily presents itself as a stable, block universe, a flat field of
objects on hand to be experienced, named, understood and m anipulated, nor the
anthropocentric hubris of so m uch postm odernism , w here w hatever we m ean by
reality has no standing apart from that conferred upon it by hum an subjectivity
and w here w hat the philosopher really m eans by nature is "nature-construct" and
w h at the theologian (or better still, the faithful devotee) really m eans by G od is
"god-construct." Instead, focal reality, as I understand it, seem s to point to
reality, not as a static field, but as an occurrence or event rising up betw een a
thing as a presence - firm and 'thick' with its own being, its non-negotiable
otherness - and a co-presence receptive and responsive to this other, beckoning
presence. A nd it seems that the reality of focal things is not so m uch 'proven' by
our ability to kick them, as Berkeley’s empiricism w ould have it, as it is by these
things' self-articulating capacity to step up to us and, at times, stom p on our
heads.

Of course, if we shut ourselves off from eloquent things or shout them
d o w n w ith our projections and conceptual representations, we m ay come to
d o u b t or altogether deny the eloquence of anything and everything. As
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Borgm ann points out, "When a postm odern theorist m akes that claim [that things
lack eloquence] in a w indpw less lecture hall containing h undreds of hum ans,
speaking up on behalf of the voices silenced by the auditorium walls requires
m ore sensitivity and courage than m ost of us can m uster" (Crossing 51). W ithin
the confines of a w orld thoroughly dom inated by hum an artifice and fabrication,
such a postm odern perspective often seems incontrovertibly true. But step
outside the lecture halls and haute espresso bars, and walk in M uir's - or
Thoreau's - footsteps awhile.8 W hat had seemed so undeniably correct in that
sterile and unengaging w orld will, I believe, be exposed as arrogantly false by a
deeper truth as one picks one's way carefully across a steep and crum bly scree
slope, or keeps vigil in an alpine m eadow on a fullmoon night, or as one just sits
to w atch a pika gather hay am ong the rocks on a sunny October day at 9,000 feet.
Focal realism , as I read Borgmann, seems to allow for the eloquence of things like
scree slopes, alpine m eadow s and pikas, while at the same time, it also
acknow ledges the significance and m eaning - the reality - of our encounters w ith
them. A nd while this reality cannot come to fruition apart from, or outside of,
our engaged participation in it, neither can it be reduced to a m ere realityconstruct, the product of our conjuring and willful imposition. Focal reality
occurs betw een us and those things that we come to know as non-negotiably and
irreducibly other than us and our constructs - as focal things that engage us,
speak to us and meet us.

In sum , then, Borgmann's treatm ent of technology, unlike H eidegger’s,
seem s to allow for the present possibility of taking up with nature outside of
technology’s rule. Although the device paradigm is widely and deeply
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instantiated, it is not exhaustive. N ature is not only an assem blage of resources
and com m odities, the passive recipient of our purposive and consum ptive
projections; it can also be an eloquent and self-speaking focal thing. In turn, we
are not only developers and consum ers w hose commerce w ith n atu re is limited
by our procurative and comm odious intentions; we also have the capacity,
particularly through our active participation in focal practices w here we become
fully engaged with, or im m ersed in, the things of nature, to hear and
acknow ledge n ature’s voice as it speaks of itself and in its own right. Through
the resonance of this eloquent speech w ithin the engaged - 'attuned,' perhaps respondent, focal reality emerges: a reality where we find ourselves face to face
w ith som ething real, some "dense and opaque" (Bugbee, Inw ard M orning 163)
other w hose non-negotiable otherness confounds all attem pts to explain it away
as one m ore product of hum an intent a n d /o r making; a reality w here we
recognize and affirm the m eaning and value of these others as well as our beingtogether-w ith-them ; and, finally, a reality where we may find a center of
m eaning from which we can venture forth to live and act - m eaningfully and
responsibly.

For me, it is the twofoldness of Borgmann's account of technology that
rings true. Obviously, even overwhelm ingly, technology informs, and usually
dictates, the terms of our relations w ith nature. But, there is also focal reality and
our encounters with nature as a focal thing. N either m ode of taking u p w ith
nature can be dism issed in any satisfactory account of technology - or experience,
in general. A nd within this twofoldness, as Borgmann describes, acknow ledges
an d interprets it, I see room for the relational twofoldness of which Buber speaks
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- both I-Thou and I-It. Put negatively, I find nothing in Borgm ann's account of
our life u nder the pattern,of m odern technology that excludes the possibility of
our m eeting nonhum an creatures in dialogue. So, while I fully recognize the
indelible m ark technology stam ps on our relations w ith nature, I feel confident,
despite this recognition, in m aintaining that I-Thou dialogues w ith m artens and
m ountains, canyons and ponderosa pines not only can occur, but, in all actuality,
do occur, and that such occurences are im portant for the way we live w ith, and
act tow ard, such creatures.

W ith the possibility and actuality of dialogue comes the possibility of
ethical responsibility. N ature as a resource or a com m odity m akes no self
speaking claims upon us; under technology's rule, we do all the claiming.
Therefore, we cannot talk about our ethical responsibility to nature in any
m eaningful sense of the word. Of course, we m ay still speak of environm ental
ethics and em ploy the rhetoric of conservation - resource m anagem ent, sustained
yield, wise use, m ultiple use, etc. But to practice ethical responsibility to
nonhum an nature, nature's creatures m ust speak to us, not as natural resources,
b u t as and of themselves, independent of our categories of use and purpose.
Practicing ethical responsibility requires the presence of an eloquent, self
speaking other to w hom one responds. Only as the beings and things of nature
ad d ress us in their own right, and we receive their address, can they call forth the
respect and compassion upon which we may ground our ethical response.

IV.

ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO N O NHU M AN CREATURES: A

GENERAL

OVERVIEW
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So now, having responded to both the challenge of the noem atic prejudice
and the challenge of technology, and having, I hope, m aintained the veracity and
integrity of the three prem ises stated earlier, I w ould like to return to Buber's
philosophy of dialogue and examine w hat the practice of ethical responsibility
tow ard nonhum an creatures m ight look like - for him and for me. A nd while
Buber m akes it unm istakably clear that I-Thou relations can and do occur
betw een hum an and nonhum an beings, he and his contem porary interpreters say
very little about how the m eaning and knowledge received in these encounters
are em bodied in ethical response. The account of his I-Thou relation w ith the
tree, for exam ple, does not proceed beyond the description of the encounter I
quoted earlier; he does not move on to suggest how such a m eeting claims us and
calls us forth to actualize its m eaning responsively - ethically. H ow ever, while
discussing our relations with nonhum an beings (and, quite specifically, nonsentient beings in this particular instance) in his "Afterword" to I and Thou,
Buber writes, "What m atters in this sphere [our relations w ith non-sentient
things] is that we should do justice with an open m ind to the actuality that opens
u p before us" (173). While I suppose it is possible to read this passage in a less
explicitly ethical way, I believe Buber m eans for us to "do justice" in our relations
w ith trees and rocks (a fairly radical notion for his day - for our day - no m atter
how one chooses to read the passage) not only by becom ing aw are of the self
speaking address of such creatures, but also by practicing responsibility - ethical
responsibility - as we move to actualize and incarnate the m eaning and
know ledge received in these encounters through our actions a n d /o r non-actions.
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In addition, given the rhythm of dialogue and responsibility outlined in
Buber's w ork and in this paper, it is inconceivable that trees and the like could
address us, and we could enter into dialogue w ith them , w ithout such events
m aking claims upon us and informing our decisions and actions regarding these
creatures. For, as stated in C hapter Two of this paper, the very m eaning of the
address received in the m om ent of dialogue lies in its evocative force; it is a
sum m oning address that calls for an answer, beckons for a response. The
evocative voice of the other, heard and acknow ledged as such, places us in a
situation of responsibility, regardless of w hether or not the particular other
w hom we meet is hum an, sentient or alive. As Emmanuel Levinas explains,
"[A]nd the tree, too, instead of being of use to me or dissolving into a series of
phenom enal appearances, can confront me in person, speak to me and elicit a
re sp o n se .... I am in a m easure obligated by it" (145). A nd yet, the sum m oning
address of the tree not only places us under obligation; through the know ledge
and m eaning received in such an encounter we may also find ourselves
em pow ered and directed to act with decisiveness, com m itm ent and integrity. In
receiving the self-spoken address of the tree in the I-Thou relation, we come to
know the tree in an intim ate and m eaningful, although decidely non-objective
w ay, recognizing its otherness, independence, integrity and non-instrum ental
value, while at the same time acknowledging the ties of our co-creaturely kinship
- our fundam ental being-together. Here, the obligation and know ledge - the
responsibility and m eaning - received in the I-Thou dialogue come together. As
w e attem pt to respond to the exigencies present in the call of our fellow beings,
w e will, at the same time, seek to em body our dialogically-sponsored know ledge
of these beings - as both other and kin - in respectful and caring, com passionate
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action. A nd, conversely, to know these beings in such an intim ate w ay
engenders a n d /o r deepens our desire to affirm them in com m itted, responsible
action. In such instances, we find ourselves obligated in a w ay that has nothing
to d o w ith the m ore compulsory or heteronom ous connotations that so often
d isto rt our understanding of obligation; we are obliged to respond to the
evocative claim of the other and from the depths of our concern an d m utual
affirm ation. For Buber, such affirmation is critical in our relations w ith
no n h u m an beings such as trees. As Malcolm Diam ond writes, "W hat is of central
significance for Buber is our ability to affirm the tree as existing just as it is, in its
ow n right, independently of our purposes" (30). Clearly, such affirm ation, if it is
truly genuine, will m anifest itself in our decisions and actions concerning these
creatures. Examined in this light, then, "doing justice" in our relations w ith trees
- or bears or m ountain ranges - becomes, most fundam entally, a m atter of
'affirm ative action,' so to speak; it is an attem pt to "put to the proof in action" (as
Buber says) our affirmation of the other - and, at the same time, ourselves sponsored in the sacram ent of dialogue.

As we come to recognize that not only hum an beings but also trees and
w ildflow ers and m ountains speak to us in ways that call forth our response, the
fundam entally vocative and responsive character of our existence, w rit large,
daw ns u p on us w ith increasing clarity. That is, we become aw are of ourselves as
creatures w ho are called upon and w ho m ust venture to answ er, not only to the
call of the particular, finite beings whom we meet in the countless relational
events of our daily lives, but also for the very m eaning of our creaturely
existence. According to the philosophical/theological anthropology outlined in
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the previous chapter, our creatureliness comes to us as a sum m ons or vocation- a
task that we, in our uniqueness, are called upon to fulfill and for which we alone
are responsible. Furtherm ore, we practice responsibility for this task - to become
ever m ore fully the creatures we are created to be - in and through our
participation in m eaningful, dialogical relations - holy intercourse - w ith our
fellow creatures in the ongoing process of creation. Therefore, as w e step out to
m eet our fellow creatures in dialogue and attem pt to actualize the m eaning and
know ledge received in such encounters through our concrete actions, we come to
recognize our existence as, at root, vocational and, at the sam e time, move
tow ard fulfilling the very task for which we have been sum m oned.

For Buber, this existential vocation is all-encom passing and finds its
fulfillm ent only insofar as all aspects of our relational life are inform ed by the
spirit of dialogue, including our relations with creatures like trees and herons
and waterfalls. We cannot practice responsibility for the creaturely task
entrusted to us if we close ourselves off from, and fail to acknowledge, the
address of our nonhum an fellow creatures as they speak to us in their own right.
In his essay entitled "What is Man?” Buber explains,
In virtue of his nature and his situation m an has a threefold living
relation. He can bring his nature and situation to full reality in his
life if all his living relations become essential. A nd he can let
elem ents of his nature and situation remain in unreality by letting
only single living relations become essential, while considering and
treating the others as unessential.
M an's threefold living relation is, first, his relation to the w orld and
to things, second, his relation to men - both to individuals and to
the m any - third, his relation to the m ystery of being - w hich the
philosopher calls the Absolute and the believer calls G od, and
w hich cannot in fact be eliminated from the situation even by a
m an who rejects both designations.
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The relation to things is lacking in Kierkegaard, he know s things
only as similes. In Heidegger it can be found only as a technical,
purposive relation. But a purely technical relation cannot be an
essential one, since it is not the whole being and the whole reality of
the thing one is related to which enter into the relation, but just its
applicability to a definite aim, its technical suitab ility .... But
besides, and in the m idst of this, there is a m anifold relation to
things in their wholeness, their independence, and their
purposelessness. The m an who gazes w ithout purpose on a tree is
no less "everyday" than the one who looks at a tree to learn w hich
branch w ould make the best stick (Between 177 &178).
If w e are to become m ore fully and authentically the hum an creatures we are
created to be, our relations with nonhum an creatures m ust become, in Buber's
w ords, "essential." O ur creaturely task extends to our relations w ith anim als,
plants and rocks, as well as hum an beings, and approaches fulfillm ent as w e take
u p w ith these creatures in a spirit of dialogue, ready and available to m eet them
as Thous w ho m ay speak to us of themselves from out of the depths of their
otherness, integrity and non-instrum ental value. Conversely, we fail to practice
responsibility for this task - and deny ourselves that degree of authenticity
available to us in our brokenness and finitude - if our relations w ith nonhum an
beings are defined exclusively in terms of It, where we deny or silence the self
speaking eloquence of the beings and things we meet and sum m arily reduce
them to resources that exist solely for our appropriation, developm ent and use.
For Buber, to become the creatures we are created to be we m ust rem ain open
and alive to the voice of all creation (singing out in and through all its
particularity) and the possibility - unlim ited and, at the same time, alw ays
unprocurable and unforeseeable - of I-Thou dialogue, even w ith trees and
m ountain streams.
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In and through our participation in dialogue w ith our fellow beings we
practice responsibility for our creaturely task and come to know , albeit partially,
a sense of authenticity and vocational integrity in our lives. We receive an
intim ation - oftentim es perhaps no m ore than a hazy apparition - of w ho w e are
and w ho we are called to become, as well as the finally unbridgeable gap
betw een the two, and this sensibility funds our conscience (in Buber's sense) and
inform s our decision-making and acting. It is from out of the depths of this
personal aw areness of who we are (and who we are not) and our sense of

.

creaturely vocation that we respond to the address of our fellow creature as we
struggle to incarnate both the m eaning of a particular relational event and the
m eaning of our existential being-called-upon in ethical action. A nd if, as
discussed above, the self-speaking call of our nonhum an fellow creatures,
received as such, elicits our respect and compassion, then our aw areness of the
task entrusted to us to fulfill through our co-creaturely participation in the
m utuality of creation may provide us with the personal strength and direction to
em body that respect and compassion in non-arbitrary, com m itted action - ethical
action. As we come to recognize ever m ore clearly w ho we m ay be - in all our
creatureliness - we m ay find the capacity and knowledge to act as we m ust - w ith
regards to our fellow creatures.

Finally, in and through the I-Thou dialogues with our fellow creatures
shines the presence of the sponsoring and enduring Creator, w ho addresses us in
and through the m ultitude of events that make up the ongoing process of
creation. As we avail ourselves to the address of the tree and the m ountain goat
and m eet them in I-Thou dialogue, we meet, co-presently, the eternal Thou.
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According to Buber, "But w hat is greater for us than all enigm atic webs at the
m argins of being is the central actuality of an everyday hour on earth, w ith a
streak of sunshine on a m aple twig and an intim ation of the eternal You" (I and
Thou 135-136). Certainly, neither the m aple twig nor m ountain goat is the
eternal Thou; like us, they are finite creatures - derivative beings sponsored and
anim ated from a source outside themselves. A nd yet, as w e m eet these fellow
creatures, in all their - and our - creatureliness and finitude, we find our lives
graced by the presence of the non-derivative and unconditioned, w hich Buber
calls the eternal Thou. Illum inated by this holy - and wholly O ther - glow, our IThou relations with trees and goats become nothing less than sacram ent and
revelation, in and through which the divine presence becomes m ainfest and, to a
degree, even articulate as it dwells am ong us - betw een us.

A nd, as w e participate in these sacramental, revelatory encounters, we
find ourselves called upon - com m anded - to incarnate the grace and m eaning
received in them through our actions and non-actions. That is, we receive not
only the grace and guidance of the divine presence but also the concomitant
responsibility of the divine imperative. For Buber, this is the core of the divinehum an dialogue: God speaks to us - and sum m ons us - in and through the
particular events of our everyday lives, and we respond to this divine address and claim - through our decisions and actions regarding these same events.
Concerning the specifics of this "contentless" divine address and our attem pts to
respond to it in an ethically decisive m anner, we can say nothing apart from the
concrete particularity of the situations in which we find ourselves divinely called
upon. In each m om ent, God calls upon us, in w holly new and unforeseeable
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w ays, to decide and act, in equally new and spontaneous ways. A nd yet, as
stated in the previous chapter, w hat God dem ands of us m ay be nothing other
than the Ten C om m andm ents or the divine injunction in Micah, w hich dem ands
"justice," "love," and that we "walk humbly" w ith God. But w e m ust rem em ber
that these are not prescriptions for ethical conduct that we m ay apply universally
and abstractly to the unique events of decision and choice. Rather, they are
com m ands that w e m ust hear afresh and anew as they are spoken to us - equally
afresh and anew - in the concrete, particular and altogether unforeseeable
situations of our lives; as Friedm an explains, we m ust "re-hear" these com m ands
again and again, according to the unique exigencies of each situation
(Touchstones 137).

W ith this in m ind, then, let us return for a m om ent to the tree and the
m ountain goat, considering the fresh and radical w ays we m ay re-hear these
traditional im peratives within the context of our I-Thou relations w ith such
creatures. W hat m ight "justice," "love,” and "humble walking" entail w ith regard
to trees? W hat if, in our dealings with m ountain goats we find ourselves obliged
to curb, or refrain altogether from, those actions by which we "steal" from them,
"covet" w hat seems to be rightfully theirs, "bear false witness" against them, and,
m ore plainly perhaps, "do m urder" against them?9 In suggesting that such
considerations are relevant for our treatm ent of trees and m ountain goats,
how ever, I am not arguing for yet another version of "moral extensionism," in
w hich traditional norm s or rights are stretched and applied to cover our relations
w ith all creatures. That kind of universality and abstraction is antithetical to the
practice of ethical responsibility. Rather, I wish to acknowledge the possibility
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th at in o u r encounters w ith such creatures we m ay re-hear these guidelines,
perhaps w ith a m eaning and richness heretofore unconsidered, and find
ourselves called upon to act in consonance w ith them. Furtherm ore, it seems that
only in such instances, in which we are able to re-hear these com m ands anew (as
they are revealed and re-revealed a n ew ), do we discover their relevance and
m eaning in term s of our uniquely personal ethical responsibility. For, as
suggested throughout this paper, responsibility m eans responding, which can
never be separated from the claims which one hears and to which one responds.

Therefore, like our ethical responsibility in general, our capacity for
responsible action with regards to nonhum an creatures like trees and buzzards is
rooted in our actual participation in the sacram ent of dialogue. As we meet our
fellow creatures in dialogue we find ourselves addressed not only by a present,
finite other - this very larch or that particular stand of aspens - but also by the
m eaning of our creatureliness and by the ineffable m eaning and m ystery that
perm eates and circumscribes our co-derivative, co-creaturely being- togetherw ith creatures like larches and aspens. And, in the reception and
acknow ledgm ent of this threefold address, which comes to us as the call of the
situation in toto , our lives are graced by a sense of w hat Bugbee calls finality that deep and abiding awareness and affirmation of the prim al m eaning and
fundam ental reality of our m utual co-existence. M oreover, for Bugbee, finality
comes to us as the "spring" of responsible, necessary action (Inw ard M orning
207). The know ledge and m eaning received in the situation of dialogue cry out
for incarnation and place us in a position of responsibility, while at the sam e time
em pow ering us and guiding us to act with integrity and com m itm ent - certainty.
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That is, as finality daw ns upon us, we may find the strength and direction to act
as w e m ust, and, likewise, through the em bodim ent of necessary action our
apperception of finality m ay come to us anew, renew ed and deepened. For, it
also seem s that in acting as we m ust, we may gain access to integrity, m eaning
an d that deep-seated capacity for affirmation which is called faith.

This, then, seems to be the rhythm at the heart of the relationship betw een
dialogue and responsibility described generally, and in considerable detail, in the
tw o previous chapters and briefly sketched out here w ithin the narrow er scope
of o u r relations with nonhum an creatures. O ur I-Thou relations w ith trees and
bears and rivers, no less than our I-Thou relations w ith hum an beings, are
characterized by the anim ating and em pow ering dynam ic of claim and
responsibility. These creatures, too, address us in ways that dem and our
response - our ethical response.

V.

REFLECTIVE EXPLORATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF ETHICAL
RESPONSIBILITY

But how, specifically, do we practice ethical responsibility tow ards
trees an d bears and rivers? H ow does this rhythm of dialogue and responsibility
m anifest itself in our real-life decisions and actions? Well, that all depends upon the m eaning and knowledge received in those situations in w hich we find
ourselves addressed. Although certain readers m ay w ant som ething a bit m ore
tangible and substantive here, perhaps som ething bearing m ore resem blance to a
com prehensive, widely-applicable theory of environm ental ethics, I m ust insist
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on the experiential, non-prescriptive, non-verifiable and non-objective (m eta
objective) nature of ethical responsibility. In a certain sense, such an ethic is not
'applicable' to the questions and scenarios of environm ental ethics as it is often
understood. We cannot practice responsibility tow ard nonhum an creatures by
applying universal norm s and maxims to the concrete, particular situations in
w hich w e m ust decide and act w ith regards to them; responsibility alw ays m eans
responding from the depths of who we are and to that w hich addresses us - here
and now.

How ever, just because ethical responsibility is non-applicable, that does
not m ean that it is irrelevant or som ehow limiting. In fact, I w ould suggest that it
liberates our ethical discourse and frees us to speak plainly about those things
that m atter to us most. No longer are w e bound to form ulate universal
principles, such as, say, "Equal rights for all species," which, despite the residual
afterglow of truth toward which it points, strikes us as som ehow disingenuous,
trivializes and reduces the richness and diversity of our co-creaturely beingtogether, and makes a farce of our actual practices. And yet, bound w ithin a
universalist fram ew ork, to say less betrays our experience of certain things especially non-sentient and non-living things - as deeply and irreducibly
m eaningful, non-instrum entally valuable, and em inently respectw orthy, while,
at the sam e time, potentially justifies all m anner of m orally reprehensible and
irresponsible actions. Here, it seems that our insistence on universally
prescriptive norm s has trapped us in an untenable and unsatisfying e ith e r/o r
situation. W hat is called for here, however, is neither a pointless default to
relativism and subjectivism nor frustrated and resigned silence; w hat is called
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for, perhaps, is a different way of speaking. We need to reflect honestly and
articulate faithfully concerning those things w hich have spoken to us m ost
forcefully and eloquently, and which have called upon us to act w ith respect and
concern. O ur ethical discourse needs to take on a m ore reflective, descriptive
and testim onial voice, rather than the prescriptive, norm ative, universalist one
that seem s to m is-speak or distort the fundam ental sources that ground and
sponsor o ur actions. W ithin the fram ework of ethical responsibility, w e are freed
from these corrupting lim itations and free to tell our ethical narratives - to bear
witness to the eloquence of things that have spoken to us of themselves and in
their ow n right And through the telling, insofar as we speak honestly and from
the heart, w e reveal the em pow ering experiential roots of our decisions and
actions and, in a sense, validate them, while, at the sam e time, call others to a
shared receptivity regarding like things and invite them to tell their own stories
of concern and commitment.

So, for a m om ent, let's consider Buber's tree in the discourse of ethical
responsibility. W ould the ethical response to such an I-Thou encounter involve
chopping the tree dow n to m ake a parking lot or to clear a 'view'? N ot likely.
But suppose the tree became infected with a term inal disease and posed a serious
threat to the life and health of all the trees around it. N ow our decision is not so
easy; w e m ay have to consider the option of chopping dow n the tree. W hat have
w e learned from this scenario? Very little, really - except that our I-Thou
encounter does not exclude the possibility of chopping dow n the tree; our ethical
responsibility cannot take place in a vacuum of exclusive concern.
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A nd yet, even in such a brief and superficial account, w e learn how
quickly the discourse of ethical responsibility can degenerate into precisely the
kind of hypothetical arm -w aving and conjecture we are trying to avoid. For
really, Buber gives us absolutely no context for his encounter, and w hen we
attem p t to 'fill in the blanks' w ith hypothetical scenarios and circum stances, the
event and its consequent m eaning lose all sense of reality. Buber's encounter
w ith the tree was em bedded in a rich contextual matrix; we have only the
isolated event to interpret. But it is precisely this isolation that m akes the event
uninterpretable - in Albert Borgmann's w ords, "ambiguous." According to
Borgm ann, "Every term is am biguous in isolation, but norm ally am biguity is
resolved in context" (Technology 54). Removed from its m eaningful contextual
m ilieu, this tree, which may have been so eloquent for Buber, says nothing - or at
least nothing m eaningful or intelligible - to us; we receive nothing of the strength
or presence upon which we m ay ground an ethical response.10 Like the
particular encounters that ground and sponsor them , our ethically responsible
decisions and actions are always deeply situational, contextual affairs. It seems
fair to say that the rhythm of dialogue and responsibility at work here can only
be em ployed w ithin the concurrent and encom passing song of "imm ersion and
com m itm ent,” which Bugbee discusses in Inward M orning (and which,
incidentally, he introduces by way of two narratives) (42-54). The gracious
m anifestation of dialogical encounters with our fellow creatures not only
requires our engaged participation in the ongoing process of creation; it is
precisely our imm ersion in this flow that allows us to hear the self-speaking
address of things and to respond wholeheartedly w ithin a larger fram ew ork of
m eaning.
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So, w hat about the ethical im port of m y encounter with the pine m arten?
H ere, this event comes to me fully em bedded w ithin a rich and, to som e degree,
interpretable context; ambiguity, while not entirely lacking, is surely lessened. I
encountered the m arten in late afternoon, on a sum m er day, in w estern M ontana,
on the Flathead National Forest, the Mission M ountain W ilderness, Piper Creek
drainage, etc. And, concurrent with this superficial account of the tem poral and
geographical context, I can also draw upon the recollection of the state of my
spirit that day, m y happy tirednesss, thirstiness, and carelessness, the m em ory of
a com panion and our happy banter, the loose-armed, gravity-driven bounce of
m y w alk as we ambled along the gradually descending trail, and the angles of
afternoon light and shadow , the warm th of splintered, diffused sunshine; all this,
along w ith a million other stimuli - some rem em bered, others forgotten or never
consciously acknow ledged - surely inform this relational event and m y
response(s) at som e level. A lthough far from exhaustive, I can place the event
w ithin this context of m eaning and, likewise, place m y attem pt to articulate a
response.

A nd, as is often the case in such instances, my initial response was to do
nothing, really, beyond lingering for a m om ent to bath in the halo of joy and
grace circum scribing the event. A nd yet, clearly, the story doesn't end here; I
carry som ething of that light - the strength and pow er of reciprocity, im m ediacy
and presence - with me, and this illum inates and inform s m y subsequent
decisions and actions. Of course, that particular m arten is m ost likely dead, and,
if it w ere alive, it seems unlikely that I will ever see it again and even more
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unlikely - quite impossible, really - that, were I to see it again, I’d recognize it as
that sam e m arten I encountered so m any years ago. In this instance, then, it
seem s that the force of address received in that particular m eeting extends
o utw ard in concentric circles of inclusiveness.

O n the wall of a certain roadhouse/lodge in central Idaho hangs a fairly
recent photograph of a trapper proudly displaying the several hundred dead
m artens that he caught that season - in, I w ould assum e, steel leghold traps. O n
the few occasions I visit that place each year, I find the picture unsettling and
disturbing. No, I w ould not trap martens; I w ould not buy their fur or that of
other "fur-bearing m am m als" (a term that, in itself, betrays an exclusively
instrum entalist orientation with regards to such creatures - now reduced to, and
defined as, a fur resource, an It). Yes, I would support a ban on using leghold
traps to capture and eventually kill such animals. And finally, and m ost
im portantly, I w ould place the highest priority on the preservation of relatively
u ndisturbed m arten habitat, so that a healthy and thriving breeding population
of m artens could evolve independently of heavy-handed hum an m anipulation
and interference.

H aving stated these few, and relatively tame, positions, I will m ost likely
face a whole battery of charges to which I m ust respond. And that’s as it should
be; in attem pting to articulate a response to these charges I am forced to return to
the source(s) that engendered a n d /o r inform ed the positions in question, while,
at the sam e time, I am confronted w ith their possible repercussions and open
m yself to other, perhaps competing claims, to which I m ay also be, to a certain
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degree, responsible. In my defense of m artens, for example, I m ay find m yself
being accused of denying som eone their livelihood, of being a sentim entalist, and
of being altogether too parochial in m y vision.

W hat about those people whose livelihoods m ay be threatened by
advocating and im plem enting m easures born out of such positions - m ost
obviously, the trapper, but also the logger, heavy equipm ent operator, m ining
industry executive, corporate lawyer, and others whose access to incom e or
profits from potential timber and mineral resources m ay be denied in certain
forested areas by efforts to preserve sufficient m arten habitat? On w hat ethical
grounds m ight we attem pt to adjudicate between these com peting claims? W hat
about the Buddhist notion of Samma-ajivn , or Right Livelihood? N ot an ethical
prescription, Right Livelihood is a basic tenet of the Noble Eightfold Path (one of
three precepts dealing specifically w ith ethical conduct,siln ), the practice of
w hich m ay lead us to a fully and properly hum an life. According to Walpola
Rahula, "Right Livelihood m eans that one should abstain from m aking one's
living through a profession that brings harm to others" (47). Surely, such a
straightforw ard, common sense notion has relevance for those of us outside the
B uddhist religious tradition. It suggests that how we earn our incom e or m eans
of subsistence is subject to evaluation under superceding claims, such as those
concerning the life and well-being of others; our livelihoods cannot be justified
m orally if they involve the unw arranted endangering, injuring or killing of
others. A nd so, weighed against m y knowledge of m artens, m y experiential and
reflective recognition of their non-instrum ental value and respectw orthiness, I
am not sw ayed by the trappers' claims to their "right" to kill m artens so that they
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can get m oney for their fur, m ake a living or m aintain a certain lifestyle. Like
em ploym ent in the nuclear weapons industry, perhaps fur trapping is another
profession that can no longer m orally justify its continued existence in our
society.11 As for the logger, road builder, exploration geologist or law yer, the
situation seem s different. These livelihoods, in and of themselves, are not
necessarily objectionable and m ay even be necessary within the present
fram ew ork of our society. But the particular "how" and "where" and "what for"
questions that attend each new plan to log trees or search for m inerals m ust
alw ays be approached in a way that gives the non-instrum ental values of a
potential logging or m ining site - and the creatures that call that site their hom e are given their due. It seems altogether possible that while felling trees m ay be a
m orally justifiable and "right" livelihood in one situation, it m ay border on
crim inal in the next.12 Here, the onus of juggling com peting claims - and their
consequent responsibilities - and m inim izing the deleterious effects of their
actions m ust rest w ith those who wish to alter the landscape for their specific
purposes. That is, the burden of proof ought to rest with the developer, not the
conserver/preserver - and while this m ay have been how environm ental
regulatory processes were supposed to work, the situation, in practice, now
seems to be reversed.

A nd w hat about the charges of sentim entalism and parochialism ? "You
only care about fuzzy little critters with inquisitive eyes and endearing faces.
W hat about the majesty and beauty of that elk, now dead, w hose giant hide
hangs on the wall adjacent to your picture of the several h u n d red m arten pelts,
and which, if you were honest with yourself, you'd have to adm it doesn’t really

177

bother you at all? And w hat about your leather boots? Elk and cattle are also
beings w ith w hom one can enter I-Thou relations (concerning elk, you even
testified to the reality of such an encounter in your Introduction). W here's your
responsibility regarding them?" Although at times it’s tem pting to follow the
lead of those espousing a strictly com m unitarian or organism ic approach to
- environm ental philosophy and quickly dism iss such nagging questions as petty
and narrow -m inded (unim portant from the ecological or even planetary
perspective), I believe that such charges are valid and m erit both serious
reflection and thoughtful response. It's just too easy to gobble up elk burgers or
beef kabobs and hold forth on the suprem e good of habitat, while ignoring
a n d /o r denying the value of individual creatures or failing to consider w hat
m ight m ake a notion as essentially abstract as habitat som ething to value in the
first place. A nd yet, in responding to these questions, I m ust avoid being draw n
in by the im plicit universalism of such charges. Ethical responsibility, as
presented in this paper, is always grounded upon and sponsored in the
experiential reality of our dialogues with particular things, not in our abstract
and universal notions of the "potential thouness" or "equality" of all things. Such
a universalist egalitarianism not only betrays experience, it also paralyzes any
possible response. This is not to say that such generalizations aren’t useful
checks against exclusivism and prejudice. In fact, the guiding sensibility behind
such generalizations, and the m ental processes of perceiving and acknow ledging
identity and difference that foster them, play an im portant role in our ethical
reflection and m editation. But an abstract aw areness of the potential thouness of
like things, while useful (like the Ten C om m andm ents or a Kantian m axim or a
B uddhist precept concerning ethical conduct), is a weak substitute for our actual
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know ledge of the other as Thou, a knowledge from which the preceding
generalization is derived and from which it obtains its usefulness and efficacy.

But w hat about the elk hide? and hunting? and eating "game" (again, the
purposive, instrum entalist nom enclature betrays the dom inance of I-It
experience in our relations w ith nonhum an creatures)? I cannot im agine anyone
arguing against the overw helm ing eloquence of an elk encountered in the wild.
As I reflect upon my own experience, even the haunting sound of their bugling
conveys a presence so arresting and im m ediate that it m ay initiate dialogical
'contact' with a creature one cannot even see.13 N one of m y visual encounters
w ith elk have been so intensely engaging and aw e-inspiring as that autum n
m orning in the Pintlers, as I walked in a high bowl just below the Continental
Divide accom panied by the seemingly sourceless, interm ittent echoing of these
bugling ghosts - the very song, it seemed, of the m ountains themselves. And yet,
that hide in the Idaho bar doesn't bother me, and, while I've never killed an elk,
I've eaten of their bodies on several occasions. Surely, this is hypocritical and,
w hat's worse in an ethical tradition so insistent on universal applicability,
inconsistent. Perhaps. But I also believe there is a real difference betw een fur
trap p in g and elk hunting, and so I cannot advocate a ban on the latter. Given
their num bers and limited habitat, as well as the eradication of top level
p redators throughout m uch of their range, hunting elk for food seem s justifiable.
The real ethical question here lies in preserving and m aintaining enough critical
elk habitat - and also elk predator habitat - to allow a region’s elk population to
thrive - to live, reproduce and die in their 'elk-ly' way. Or, m aybe I'm just trying
to justify m y callousness and, at root, unjustifiable behavior?
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A nd w hat about domestic cattle? Obviously, hum ans can and do enter IThou relations w ith cows. Stories abound of ranch and farm children devastated
by the loss of a favorite cow - or pig or sheep - after the fair is over or the stock
truck rolls aw ay to the auction or stockyards. To deny the significance of such
events, and the loving relationships that spaw ned them and give them their
tragic force, as 'childish' sentim entality not only denies the value of children's
experience but implicitly denies the reality of experience in general. W hat's
m ore, such a denial is nothing other than a subjectivist - albeit in the nam e of
"objectivity" - projection of the kind so often associated w ith sentim ental and
rom antic excess, only now in reverse, so to speak. "It's only a cow. She's got to
learn sometime," says the coolly detached, "realistic" parent. But w hat is this
parental "realism" except an interpretive projection of a purpose-specific vision
(in which, perhaps, cow=beef=$) that w ould dismiss and displace the reality and
m eaning of the intim ate encounter between the child and a cow? Or, to interpret
this situation in phenomenological terms, we m ight follow Kohak and say that,
Until we consciously "remind" ourselves that w hat we are dealing
w ith is "only an object,” we frequently do experience and treat the
things of this w orld as fellow beings, as thoii's .... It is questionable
w hether it [phenomenology] can ever legitimately resort to a
herm eneutic analysis which applies an external criterion of reality
to experience - in this case, the doctrine of transparent
consciousness - and claims that while things m ay "appear" as thou
they really are objects of m anipulation or speculation. If the w ord
"really" does not mean "in actual experience as it in fact presents
itself to consciousness," it loses all univocity.... Only on the level of
im m ediate experience, prior to the introduction of any special
purpose and perspective, can the term "real" be used univocally:
im m ediate experience is w hat it is. On any other level, prim acy or
"reality" of this or that aspect becomes contingent on the purpose,
on the needs of the activity from which we derive our criterion ("I,
Thou, and It" 51).
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If anyone can claim access to "reality" in my example, it is the child, and not the
parent; the child m eets the cow in all its unm ediated, integrated actuality,
in d ep en d ent of categories of use and purpose.14 The cow is, really and actually,
Thou for the child, and the reality and m eaning of this encounter cannot be
explained aw ay by invoking some transcendent or objective - really real - reality
in dependent of that encounter.

A nd yet, examined honestly, it seems that in my experience not all things
are equally eloquent; cows sim ply do not speak to me w ith the sam e evocative
pow er as m artens or elk. U ndoubtedly, this has som ething to do w ith m y
deafness regarding cows (how does one regain a child's receptivity and freshness
of vision?), but it also seems that their domestication and reduction to resources
defined in terms of their function as milk or beef producers has m uted som e of
their eloquence. However, even my im poverished relational life w ith cows does
not lead m e to exclude them from ethical consideration. H ere, I m ust pause to
reflect and tread lightly in the silence of dialogue's absence. For clearly, cows
suffer and feel pain. I cannot dism iss the all-too-obvious m anifestations of their
sentiency. As such, it is difficult for me to eat cows, and I find their treatm ent
u n d er the m achinations of the cattle industry, for the m ost part, appalling. And
w hile the stock pens and processing practices of this industry strike me as
unnecessarily cruel, I also find the wanton and careless destruction of W estern
rangelands and riparian zones by grazing cattle no less unconscionable. H ow
can we continue to 'perm it' our public rangelands to be tram pled u n d e r hoof and at ridiculously and artificially low prices, no less?15 A nd w hat about the
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untenable waste, in terms of biomass and energy production, of som e people
eating cows while others starve from w ant of basic grains, or the insensitivity
and injustice of the social and political milieu that prevents such foodstuffs from
being distributed equitably and among those who most desperately need them?
Can w e really still justify eating beef - or tacitly complying w ith politics as usual?

All of which is a long way from m y encounter with a pine m arten in the
M ission M ountains one late sum m er afternoon. And, lest m y readers think I've
lost all sense of organization and coherent, sustained developm ent over the past
couple pages, I m ust confide that the tangential route of this journey and my
cursory treatm ent of complex issues is, to a large degree, intentional. I had
intended to sketch out an ethical exploration - an uncharted venture into
unknow n territory - and find out where these reflections w ould take me.
H opefully, I have also illustrated that ethical responsibility is a messy, openended and far-flung business, one usually fraught w ith am biguity and,
som etim es, even apparent contradiction. This seems excruciatingly so in the case
of an environm ental ethic of responsibility, where the field of ethical
consideration is all-encompassing and where we are not allow ed the reductionist
luxury of draw ing a priori boundaries on the limits of our ethical concern. As we
bracket the noematic prejudice, our ethical responsibility becomes potentially
universal, while, at the same time, it rem ains inextricably em bedded and rooted
in the actual, concrete particularities of our existence. Ready to respond to all
things, w e m ust nonetheless decide and act in response to particular things,
events and occasions.
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A nd so, I set out on the preceding ethical exploration from the experiential
reality of m y actual encounter w ith a pine m arten. How ever, the choice of this
starting point, while certainly very specific and personal, is not arbitrary.
Ethically responsible reflection and action need to be grounded upon those
decisive m eetings in which we m ay come to know a particular being, such as a
m arten - and, concurrently, ourselves, and the trees and m ountains and creeks
an d birds and bugs around us and co-existent with us - as m eaningful, apart
from any instrum entalist and purpose-laden reductionism . Graced by such
experientially funded m eaning - finality - we find the capacity for that deep
affirm ation - faith - that engenders respect, compassion and integrity in our
thoughts and actions. Inspirited and em pow ered by my sacram ental encounter
w ith the m arten - and with that m easure of knowledge, m eaning and faith
sponsored a n d /o r renew ed therein - 1 set out to reflect upon w hat it m ay m ean to
act responsibly w ith regard to my fellow beings - not only with regard to that
m arten or m artens in general, but also with regard to creeks, cows and hum an
beings just to nam e a few. And as the implications of this single event radiate
ou tw ard in concentric circles, intersected, at the same time, by a host of m utually
inform ing w aves from other events (so that the m ental image here is not so m uch
of a single rock tossed into a pond but rather, perhaps, the ploppings of big,
sum m er raindrops on w hat had been only a m om ent ago a still and m otionless
pool), and as these waves w ash upon the shores of divergent, but related, issues
(habitat preservation, hunting and dietary issues, grazing practices, the politics of
injustice and starvation), I struggle to respond to the m anifold, and perhaps
com peting, claims that confront me in a spirit born of dialogue. If this seem s a
m essy and am biguous way to do ethics, open to abuse and dishonesty from
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every side, so be it. Ethics, understood in terms of responsibility, dem ands that
sincerity, honesty and hum ility inform our ethical reflections as well as our
ethical actions. A dm ittedly, this is a serious and challenging dem and. But to
d em an d less of either our thoughts or our actions strikes m e as escapist, a failure
of m oral courage, and a concession to our im pulse to shrink from sustained
reflection upon, and comm itted response to, the often overw helm ing
complexities and contradictions of our existence. Ethics cannot be m odeled on a
com puter; we cannot sim ply buy the ethical software package, learn the system,
plug in a few variables, and then receive a com prehensive program that tells us
w hat to do u nder a given set of circumstances. Obviously, ethical responsibility
is a great deal more messy and am biguous than such a com puter-age fantasy.
A nd while it requires courage in the face of inescapable uncertainty, it also seems
to offer the possibility that through our acknow ledgm ent of, and reflection upon,
the m eaning of experience we may find the capacity and direction to act with
com m itm ent and, ironically, certainty; we may be em pow ered to act as we must.
In other w ords, I believe that an ethic of responsibility is relevant to a sincere
exam ination of how we, in fact, decide and act concerning those things that
m atter m ost to us.

A nd yet, there is som ething about my previous exam ple that I don't like.
Perhaps it's the far flung nature of m y associations, or the gross superficiality
w ith which I take up with serious and complex m atters, or m aybe it's the
lingering presence of the hypothetical that taints the questions I've raised w hatever it is, som ething disturbs me. In traveling so far and w ide - in
attem pting to illustrate the interconnectedness of our ethical concerns and point
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to a few of the issues that w arrant our careful m oral consideration - I've lost
touch w ith m any of the actual events that, along w ith the encounter w ith the
m arten, co-sponsor m y thoughts and actions in regard to these m atters. To
retu rn to the previous paragraph’s image, I've focused on a single 'raindrop'
w hile briefly noting one or two m ore and completely neglecting the rest; and, in
doing so, m y illustration strikes me not so m uch as inaccurate, but rather
lopsided, distorted. The pool seems so large, and the deluge so steady, that I
can't even begin to do it justice here.

So, let's test the waters of a smaller and, hopefully, m ore focused pool for
our reflections. W hat m ight this environm ental ethic of responsibility look like
w ith regards to Lolo Peak, the Missoula Valley's m ost unam biguously eloquent
m ountain? W hat m ight it m ean to practice responsibility to this particular
m ountain? W ould I propose or support the developm ent of a destination
dow nhill ski resort on its slopes? No. W ould I actively oppose such plans? Yes.
O n w h at grounds? To m ake an inform ed decision on such an issue, we are told,
environm ental assessments m ust be perform ed, environm ental im pact
statem ents prepared and feasability studies undertaken. Then, if it is decided
that such developm ent will not degrade water and soil quality below acceptable
standards, and that the wildlife and fisheries resources of the area will not be
negatively im pacted, and that all the potential social and environm ental threats
can be m itigated, and that there is enough snow (or if there isn’t, we'll m ake m ore
w ith our machines), and that people will c o m e, and it will m ake m oney and
create jobs, who are we to oppose such well planned, economically salvific and
eco-friendly developm ent? And why? Because the m ountain has spoken to us
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and told us "NO!"?16 M ight this not be, at root, our m ost honest and
fundam entally truthful response? EAs, EISs and feasability studies are all fine
and good; this kind of scientific data is useful, im portant and never to be ignored.
But w hat if all our stated scientific and legal concerns are found unw arranted
and all our scientific and legal appeals exhausted? Do we then, in the face of
good science, hard facts and incontrovertible evidence, give our full su p p o rt and
stam p of approval to the developm ent of "Ski Lolo" or som e such desecration?
Of course not - because the halls of science and the courts of law have only
addressed the derivative reasons (our most efficacious strategies, w ere we
honestly to adm it it) for our opposition; they have not - and cannot - address
that opposition's fundam ental origins. For our position, finally, is an ethical one,
an d ethical responsibility, as presented in this paper, is funded by a m eta
objective know ledge that daw ns on us through our im m ediate and engaging
encounters w ith things as self-speaking presences. D on’t w e oppose the idea of a
ski hill on Lolo Peak because it seems a terribly inappropriate, disrespectful
response to the eloquent and enduring presence of that m ountain in whose
shadow the residents of this valley live out their lives - that beautiful, though
deceptive, dual sum m it that m easures the seasons, orients our lives, and speaks
to us of a realm beyond and other than (and yet increasingly at the m ercy of) the
hum an fabrication and artifice of our city and our city ways; in sum , that
ultim ate tem poral and spatial reference point for our locale? In the course of
living w ith and under this peak, a relationship evolves. A nd it is the m eaning
an d know ledge sponsored in this relationship - to be sure, a com posite of
countless I-It and I-Thou relations - that anchor and ground our opposition to
such developm ent schemes. In all its seasons and m oods the m ountain has, at
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tim es, spoken to us im m ediately and compellingly, and we, in all our seasons of
the spirit and shifting moods, have received this address, heard in the fullness of
its grace and m eaning. These occasions of dialogical intercourse w ith this
eloquent m ountain elicit our respect and obligate us to act respectfully tow ard it.

A nd yet, I cannot move from such experientially g rounded respect and
say, by w ay of general prescription, that everyone else ought to respect the
m ountain in the same way. Aside from any theoretical objections to such
prescriptions, w hat good w ould it do? Here, m y insistence on the nonprescriptive nature of ethical responsibility, which, up until now, m ay have
seem ed derived and clung to as the necessary conceptual conclusion of a cogent
theoretical argum ent, takes on matter-of-fact, experiential force. M y respect for
Lolo Peak does not grow out of my conscious and willful obedience to some
prescriptive m andate, and it seems impossible that anything approaching
genuine respect could. Upon m y arrival in Missoula I w as not told by the
C ham ber of Com merce or the City Council, or even the faculty of the
Environm ental Studies Departm ent, that I ought to respect Lolo Peak; m y respect
w as born out of daily interaction and, occasionally, incandescent m om ents of
holy intercourse, in and through which I came to know Lolo Peak as deeply and
em inently respectworthy. And while I cannot prescribe such know ledge, I can
testify to it - attem pt to articulate and share the w ays this m ountain's presence
has graced and informed m y life - and invite others to examine their ow n life
w ith the m ountain and offer their own testimony to its eloquence - or silence, as
the case m ay be.
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Does this m ean that I am universally, unilaterally opposed to all dow nhill
ski resorts? N ot at all. So, perhaps I've sim ply fallen prey to the 'NIMBY' (Not In
M y Back Yard) syndrom e? Perhaps. A nd yet, our truest and m ost com pelling
testim onials and enduring commitments will bear witness to the beauty and
m eaning of those things we know most intim ately and im portantly. Like the
non-prescriptive quality of ethical responsibility, its non-universal character
arises not so m uch from theoretical conclusions as from the dem ands of everyday
existence. Yes, Lolo Peak is particularly m eaningful to me. I have looked up to
it, from below, in full w inter's moonlight, in daw n's first sun, noon's full glare,
and evening's shadow ing and silohuetting, in joy and m isery and paralyzing
confusion; with a glance toward its cool sum m it, I have sought a sum m ertim e
refuge in the m idst of yet another day of stiflingly alienating and dehum anizing
work; I've checked it daily to gauge weather, snowfall, air quality; upon
returning from an extended absence, I've anticipated its appearance w ith an
insatiable thirst, craning my neck to find its massive presence and begin the
process of reorientation. And I've stood atop both sum m its, looking back tow ard
m y suddenly small and insignificant - although, now, som ehow 'placed' - town
and beyond into the unbroken beauty of the Selvvay-Bitterroot W ilderness as well
as the indescrim inant clearcuts on the Lolo and Clearw ater N ational Forests.
Yes, Lolo Peak is particularly meaningful to me, but this does not necessarily
m ean that my efforts to protect it against the developm ent of a ski resort are
m yopic or som ehow selfish. I have come to know it, respect it, even care about it
- not abstractly, but actually, deeply; as such, this experientially grounded
know ledge, respect and concern will foster the strongest com m itm ents and m ost
enduring vigilance.
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H ow ever, this inescapable particularity does not m ean that m y respect
an d concern, com m itm ent and vigilance are exclusive. My relationship w ith
Lolo Peak leads m e to question the need for additional ski resorts anyw here. Do
w e need to carve up any m ore m ountainsides w ith our recreational clearcuts,
tu rn any m ore m ountains into w inter recreation resources? M aybe w e have
enough already - in this particular region of the country we certainly seem to.
Intim acy w ith, and respect for, particular things also sponsors reflection on the
possible eloquence of like things. And while such reflection can never substitute
for th at sponsoring intimacy, I w ould be the last one to suggest that abstract,
associative and analogical thinking should be dism issed from the ethical
decision-m aking process; rather, w hat we need to rem em ber is that, as
abstractions from, associations with and analogies to, they are necessarily
derivative, secondary. Experiential engagem ent m ust be the prim ary, anim ating
source of ethical reflection. So, while I'm not ready to outlaw new ski resorts
universally, I w ould be extremely doubtful and hesitant regarding any such
proposals. Again, it seems the burden of proof in such cases m ust rest squarely
upon the prospective developer to find a suitable place (perhaps like Silver
M ountain outside Kellogg, Idaho) where such developm ent w ould not only be
socially and environm entally benign, but also where it w ould not silence or
com prom ise the still self-speaking eloquence and integrity of a m ountain.

Are these scattered remarks, and those concerning the m arten that
proceeded them, my idea of an ethical argum ent? Not really, but then it seems to
m e that ethical argum ents m ay be part of the problem and our attem pts to
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construct them the cause of so m uch counterproductive frustration. Perhaps it’s
time to start telling each other our ethical stories, and it is this which I have tried
to do over the last few pages. Of course, our stories, no m atter how insightfully
and skillfully told, will never be comprehensive, encyclopaedic or all-inclusive.
Fortunately, such criteria are irrelevant w ithin an ethic of responsibility. Rather
than air-tight argum ents, our stories will hopefully offer compelling testim onies,
resonant invocations and open invitations. In their telling, we testify to the
m eaning of those things that m atter to us most, to their self-speaking eloquence
and the experiential ground of our respect and concern for them. A nd, in
testifying to their value, we m ay call forth, stir up and aw aken in our audience
shared feelings and concerns, perhaps inspiring w ithin them a renew ed
com m itm ent to resolute action. Finally, as we venture to tell Our stories, we
invite others to respond, perhaps by enriching the stories we tell, or by telling
their ow n unique stories, or by showing us our prejudices for w hat they are, or
by objecting to the ways we seek to embody the m eaning of our experience in
action. Because our stories are partial, particular and personal, they invite
enrichm ent, am m endation and challenge. "But w hat about...?", that seem s to be
the question our stories invite and to which we m ust respond honestly and
w ithout defensiveness. So, tell me about your horror at my eating elk meat;
perhaps you can clarify and help resolve my own ambivalence here. Suggest
alternative m aterials for my "manly footwear" (Merle H aggard). State your case
for supporting a ski resort at Lolo Peak or harvesting a particular stand of timber;
I will try to rem ain open and receptive to w hat you have to say. But if w e w ant
to m ake an ethical decision, let’s keep our ethical concerns in plain view w ithout
sounding self-righteous, parroting party lines and rhetoric, or getting bogged
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d o w n in our efficacious stratagem s and derivative justifications. To be sure, this
will be a terribly messy, pluralistic affair; but business as usual seem s just as
m essy and usually leaves us feeling m isunderstood, frustrated and som ehow
disengenuous. We can m ake inform ed, scientifically sound decisions, bu t let's
keep the fundam ental, experiential ground of our actions in the forefront of our
discussions.

For in reality, it seems that the sponsoring sources of our concern are
rarely m entioned. And, within the "environmental m ovem ent" this silence seems
especially apparent and, I believe, debilitating.17 Most environm entalists, I
think, believe they carry the banner of the morally good, true and right; their
position, and not that of the greedy industry or the corrupted agency, is the
ethical one. At the sam e time, however, m any environm entalists seem
discouraged with, or have given up on, abstract environm ental philosophizing
that does not speak to their experience or, in one w ay or another, reduces or
betrays that experience. And yet, should they try to speak of that experience
(even am ong those sym pathetic to their concerns) and articulate its im perative
pow er in a narrative, personal m anner, they find that their testim onials fall on
deaf ears in a society that finds stories and "nature writing," although
entertaining, merely subjective and untranslatably relative, lacking in any
illum inating, em pow ering or compelling force. So, m any environm entalists, to
cham pion their causes, turn to the 'story' that our society finds m ost persuasive
and compulsory: science. W hen asked why they do w hat they do, m ost
environm ental activists will reply, "To preserve habitat and endangered species,"
"To m aintain biological diversity, ecosystem integrity or a viable gene pool," "To
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protect the quality of a w atershed or aquifer/' etc. But these are scientific
justifications and explanations, and by them selves they carry no anim ating or
orienting pow er. W hy are we concerned about habitat, endangered species,
ecosystem s, gene pools and such in the first place? W hat has focused our
attention on these things and fostered our active com m itm ents to preserve,
protect and safeguard them? Surely not science; science, for all its explanatory
pow er, cannot explain the events that sponsor our concern, attention and
com m itm ent.18 Surely not abstract ethical theories, no m atter how biocentric or
egalitarian, which we find neither satisfying, practicable nor 'true.' A nd surely
not the rather bankrupt (although, I believe, well-intended) bum per sticker
alternatives of Deep Ecology, Gaia spirituality and the like.

W hat grounds our concern, calls forth our respect and fosters our deepest
com m itm ents? I believe our relations - our dialogues - with concrete, particular
beings and things do - creatures like grizzly bears and m ountain ranges, orchids,
tide pools, prickly pears and great horned owls. Abstractly considered, these
creatures do not necessarily w arrant our respect and compassion; if we m aintain
enough objective distance, even a grizzly bear can still be perceived as nothing
other than an object, an It. But as we come into the presence of such creatures,
we m ay hear their self-speaking, evocative address and come to m eet and know
(and recollect) them as Thous, eminently respectw orthy and non-instrum entally
valuable beings. Through participation in the sacram ent of dialogue we become
aw are of our fundam ental being-together-with our fellow creatures - despite
their non-negotiable, m ultiform otherness - and find the capacity to affirm -
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actively and respectfully - not only them and ourselves but also the holy, tragic
flux of the creation in which we find ourselves placed - together.

M eaning and know ledge, grace and affirmation - these blessings (at once
anim ating and obligating and em pow ering) come to us, if at all, through engaged
participation in the particular events of the unique existence that has been lent
us. A nd so, if w e are to speak of these things, and the decisions and actions they
engender, w e m ust speak out of our particularity and uniqueness, of w ho w e are
and w ho we m ay yet become. That is, we need to tell our stories. H ow else can
w e po in t to the bedrock m eaning and reality things m ay come to hold in our
being-together-w ith them? H ow else could we attem pt to speak of the
sponsoring sources of the respect and compassion they call forth w ithin us?
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- EXPLANATORY NOTES
1 - A t the sam e time, I m ust rem ind my readers of the anthropological nature and
lim its of this account of dialogue. As for w hether or not dialogue m ay occur
betw een two non-conscious beings (two rocks, say), I cannot venture to say.
Buber and Bugbee offer a description and interpretation of h um an relationality,
and even w here ontological questions are raised, the ontology offered is alw ays a
regional one, in which we speak about being from the perspective of being
hum an.
2 - Furtherm ore, this readiness and capacity is, as discussed in C hapter One,
inextricably bound up with the issue of faith, that fundam ental, non-verifiable,
perhaps even non-referential, affirmation of our co-creaturely existence and,
correlatively, our co-existents. To requote Bugbee's beautiful statem ent on the
relation betw een faith and dialogue, "If we have looked upon the m ountains time
and again, and they have called upon us, and w e have responded, let us
rem em ber that we have looked upon them with the eye of faith" (Inw ard
M orning 116). For me, it is the issue of faith that seems to m ark the crucial
difference between Buber's meeting with the tree and another philosophically
fam ous hum an-tree relation: Roquentin's m ental w restling-m atch w ith the
chestnut tree in Sartre's N ausea (126-135). At first, I returned to Sartre's account
of this m eeting because I thought it w ould be an exem plary counterpoint to
Buber’s I-Thou encounter with the tree - the perfect m odel of the I-It relation.
H ow ever, as I re-read the passage several times, I was struck by how m any
characteristics the two hum an-tree relations have in common; both are exclusive,
intensely engaging, im m ediate and fully present. For me, the telling difference
betw een the two relations seems to lie in w hat is absent in Sartre's account: any
recognition of reciprocity and any sign of faith. W hat Roquentin takes aw ay
from his m eeting with the chestnut tree is the final conclusion that the tree,
himself, indeed all existent things are "in the way," "absurd," "contingent" and
"superfluous." It is this conclusion, which, at the sam e time, is also an underlying
predisposition, an as-yet undefined premise, that is so antithetical to the spirit of
both Buber and Bugbee. Again, Bugbee’s w ords seem especially relevant here
w hen he says,
A nd the story seems som ething like this: as we take things, so w e
have them; and if we take them in faith, we have them in earnest; if
w ishfully-then fantastically; if wilfully, then stubbornly; if m erely
objectively, with the trimmings of subjectivity-then emptily; and if
in faith, though it be in suffering, yet we have them in earnest, and
it is really them that we have. That is, the order of occurrent
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m eaning in which we are placed with them is one in w hich we m ay
find our place with them, and in so doing place ourselves
(’’Sublime" 7).
According to Bugbee, rather than being "in the way," our lives hold the gracious
possibility of m eaningful participation w ith our fellow beings in, to use another
phrase of Bugbee's, "the sacram ent of co-existence." This is the voice of faith that
is utterly lacking in Sartre's description and interpretation of his protagonist's
'revelatory' run-in with the chestnut tree.
3 - A response driven, so this line of thinking runs, by a particular m ood or
em otional condition that we can quickly and easily overcome by falling back on
our objectivizing categories and interpretive grids. For exam ple, regarding my
so-called dialogical encounter with the pine m arten, I m ay safely, passively - and
w ith com plete accuracy and correctness - report that a siting has occurred of a
"semiarboreal slender-bodied m am m al of the genus M artes" in the Mission
M ountain W ilderness (on the Flathead National Forest). W hat w e are then left
w ith is b u t a dessicated, although perhaps useful, bit of inform ation, w ith the
richness and depth of the encounter going unrecognized and unheeded.
4 - Like Buber, I am convinced that the manifestation of such encounters in our
lives is alw ays a m atter of "will and grace.” And yet, the 'proportion' of will and
grace seems to vary from meeting to meeting. Especially evocative presences can
at times overw helm us even in the most unlikely places and w hen we are at our
m ost unresponsive. On clear days in Seattle, for instance, I've heard even the
m ost prosaic souls begin waxing poetic at the sight of Mt. Rainier's hulking mass
in the seem ingly-not-so-distant distance. Conversely, in m eeting certain people
and reading certain books, I have come across individuals and authors who
exude a sense of readiness - a predisposition - to step out and engage the world
in dialogue, finding beauty, holiness and joy in the m ost seem ingly unengaging
events and circumstances. Let Us N ow Praise Famous Men, by James Agee and
W alker Evans, stands out as a text that bears witness to both m en's intense desire
and astounding capacity to meet the world - and, m ore specifically, the world of
tenant farm ers in central Alabama in the late 1930's - in all openness and
earnestness and that represents their sincere attem pt to articulate, through w ord
an d picture, w hat they encountered. In his Preamble to the w ritten text, Agee
describes w ith unshakeable faith the operative prem ise that inform s and
perm eates his 'phenomenological m ethod.’
For in the im m ediate w orld, everything is to be discerned, for him
w ho can discern it, and centrally and simply, w ithout either
dissection into science or digestion into art, but with the whole of
consciousness seeking to perceive it as it stands: so that the aspect
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of a street in sunlight can roar in the heart of itself as a sym phony,
perhaps as no sym phony can: and all of consciousness is shifted
from the im agined, the revisive, to the effort to perceive sim ply the
cruel radiance of w hat is (11).
A nd if, as Bugbee maintains, "as we take things, so we have them," then Agee,
not surprisingly, speaks frequently of receiving and celebrating things in the
fullness of their actuality. For example, of sum m er nights spent sleeping - and
lying aw ake - on the porch of his hosts' shack, he writes,
The dead oak and pine, the ground, the dew , the air, the whole
realm of w hat our bodies lay in and our m inds in silence w andered,
w alked in, swam in, watched upon, was delicately fragrant as a
paradise, and, like all that is best, was loose, light, casual, totally
actual . There was, by our m inds, our memories, our thoughts and
feelings, some combination, some generalizing, some art, and
science; but none of the close-kneed priggishness of science, and
none of the formalism and straining and lily-gilding of art. All the
length of the body and all its parts and functions were
participating, and were being realized and rew arded, inseparable
from the m ind, identical with it: and all, everything that the m ind
touched, was actuality, and all, everything, that the m ind touched
turned im m ediately, yet w ithout in the least losing the quality of its
total individuality, into joy and truth, or rather, revealed, of its self,
truth, which in its very nature was joy (225).
Despite the tragedy that surrounded so m uch of his life, Agee m aintained that
such events of "joy" (which approaches the level of a philosophical or theological
category in Agee's non-categorized thoughts) can happen anyw here and at any
time, and that the circumstances of their occasioning are boundless. Several
pages later he continues his discussion of joy, when he writes,
This lucky situation of joy, this at least illusion of personal
w holeness and integrity, can overcome one suddenly by any one of
any num ber of unpredictable chances: the fracture of sunlight on
the facade and traffic of a street; the sleaving up of chim neysmoke;
the rich lifting of the voice of a train along the darkness; the
m em ory of a phrase of an inspired tru m p e t;... the stiffening of
snow in a wool glove; ...walking sleepless in high industrial
daybreak and needing coffee,... the taste of a m ountain sum m er
night: ...the m ulled and branny earth beneath the feet in fall; a
m em ory of plainsong of the first half hour after receiving a
childhood absolution;... aside from such sudden attacks from
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unforeseen directions, gifts which as a rule are as precarious and
transient as the returns and illusions of love for a girl one no longer
loves, there are few ways it can give itself to you. W andering alone;
in sickness; on trains or busses; in the course of a bad hangover; in
any rare situation which breaks dow n or lowers our habitual
im patience, superficial vitality, overeagerness to clinch conclusions,
and laziness (227-228).
The fact that I have cited Agee several times, and at some length here, does not
m ean that w hat he speaks of is identical with the notion of dialogue outlined by
Buber and Bugbee - although some of the parallels are striking. Rather, I am
struck in reading Agee by his apparent readiness to take u p w ith the w orld anew
everyday; his w riting bespeaks an insatiable desire and unquenchable thirst to
m eet things in their fullness and to receive the abundance of their gifts in earnest.
All of which, to me, seems rooted in a deep faith that truth and beauty and
holiness can be found through engaged intimacy with, and unreserved
im m ersion in, the particularities of our existence.
5 - In speaking of the "pattern" of technology, I am following Albert Borgmann's
suggestion that we use a "paradigm atic explanation" w hen trying to understand
the im print of m odern technology upon our lives. For his treatm ent of other
possible types of explanations - substantive, instrum ental, pluralistic - see his
Technology and the Character of Contem porary Life, p.9ff. Generally, the
follow ing discussion of technology and technological patterns is based upon a
pap er I w rote for Professor Borgmann several years ago entitled, "Technological
Dialogue, Genuine Dialogue, and the Possibility of Environm ental Ethics."
H opefully, this revised and expanded treatm ent will not only be m ore accurate
b u t also nearer the m ark of w hat I'm trying to do in this essay.
6 - T w o notes on my treatm ent of Heidegger seem in order here. First, and quite
obviously, H eidegger and Kultgen use the term "thing" in very different ways.
For Heidegger, things m ay thing insofar as we let them presence them selves in a
dynam ic, vocative relational event. Kultgen's analysis m erely treats 'thing' as a
static, intrinsic label for nonpersons and subpersons.
A nd yet, while H eidegger talks of our letting things thing in a vocative
relation, I doubt he would say that we could "meet" them, as I have used that
term throughout m y paper. Here again, 1 m ust refer back to Kohak's treatm ent
of H eidegger in his article, "I, Thou, and It: A Contribution to the
Phenom enology of Being-in-the-World." As Kohak reads H eidegger, our
relations w ith things like jugs or bears can be described in term s of mitsein but
not mitdasein , a term which designates our relations w ith fellow subjects, i.e.,
hum an beings. Therefore, according to Kohak, H eidegger's a priori lim iting of
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possible partners in mitdasein to Dasein constitutes a form of noem atic prejudice,
albeit one a great deal more subtle and sophisticated than Kultgen's. In
H eidegger's defense, however, Kultgen's prejudice m anifests itself in an
argum ent that he m akes while uncritically em ploying Buber's language of I,
Thou and It, while Heidegger uses his own set of terms, which Kohak critiques
and denounces as prejudicial according to Buber's terminology. This seem s an
im portant distinction to make, as both Heidegger and Buber speak in
idiosyncratic ways that m ay not always directly translate into the other's 'dialect.'
Still, Kohak, as a well-respected Husserl scholar and phenom enologist in his own
right, offers a compelling argum ent, and I find his com parisons and critiques
illum inating and insightful. So, while I agree with Kohak's analysis, I’ll tread
lightly around H eidegger and try to stick closely to the texts of the few
H eidegger essays I've read, sincerely attem pting not to m isinterpret H eidegger
and his highly poetical treatm ent of the issues under discussion.
7 - A ccording to Borgmann, paradigm atic explanations m ust be both efficacious
and clarifying. For his discussion of paradigm atic explanations, in general, as
well as possible ways of evaluating them, see his Technology and the Character
of C ontem porary Life, pp.68-78. So, given that H eidegger's account of m odern
life u n d er the pattern of Enframing does not allow for a vital portion of m y
experience, in the end, I find it lacking both efficacy (it doesn't 'w ork' as a w ay of
explaining part of the pattern of our lives) and clarifying pow er (by not allowing
for these encounters it sheds no interpretive light on them and, in fact, casts a
shadow of doubt over them).
8 - This is, in a nutshell, Kohak's phenomenological m ethod in The Em bers and
the Stars. In a forest clearing in N ew H am pshire he finds the clarity of vision
required for his phenomenology; away from the w orld exclusively defined in
term s of hum an artifice and busy-ness, and schooled by what he can learn from
darkness, solitude and pain, Kohak finds the capacity to re-affirm the personal
and m oral sense of reality. W hether or not one shares all his convictions, his
m ethod, com m anding intellect and keen insight produce a dow n-to-earth and
beautiful book of philosophy.
9 - Both the slightly unorthodox rendering of the Fifth C om m andm ent as "Thou
shalt do no m urder" and the whole idea of re-thinking the Ten C om m andm ents
in term s of our relations with nonhum ans have their source in Kohak's The
Embers and the Stars, pages 79-81. For example, in speaking of the Fifth
C om m andm ent, he writes,
"Thou shalt do no m urder." W anton killing, be it of a person, of an
anim al, a plant - or of a love or an idea - is an act of profound
disrespect, of dehum anization so radical that it m akes its
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perpretrator an outcast and shatters the peace of the land. Yes,
there is a food chain. There are, too, the bitter works of love.
Killing a w ounded anim al swiftly - the frog im paled on m y scythe,
the baby rabbit disem bow eled by a cat - can be the m ost agonizing
act of love, letting it suffer an act of moral co w ard ice.... Still, an act
of killing rem ains an act of deep horror. Perhaps w e have learned
to objectify our w orld so that we could kill w ithout rem orse.
Unquestionably, having objectified it, we do so kill, and easily.
Like Cain, w e find ourselves outcasts, taking w hat is not o ur ow n
(80).
A nd in discussing the N inth Com m andm ent: "Thou shalt not covet," he writes,
This is not an injunction against the rightful striving of all beings
whose being is projected into temporality. It is an urgent w arning
against turning the world from the place of our dw elling into an
object of possession, rendered dead and soulless by greed. Of all
the com m andm ents governing the relationship of finite beings to
each other, it is, perhaps, the m ost basic (79).
H ere Kohak enriches our usual understandings of these two com m andm ents by
bringing to the forefront of his interpretations the dangers of our objectifying and
greed, which have been so pervasive in our dom inant way of taking up w ith
n atu re as an assem blage of silent and lifeless resources or comm odities. For me,
the Eighth C om m andm ent - "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy
neighbor" - also seems especially relevant here. In the particular instance under
discussion, bearing false witness against a m ountain goat is, above all, a m atter of
denying its eloquence and capacity to speak to us in its ow n right. Judged
against the truth of experience, nothing seems m ore outrageously false. In fact,
m y several encounters with goats in their m ountaintop habitat (here, the huge
billy standing no more than ten feet below the sum m it of Alpine Peak in Idaho's
Saw tooth M ountains or tire m onstrous power of yet another big m ale m aking a
bee-line straight up the 30 degree talus slope leading to the top of M ount Pinchot
in Glacier Park stand out as especially strong m em ories of these anim als'
evocative pow ers) w ould lead me to suggest that perhaps no other anim al is
m ore undeniably and overw helm ingly eloquent - speaking not only of
them selves but also of the wild and rocky alpine country they inhabit. A nd yet,
how easy has it become for us to take up with them as m ute creatures, objects?
To answ er this question one needs only to consider how strange it sounds in the
context of our everyday speech to suggest that m ountain goats 'speak' to us at all.
10 - Anim als in a zoo seem to be an especially good exam ple of this. Removed
from the natural context in which they may speak of their aw e and beauty, even
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so aw esom e and beautiful an animal as a polar bear is rendered silent (or, at best,
speaks tragically and brokenly, at worst, comically, of its now enslaved and
castrated glory) within the artificial confines of a zoo.
11 - It is, at best, a m arginal profession already. The few people I've m et or heard
about w ho still trap m am m als in this part of the country are loggers, school
teachers and others who do it as a seasonal supplem ent to their income. As for
native A laskans and others in very different cultural, economic and ecological
settings, I respectfully refrain from draw ing even these tentative conclusions.
This is not to say that we m ay not, at times, have to decide and act in cases w here
cultural values, attitudes a n d /o r behaviors conflict; rather, I refrain from
offering any such conclusions here because a serious and sensitive exam ination
of the particulars of such situations is far beyond the scope of this essay.
12 - Building new roads in currently roadless areas is another story. At least in
our region of the w orld, it appears that we have exceeded acceptable road
densities, and any new roads will only increase erosion, stream sedim entation,
habitat fragm entation, behavioral disruption caused by an increased hum an
presence, and m ay exacerbate a host of other ecological problem s.
13 - It seems unw arranted to suppose that vision is in any way privileged as the
necessary sense through which we m eet our fellows as Thous. In fact, given the
strongly 'auditory' imagery used throughout this discussion of dialogue, hearing
seems to be an especially potent and receptive sense through w hich w e m ay
encounter another being in dialogue. In addition, given the tactile and even
sexual im agery em ployed in this essay, touch also seems to be a sense through
w hich w e can come into contact with another as Thou.
14 - The m inds and spirits of children seem to predispose them to regular and
frequent participation in dialogical encounters. As an exam ple of this, Kohak
sites those occasions where our food too closely resembles the living anim al that
it was. In particular, he notes holiday feasts with M artinm as goose and
Christm as carp, w here a child's horror and outrage are appeased and the festive
spirit restored "only by adult ability to re-objectify" ("I, Thou, and It" 55). This
'childish' im m ediacy and purposelessness- "realism," even - is central to the
w hole notion of play that I will discuss in the following chapter.
15 - BLM and USFS grazing perm its are artificially cheap - unless, of course,
they're subleased from profiteering leaseholders. Here the hypocrisy behind the
stereotyping of "welfare mothers" and welfare fraud reaches the alm ost comically
sublime. "Although we feel entitled to sublease public lands to less fortunate
ranchers (whose ties to the industry don't date back to the glory days of the
C attlem an's Association) at ten times the price the federal governm ent charges us
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on the original lease, we better not catch you selling your food stam ps (at 50% of
their face value!) or trying to peddle your comm odity cheese for a little cash.
A nd no, we don't care if your wife (with whom you cannot legally co-habitat
unless you're willing to forfeit or reduce certain entitlem ents) is lactose intolerant
and can't eat the cheese w ithout "luxury" medications she can't afford. We've got
to start cracking dow n on you folks who are exploiting the system!"
16 - It's all too easy to imagine the general response to such a statem ent were it
offered at a public hearing on the issue; to speak of talking m ountains borders on
nonsense w ithin the context of our society’s everyday speech. A nd yet, as Ron
Erickson asks, how often do we let such im aginings keep us from saying w hat
w e know to be true - w hat we know needs to be said? A nd furtherm ore, how
can such w ays of speaking ever be taken seriously unless we venture to articulate
them in the public sphere? Coming from someone who has, in his ow n life,
exhibited the courage to speak out from the heart on such m atters, I greatly
appreciate and value Ron's insight on this point.
17 - This silence in regards to telling stories of concern, I believe, is a sym ptom of
the heavily 'Protestant' leanings in most adherents of the "gospel of ecology"
(Nash). To use distinctions m ost often applied to the differences betw een
Protestants and Catholics, environm ental devotees place a decided em phasis on
the W ord (often the gospel of science) over Sacrament, and w hile they m ake
excellent prophets, they lend to neglect their priestly calling. Of course, given
the Nineveh-like proportions of this country’s environm ental sins, this prophetic
leaning is perfectly understandable. And yet, we need to celebrate the
sacram ents as well, and we do this, unavoidable, when we tell our stories. As we
bear witness to our encounters w ith things as presences (in which the Divine
Presence dw ells am ong us) we acknowledge and celebrate our participation in
the sacram ent of dialogue. And, as discussed earlier, these sacram ental events
carry a comm ission to go forth and em body the m eaning received in our actions.
In the end, the two go together; through our priestly celebration of the sacram ent
of dialogue we are em pow ered to challenge and critique the status quo w ith all
the pow er of the prophetic tradition. W hat gave Jerem iah his voice but the touch
of G od’s hand on the prophet’s m outh? What power lies in H osea's w ords apart
from his intim ate contact with the Divine, which the Bible describes in such
straightforw ard sexual imagery? The voice of the prophet comes to h im /h e r
through direct contact with the fundam ental sources of m eaning, and h is/h e r
challenges are issued out of such intercourse.
Forgetting these holy sources of our concern and com m itm ent not only
divorces us from our m ost potent anim ating powers, it also m akes us fall prey to
another distinctively Protestant vice. The personal pietism and selfrighteousness of certain environm entalists can only be rivaled, at least in m y
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experience, by a few tongue-clucking, blue-haired Scandinavians of the Lutheran
persuasion [and specifically those who pledge allegiance to the Missouri Synod]
and those sanctified, sealed-in-the-blood Southern Baptists or nondenominational fundamentalists. And unfortunately, and quite seriously, such
self-righteousness has turned away potential adherents to the gospel of ecology
m uch in the same way as holier-than-thou church-going folk keep so many
others away from organized religion.
18 - For a discussion of the limits of scientific explanations, see Albert Borgmann's
Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Particularly relevant here
is his description of the differences between apodeictic, deictic and paradeictic
(paradigmatic) explanantions (pp. 22-26 and pp. 68-78).

THE CASE OF WILDERNESS

"Wilderness: Land of No Use." Several years ago, back before "I H eart
Spotted O w ls - Fried!”, and even back before those little green signs touting the
tim ber industry as our region's economic jockstrap, this anti-w ilderness slogan
could be seen on bum per stickers all across w estern M ontana. In the m inds of
those w ho printed, distributed and displayed them , the slogan offered a
com pelling argum ent against designating any m ore of M ontana's rem aining
roadless lands as wilderness.

Of course, the phrase on the bum per sticker, in and of itself, is only part of
an argum ent. In order to arrive at the intended conclusion, the reader m ust add
an im plied second prem ise, one that we find displayed on an em broidered nicknack decorating the wall of Halverson's home outside Glacier Park, in W illiam
K ittredge's story "We Are N ot In This Together." A ttributed to C otton M ather,
the saying reads, "That which is not useful is vicious" (103).

N ow we have an argum ent. Complete the syllogism, and you get the
desired anti-w ilderness conclusion:

W ilderness is not useful.
W hat is not useful is vicious.
Ergo, W ilderness is vicious - bad, unnecessary, to be resisted.

Logic 101.
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The first time I sa w jh e "Land of No Use" bum per sticker it w as displayed
on the back of the pick-up truck I parked alongside at a gas station/convenience
store in Thom pson Falls. Two friends and I had stopped in to buy a few more
item s for our w eekend trip into the Cabinet M ountains W ilderness - a weekend,
as I rem em ber it now, of swim m ing through steam y w illow thickets by day and
keeping a close watch on burnt out tree stum ps w ith ears at night. It was late
spring, June I think, and I w as nearing the end of m y first year in the
Environm ental Studies Program, well informed on the "wilderness issue” (all
year long I had attended w ilderness sem inars and lectures religiously and drank
a lot of beer w ith very knowledgeable and com m itted Earth First!ers) and a
strong (though "realistic,” "reasonable," "practical") w ilderness supporter - or so I
liked to fancy myself. And, having had a sem ester of logic in college, I knew that
w hen you find yourself disagreeing with the conclusion of a cogent, wellform ulated, logical argum ent, you go back and examine the validity of the
prem ises upon which the conclusion rests.

So, inspired by the w ilderness weekend ahead and arm ed w ith m y
graduate school know ledge, I plunged into battle - m entally, anyw ay - w ith the
im plied argum ent on the bum per sticker. In m y head, I quickly rattled off a
grocery list of reasons w hy wilderness is so valuable. Just consider the
recreational, aesthetic, spiritual, economic and medicinal values of w ilderness, or
its im portance for m aintaining and preserving habitat, wildlife resources,
fisheries, endangered species, genetic variation, biodiversity, w ater quality, etc.,
etc. See how "useful" wilderness is!
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At the time, though, it never occurred to me to take issue w ith the
unstated second prem ise of this anti-wilderness argum ent. Sure, I w as well
aw are of that whole 'intrinsic value' v. 'instrum ental value' angle, bu t none of
that seem ed terribly concrete or persuasive here. Like m ost Am ericans, there's a
lot m ore of Cotton M ather's spirit in m e than I 'd care to adm it. The "bottom line"
is th at if w ilderness is good, it better be good for som ething, useful. But w hat if
use-lessness, rather than being vicious, is redem ptive, healing, em pow ering?
even necessary? W hat if, instead of trying to sell w ilderness as a pru d en t
investm ent, we celebrated the gifts and acknowledged the responsibilities that
use-less w ild places sim ultaneously bestow upon us and call forth from us?
N ow , half a dozen years and a lot of walking, reading, and reflection later, and
w ith the wilderness debate still raging in this region of the country, I'd like to try
to think through a very different response to that bum per sticker I saw in
T hom pson Falls; I'd like to affirm the radically subversive and potentially
transform ative im portance of use-lessness in a society dom inated by
instrum entality and intentionality and, at the same time, affirm the potential
significance and m eaning of w ilderness as a use-less anti-resource, a sabbath
place of prayer and play. Finally, through our sacram ental engagem ent w ith
w ild places and w ild creatures, I'd suggest we return from our w ilderness
sabbatical not so m uch re-created as re-attuned to our co-createdness, re-oriented
and, above all re-com m issioned to em body the respect and concern engendered
in our holy intercourse w ith these places and creatures, even w ithin the all-tooprofane busy-ness of our daily strivings. That is, through our intim ate contact
w ith, and im m ersion in, wild places I believe we receive a know ledge and
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instruction that m ay inform and transform every facet of our w ork-a-day lives as
well as the non-negotiable im perative to "Remember the sabbath place and keep
it holy."

I realize that for some readers, speaking of w ilderness as an anti-resource
borders on sensationalism . A nd yet, to speak of w ilderness as a resource only
strikes m e as terribly reductive and superficial. Even talking about w ilderness as
a non-resource - although I believe it is this, too - says too little and trivializes the
potentially transform ative pow er and compelling im perative force that m ay
come to us in and through intim ate contact with wild places and w ild creatures.
I believe w ilderness offers not m erely an alternative but a radical challenge to the
technological patterns and objectifying, representational, and instrum entalist
postures that dom inate and distort our relational lives. For both conceptual and
practical reasons, wilderness offers us a potential home of dialogue - a place
w here eloquent nature m ay speak to receptive hum anity and elicit our m ost
respectful response in thought, w ord and deed.

That, I am convinced, is the potential of w ilderness as an anti-resource; the
prevailing attitudes of the present situation, on the other hand, m ilitate against it.
Both the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land M anagem ent, the two
governm ent agencies that m anage the majority of public w ildlands (both de facto
an d designated wilderness), operate under the guiding principle of "multiple
u se." W ilderness recreation (sic), like timber harvesting, cattle grazing, wildlife
an d fisheries m anagem ent, is just one am ong a host of uses. That's w hy the
agencies, on their brochures, posters and educational publications, so often refer
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to it as "the enduring resource of wilderness." You've got the w ilderness resource
alongside the tim ber resource and the fisheries resource; they’re all there for our
use. Each stands ready, according to H eidegger, to be set upon, secured,
ordered, controlled and stockpiled for hum an developm ent and use. Or, in
B orgm ann's depiction of the pattern of m odern technology, each provides the
raw m aterials - the m eans - from which we m ay isolate, extract and m ake
available for consum ption the commodities - the ends - we desire. Of course, the
com m odities we seek from w ilderness are often less tangible than 2 x 4s and
tro u t filets, but the technological paradigm that informs such comm erce rem ains
the same. The w ilderness resource offers the recreational, aesthetic and spiritual
com m odities - to nam e just a few - that we set out upon wilderness to procure
an d consum e. A nd while this acquisitive agenda is usually doom ed to
frustration and failure by the fact that w hat we often seek to procure from
w ilderness is fundam entally non-com m odious and unprocurable, it rem ains that
w ilderness-as-resource is no exception to the rule of technology. It is defined exists - in term s of hum an purposes, intentions and desires, and w e develop,
m anage and use it accordingly. As H enry Bugbee explains, "Why, the very
category of resource commits one by implication to developm ent of it, and to
pose w ilderness as a resource im plying the contrary w ould carry contradiction to
the point of perversity indeed" ("Wilderness" 8). 'Resource' is, unavoidably, a
term of hum anly im posed instrum ental m eaning and value; w hat resources
'm ean' and w hat they’re w orth are determ ined according to hum an desires and
capacities to develop and use them. As such, to conceive of, and talk about,
w ildlands under the auspices of "the enduring resource of wilderness," an d to
develop, study, m anage, and conserve them as such, frames these places squarely
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w ithin the pattern of technology and relegates them to entities - objects - that
exist in term s of, and for the gratification of, hum an wants, needs an d desires.

A nd yet, there's som ething going on in our relations w ith w ild places and
w ild creatures that doesn't quite fit the pattern; the contradictions that Bugbee
m entions above hover all about our experience of and attitudes tow ard
w ilderness. To speak about and treat wilderness exclusively as a resource seems
to overstate the case a bit; it leaves too m uch unexplained. If w ilderness is just
another resource, how do we account for the life-affirming joy w e so often
receive in our travels in wild places? Or the deep and abiding respect and
w onder these places elicit? Or the committed and passionate efforts of so m any
people to preserve the few wild places that remain on this continent? Surely no
m ute an d unautonom ous resource could call forth such heartfelt joy and faith,
respect, w onder and commitment. There’s som ething about w ilderness that’s
evocative and compelling in a way that a resource is not. True, w e m ay often
reduce w ilderness to a resource, but, at times, we also encounter it as som ething
m ore and other than that; it's a resource, alright, but w ith a wrinkle.

For one thing, wilderness areas are set aside and protected from m ost of
the 'industrial' form s of developm ent that have historically defined our country's
relations to forest and range lands. Although exceptions abound, in general, you
can't build roads, harvest timber, drill for oil and gas or m ine coal in a designated
w ilderness area. As the proponents of these industries so often rem ark,
w ilderness is a "lock-out;" it "locks up" the resources. And, in term s of our
history of traditional natural resource developm ent, extraction and exploitation,
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they’re right. W ilderness designation, for the most part, precludes developing
and using forest and range resources the way we've alw ays done it - no m ore
bulldozers, chainsaws, skidders and drill rigs. That's w hy that bum per sticker
w as on the truck in Thom pson Falls; to the owner, use of the w ilderness resource
seem s so contrary to traditional notions of resource developm ent that it appears
to involve no use at all. Or, at best, wilderness is a m is-use of the resources,
inappropriate developm ent, wasteful (again, Cotton M ather's puritanical ghost
h au n ts o u r w ilderness debate wherever we turn). Setting aside certain w ildlands
from traditional, high-im pact, aggressive, industrial developm ent and
designating them as w ilderness areas (even under the rubric of w ilderness-asresource) m arks a point of departure from business as usual w ith regards to
nature. Even as another variety of natural resource, w ilderness encourages us to
pause and re-think the question "What is nature good for?" A nd while, at this
level, w e m ay still rem ain entrenched within a purely instrum entalist stance,
"locked up" w ilderness areas at least offer an experiential and reflective starting
point for a deeper questioning of the technologically-informed instrum entality
that has for so long defined our relations w ith m ost nonhum an creatures.

Secondly, wilderness is an atypical resource in the sense that, by
definition, wilderness areas are places where hum an beings are visitors. A nd
w hile it's w ritten this w ay in the W ilderness Act, the w ord is, unfortunately,
rarely m entioned by the m anaging agencies. For exam ple, in the Forest Service
the resource m anagem ent ethos is so deeply engrained that w hen w ilderness
researchers w rite up their studies, they consistently speak in term s of "user
impacts," "user days," "R.U.D.s" (recreational user days), "user groups” and the
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like. For a m anagem ent agency that has, for so long, functioned as an all-toocooperative extension of resource developm ent industries, to talk about visiting a
resource just doesn't m ake sense; the w ords don't correspond. We use resources;
w e visit family, friends, and neighbors, shrines, m useum s and cemeteries. 'To
visit’ carries connotations and invokes images contrary to the rhetoric of
resources. As visitors we don’t set out to assault and aggressively transform the
people and places we visit. Instead, we come into their presence, in a place
outside our jurisdiction of im m ediate control; we "pay our respects," and, after
awhile, we return home. And even though the Forest Service continues to talk
about w ilderness "use," our actual travels within wilderness seem m ore
accurately described as visits. In this sense, our practical, on-the-ground
experience as w ilderness visitors offers us a glim pse of an alternative m odel for
our relations with wild nature that stands in contrast to the m odel of relations
instantiated in our respective roles as developers or consum ers and resources or
com m odities. As wilderness visitors we may venture forth into the presence and
com pany of those whom we respect and care about, enter their hom es with all
d u e respect, avail ourselves to receive their gifts (graciously bestow ed, gratefully
accepted and acknowledged), tarry awhile, and then leave w ith their blessing
u p o n us and our love for them and com m itm ent to them renew ed and deepened.

In addition, hum ans are visitors in w ilderness areas in a second, im portant
sense: w e do not and cannot live in them. In a very practical, matter-of-fact way,
you've got to check your proprietary claims and developm ent schem es at the
trailhead. I've never heard anyone in a w ilderness area utter that 'appreciative'
statem ent so often heard along seacoasts and lakeshores or am idst rolling hills
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and w ooded hollows: "W ouldn't this be a great spot to live? build a cabin? have a
second (third?) home?" In designated wilderness, it's out of the question. Even
the richest d u d e can't buy h is/h e r own chunk of the Bob M arshall or Frank
C hurch-R iver of N o Return W ilderness. It's just not for sale - unless, of course,
y o u ’re a guide or outfitter w ith well-placed friends who can use their influence to
m ake sure your airstrips, riverside resorts, hunting cam ps, stock pens, yearro u n d caches and other "semi-permanent" structures rem ain above the law. In
theory, how ever, w ilderness is not intended to be a place w here hum ans live,
build structures or exert proprietary rights; and, for m ost of us, this holds true in
practice as well. W ilderness is not a place to live or ow n property; in wilderness,
w e come into a place that is not our hom e nor our own, pay our respects, and
leave.

Thirdly, our w ilderness visits, examined w ithin the context of our goaloriented, technologically-conditioned society, can appear pretty pointless. At the
g round level, the "Why?", "What for?", and "What's the point?" questions can be
pretty disconerting as you walk along in a wilderness, especially w hen you're
carrying a full pack, or being drenched by rain or plagued by insects, walking on
blistered feet, or w hen you're just plain sore, tired, cold, hot, sunburned a n d /o r
sick. That cynical question, "Are we having fun yet?", can take on a whole new
m eaning in the backcountry. After all, if we're out using the recreational
resource of w ilderness, shouldn't we be having fun? Isn't that the point? Of
course, even under ideal conditions, wilderness walking can appear, quite
literally, pointless. Of the three m ain types of hiking routes available, the point
of d ep arture for two of them - the in and out trip and the loop - doubles as your
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intended destination. You walk in, do your wilderness thing, and arrive back at
the sam e vehicle at the sam e trailhead you left only a few hours, days or even
weeks ago. As for the point-to-point trip, you end up at a different trailhead
w here, m ost likely, a car you dropped off earlier will be w aiting for you - to
shuttle you back to pick up the vehicle left at the trailhead w here you started
your trip. In each case (and in any imaginable variation on these three
alternatives), in accomplishing your goal you accomplish nothing at all, and you
end u p back where you started. N othing’s changed, except you're older than you
w ere w hen you started your trip - that m uch closer to your death one could
argue.

In addition, if you travel in w ilderness to get som e exercise, test your
m ettle, find beauty, meet God or accomplish some other specific task, you'll soon
realize that there are better, safer, more convenient and tim e-saving ways to try
to achieve these same goals (of course, you m ight also realize, in the process, that
m eaningful health, self-respect, beauty and holiness defy com m odious
procurem ent and elude our purposive grasp). Spend a couple of intense hours in
the w eight room or gym, m useum or church, and you can say you've attended to
your physical fitness, recreational, aesthetic and religious needs, and you'll still
have time left over to ... watch TV or go to the mall or catch up on som e w ork at
the office. W alking in wild places, judged by the standards of our society,
appears to be, at best, a rather impractical and inefficient w ay to accomplish our
specific goals and tasks.
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The exaggeration and hyperbole of the two previous paragraphs are, to a
large degree, intentional. Walking, and specifically w alking w here roads don't
go, seem s to encourage w hat Thoreau, in his essay "Walking," calls the "extreme
statem ent" (93). W hat's more, I believe that not only T horeau’s penchant for
startling overstatem ent (awakening as the cry of the chanticleer atop his roost in
W alden), but also his radical perspective and critical prophetic voice are rooted
in his "method" of taking up with and reflecting upon the w orld in w hich he
found him self - a thinking on one's feet that Bugbee calls "peripatetic philosophy"
(Inw ard M orning 139). Perhaps it is precisely the pointlessness and inefficiency
of o u r w ilderness travels, as well as that uniquely pedestrian pace that
encourages face-to-face engagem ent with w hat we m eet and reflective
rum ination on the im port of such meetings, that force us to confront the "What
for?" question of our walking in circles (or some slight variation on that theme)
and w hich, at the sam e time, push us to extend this same question to all aspects
of our lives. A nd as we honestly examine our lives in this context, w e m ay come
to recognize that m any of our strivings and purposive pursuits - our "busy-ness"
dealings - are no m ore than so m uch diversion and idleness, a tail-chasing
perform ed by anim als w ithout tails. It seems that w alking in wild places and
am ong w ild things offers a critical perspective from which we m ay think more
clearly about the m eaning of the technological project of developing and using
resources and procuring and consum ing commodities that so often defines our
lives and dictates our actions.

In these few paragraphs I've presented three of the practical, m atter-of-fact
w ays in w hich wilderness is an atypical resource, ways in which it contradicts,
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suspends or calls into question the intentional representations and categories
through which we usually, experience, develop and use nature as a resource. To
be sure, w ilderness is still a resource, but, just as surely, w e encounter and
perceive it as som ething other than a resource as well. By prohibiting m any
form s of high-im pact, industrial usury practices, w ilderness designation flies in
the face of our traditional understandings of resource developm ent on public
forest and range lands. By defining hum ans as visitors in w ilderness areas,
w ilderness designation offers us an alternative model for our relations with
nonhum an nature; in wilderness we may take up with nature not just as
developers and consum ers or owners exerting proprietary claims, bu t as hum ble,
respectful visitors, perhaps even pilgrims. A nd finally, by traveling along the
circular (or dead end) path of wilderness we m ay find ourselves confronted w ith
questions of purpose and m eaning that challenge the acquisitive strivings and
goal-oriented pursuits of our lives and sponsor reflection upon the very sources
of ultim ate m eaning and purpose. These three anomalies - am ong others - seem
to suggest that certain things about the wilderness resource don't quite fit w ith
our usual understanding and use of resources in general; it's an odd resource that
restricts the developm ent of nature’s creatures according to our historical
understandings of w hat they're 'good for,’ that defines us as visitors w ithin its
boundaries, and that offers no clearly defined goal or purpose for 'accessing' it at
all. These oddities - these non-resource qualities - of wilderness seem to cause
endless confusion and frustration in discussions am ong w ilderness m anagers
and users, proponents and opponents, adam ant in their insistence to fit the
square peg of w ilderness in the round, resource hole.
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W hat I've presented above, however, offers not so m uch a challenge to our
technological patterns as a starting point for deeper reflection - a few
incongruities to puzzle over. A nd while a certain am ount of confusion regarding
the m is-fit resource of w ilderness m ay lead to a re-thinking and enriching of the
sense and m eaning of our relations w ith wild places and w ild creatures, I believe
the potentially radical challenge of wilderness as an anti-resource comes from the
instruction we m ay receive from w ildlands themselves, despite all our efforts to
shout dow n, ignore or m isunderstand w hat they have to teach us, as w e come
into their presence. Wild places and wild things, I believe, have a w ord to speak
to us (to invert Thoreau's fam ous phrase), a word that, heeded, com m unicates a
sense of m eaning and direction that m ay ground and orient our lives an d inform
our actions. Speaking of his time in the Canadian Rockies during the au tu m n of
1941, H enry Bugbee writes, "And it was there in attending to this w ilderness,
w ith unrem itting alertness, yes, even as I slept, that I knew m yself to have been
instructed for life, though I was at a loss to say w hat instruction I had received"
(Inw ard M orning 140). W hat I believe Bugbee so eloquently testifies to here is
the deep and abiding knowledge we m ay receive through contact w ith, and
im m ersion in, w ild places. It comes to us - if at all- as an im m ediate and
participatory know ledge (quite apart from our know ing about anything) of
inexhaustible and, to som e degree, ineffable m eaning and potency - a know ledge
that m ay take a lifetime of reflection to begin to understand, let alone articulate
or enact. Arid yet, this m uch seems clear: in and through our know ing
intercourse w ith wild places and wild things we touch som ething w e are not,
som ething that we did not make; we touch som ething non-negotiably other and
densely real, som ething that is not the product of hum an handiw ork, artifice or
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fabrication but, like us, receives its existence from a source outside itself,
som ething that we recognize as co-derivative, co-creaturely and m utually co
existent. And, standing together in the presence of our fellow creatures, w e
acknow ledge, w ith joy and affirmation, the goodness and respectw orthiness of
these beings as existing in their own right, apart from our objectifying
representations and instrum entalist categories. Intim ate contact w ith wild,
n o nhum an nature teaches us the arrogance at w ork in our reduction of nature to
an aggregate of raw m aterials and resources as well as the sinfulness of w hat
Buber calls "our lust for overrunning reality" (Origin and M eaning 65).
A ccording to Bugbee w hat we may learn from w ilderness, w hat he refers to as a
"wilderness ethos," stands in "dialectical contrariety" to the basic posture our
culture assum es w ith regards to the nonhum an natural world: "the claim ant's
stance, speaking in terms of w ant and use, resources at our disposal, the exertion
of control, the projection of goals, and the hum anly conferred status of ’values'"
("Wilderness" 6-7). As claimants, we cling to and assert "a vested interest, a
proprietary dem and ... a kind of appropriative willing in which, how ever tacitly,
a claim is staked to having w hat we w a n t.... 'N ature' then assum es the defining
aspect of the exploitable resource; and no thing can be sacred" ("L' Exigence " 12).
As we come into the presence of wild places and wild things, we m ay find
ourselves positioned with respect to them in a w ay that counters and challenges
the claim ant’s stance. Rather than staking a claim and dem anding w hatever we
w ant and desire, in wilderness we find ourselves claimed by the self-speaking
and evocative voice of wild nature and placed in a position of responsibility.
C ontact w ith w ilderness m ay teach us the arrogance of our incessant efforts to
’call the shots,’ as well as w hat it m eans to be called upon in a w ay that dem ands
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an answ er. The overw helm ingly eloquent voice of w ilderness, I am convinced,
has the capacity to break through the silence and profanity of the claim ant's
w orld and re-aw aken us to the vocative - and thus, vocational - an d sacred
character of our relations w ith not only wild places and creatures bu t w ith all
creation.

Of course, in order to receive the instruction of these places and creatures
w e m u st let them speak and rem ain open and receptive to their address. As I
explained in the previous chapter, resources have no voice ap art from that
projected upon them according to hum an purposes and desires; resources are, by
definition, m ute and speechless things, objects, Its. Therefore, if wild places and
creatures are to speak to us and instruct us, we m ust m eet them as som ething
other than resources; we m ust m eet them as Thous - irreducibly other, yet
intim ately co-existent, non-instrum entally valuable and em inently respectworthy
beings w hose existence cannot be reduced to or defined m erely in term s of our
representational constructs and purposive intentionality. We m ust m eet them as
fellow creatures - existing on their own terms and in their own right; only then
can they instruct us or, as Bugbee says, "bless us": "But nothing can bless us apart
from being acknow ledged in its own right" ("W ilderness” 13). Earlier in the same
essay he elaborates on this theme w ithin the specific context of w ilderness w hen
he writes,
If w ilderness may yet speak to us and place us as respondents in
the ambience of respect for the wild - for N ature as prim ordial, it
m ust be liberated from ultim ate subsum ption to hum an enterprise.
That is, its voice will be heard anew only as we come in decisive
forbearance into its presence. Attentive listening, active receptivity,
candor of spirit are the m ood of the place. Or - as Kant m ight say:
disinterested interest. I suggest wilderness is not to be understood
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as a place appropriated to hum an interests or to a special hum an
interest. Its fundam ental gift lies in the qualification of
disinterestedness with which hum an interest requires to be
inform ed (5).
For vocative relations - dialogue - to occur between us and w ild nature, and for
u s to receive its instruction and the consequent sum m ons to em body those
lessons in respectful response, wilderness m ust speak not in term s of our goals
and interests but of itself and in its own right. In turn, we m ust rem ain open and
attentive to that self-speaking address. As stated throughout this paper, the
m anifestation of dialogue involves the resonance of eloquent speech w ithin the
heart of the receptive and attentive listener; always, it is a m atter of will and
grace. A nd wilderness, it seems to me, may be a potential home of dialogue in
that it offers a space - an opening - where wild nature may graciously speak of
itself and w here we may receive w hat Bugbee calls its "fundam ental gift”: its
pow er to render our interest disinterested, to bracket our intentionality and
instrum entality, to re-attune our hearing to the voice of things apart from our
representations and categories of m anipulation and use.

Despite the adm inistrative and m anagerial rhetoric that reduces w ildlands
to w ilderness resources and the consequent practices em ployed in the
developm ent, m anagem ent, use and conservation of them , the prim ary im petus
or sponsorship behind wilderness designation - a sponsorship engendered and
deepened, I believe, through intim ate contact with wild places - is preservation.
W e w ork for legislative wilderness designation because it seems to be our best
hope for preserving a few rem aining places most nearly the way they've been,
the w ay they are and the way they might yet evolve to become apart from heavy
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handed hum an intervention. To preserve w ildlands is an active attem pt to let
them be - or leave them be, as Bugbee understands it. In Inw ard M orning he
writes, "By 'leaving things be' I do not m ean inaction; I m ean respecting things,
being still in the presence of things, letting them speak" (155). This active and
participatory "leaving be" is of twofold significance. In leaving w ildlands be they
are liberated from exclusive subservience as hum anly defined resources; in turn,
as we leave w ildlands be - in respectful engagement, responsive attentiveness,
stillness and silence - we take up with nature (indeed, reality) outside the
claim ant's stance, in w hat Bugbee calls a wilderness ethos and Buber calls
Hitidzvendung (the m ovem ent of dialogue) - a faith posture w here w e stand
am ong our fellow beings ready and open to receive the address of w hom ever
m ay speak to us. W ithin this framework, leaving w ildlands be offers som ething
of a m utual em pow erm ent - a harm onizing of resounding, liberated speech and
attentive, respectful hearing - and instantiates a unique home of dialogue
betw een hum an beings and nonhum an, wild creatures.

A nd according to the rhythm outlined in this essay, participation in
dialogue calls forth our active response. O ur intim ate contact w ith w ildlands
and w ild creatures places us in a position of responsibility. We are called upon
to offer an answ er to their evocative address from out of the depths of w ho we
are and w ho we m ay yet become. For me, this rhythm ic interplay betw een
dialogue and responsibility is now here more evident than in our relations w ith
w ild places. The origins of wilderness preservation in this country seem
inexplicable except as a loving and respectful response to intim ate intercourse
w ith, and sustained immersion in, wild places and a deep, personal concern that
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they m ight be defiled, destroyed and abused. H ow can we explain the passion
and com m itm ent of John M uir, Aldo Leopold, Bob M arshall and David Brower,
to nam e four of the m ost prom inent figures in the history of w ilderness
preservation, apart from their lifelong contact with w ild places? W hat sponsors
the continuing efforts of so m any com m itted w ilderness advocates to preserve
the few undesignated wild areas that rem ain and to protect from abuse and
d egradation those areas already designated? I'd suggest that sustained and
intim ate intercourse w ith wild places begets our deepest and m ost abiding love
and repsect for them, and that we cannot help but work to em body that love and
respect in responsible, non-arbitrary action on their behalf. To know w ild places
as such places us under obligation to preserve and protect them.

Furtherm ore, I'd suggest that the transformative and im perative force
received in and through contact with w ildlands and wild creatures radiates out
to every aspect of our lives. W hat we learn from imm ersion in w ild places
challenges our entire way of experiencing reality within the fram ew ork of the
technological paradigm and our entrenchm ent in the claim ant's stance.
W ilderness, m ore than anything else in the nonhum an w orld, offers a
counterpoint to the dom inant patterns and postures of our lives. As such, w hat it
has to teach us may turn our lives upside dow n and re-orient us w ith respect to
how we take up with our world. This, I am convinced, is the radical and
prophetic anti-resource potential of wilderness - the subversive pow er of its use
lessness.
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In the self-speaking presence of w ild places and w ild creatures, m et and
acknow ledged in their own right, our reductionist drive to turn nature - all of
reality - into an aggregate of resources and comm odities is exposed for w h at it is:
a reduction - not only of the irreducible m eaning and non-instrum ental value of
the other beings w hom we m eet, but also of the m eaning and value of o u r ow n
lives as we stand together w ith them as fellow creatures. That is, the
staggeringly eloquent, self-speaking voice of w ild nature speaks to us of the
potential fullness of our relational lives w ith nature’s creatures - a fullness w e
cannot know insofar as we experience the natural w orld exclusively according to
our categories of use and purpose. To be sure, we will continue to develop and
use natural resources and procure and consume their attendant commodities, but
the touch of wild nature teaches us that nature’s creatures are not only, or even
prim arily, natural resources. Although we will also have to use and develop
som e creatures as resources, we will, I hope, do so w ith all hum ility and respect,
know ing - im m ediately and intim ately - that they are fundam entally and
definitively som ething far more and other than that: they are actual and
potential partners in dialogue, independent others w hom we nonetheless may
encounter in the fullness and integrity of their being - their being-together-w ithus. Perhaps m ost basically of all, we learn that our existence and the m eaning
proferred us therein, comes to us as a gift, and that the w orld presents itself to us
not, fundam entally, as so m uch stuff to use, procure, acquire and consum e, but
as a com m unity of others, fellows creatures whom we m ay m eet and know in
sacram ental intercourse. We learn that our vocation is not that of the inquisitor
w ho presses, probes and m akes dem ands, who contorts and tortures his (here, as
in several other selected spots in this essay, it seems m ore accurate to let the
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gender-specific pronoun stand alone) subject - the object - until it subm its and
says w hat he w ants to hear and which speaks only according to the forceful
im position of the inquisitor's intentions and agenda. W ilderness placem ent
show s us and helps us acknowledge our true calling as that of the respondent
(perhaps even responsive lover), who, in respectfully and com passionately
attending to the self-speaking presence of our fellows, m ay be received into their
gracious presence and, in turn, receive their life-affirming gifts. For although the
inquisitor usually gets the response he dem ands, the coerced answ er doesn't
m ean much; it bespeaks only his projections, contains nothing true or
m eaningful, and bestows no grace. But in attentively and actively stepping back
and letting things speak w ithout coercion, projection or m anipulation (a posture
or orientation tow ard which wild places seem to predispose us), they m ay speak
them selves and the m eaning of their being - and ours together w ith them. And
in the resonance of the m eaningful and destinate speech of these independent,
fellow creatures w ithin the attendant and responsive soul, w e m ay receive the
use-less and holy gifts of dialogue - divine gifts that transcend reduction to
instrum ental terms and whose m eaning and value im m anently inspire and
inform our lives and actions. According to Erazim Kohak one such gift of
dialogue is joy. In The Embers and the Stars he writes,
Joy or enjoym ent is noninstrum ental. The experience it describes
serves no purpose beyond itself, it is not a function of the
experiences which led up to it. It breaks out of the entire
instrum ental chain as a m om ent of encounter betw een a hum an
an d an Other, be it an entity, an act, a person, in cherishing,
appreciation, enjoyment. It is precisely the experience of eternal
reference (200).
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For Bugbee, another of these gifts is beauty, defined as som ething like a
deliverance of the "sense".things make that defies reduction to their
function or purpose.
Som ething m ay happen in relation w ith things them selves, in
m utual address, that is the m ode of sense they m ake, and it has
nothing to do w ith explaining them. The m ode of sense in question
im parts to life a purposiveness w ithout purpose. Purposes
exfoliating and sustained out of that purposiveness, as they m ay
well be, cannot explain it, nor do they explain things. A
purposiveness prior to purposes, to which they rem ain
subordinate, precludes reading the sense things m ake in term s of
purposes.
Thus it m ay be that in a style of life governed by m utual address
w ith things, one m ay stand to attune hearing to that language
which things and events speak w ithout m etaphor, "which alone is
copious and standard." (Thoreau) Perhaps that, precisely, is their
beauty ("Job" 7-8).
As Kohak and Bugbee explain them, neither the joy nor beauty that m ay come to
us in and through our participation in dialogue can be explained in term s of the
purposes they serve, their usefulness or instrum ental worth. H ow ever, this is not
because events of joy and beauty are trivial and unim portant for our lives.
Rather, it is because they do not subm it to service on behalf of our particular
purposive agendas and instrum entalist reductions; that is, they are of ultim ate
im portance, inform ing our lives with a "purposiveness prior to purpose" and
offering us a glim pse of the "eternal," non-derivative, unconditioned and Holy.

Joy and beauty are but two of the m any fundam entally m eaningful gifts
that w ilderness m ay bestow upon us; we m ay count them am ong the use-less,
non-com m odious gifts of wilderness encountered not as a resource or even a
non-resource, but as an anti-resource - a place that instills a n d /o r deepens our
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capacity to suspend the instrum entalist reduction of nature to natural resources
that defines and im poverishes our relational lives w ith n atu re’s creatures; a place
that encourages us to step back, be still and listen to the eloquent voice of our
n o n h u m an fellow creatures as they speak to us of them selves and in their own
right; in sum , a place where dialogue between hum an and n o nhum an creatures
m ay flourish - a hom e of dialogue. A nd, as a home of dialogue, w ilderness is,
indeed, a "land of no use;" its ultim ate gift lies in its potential to predispose us to,
and foster participation in, relations of "no use:" I-Thou relations. For, as I
explained in Chapter One of this essay, I-Thou dialogue serves no purpose; its
m eaning cannot be reduced to an explanation of the purposes it serves or w hat
it's 'good for.' "The purpose of the relation is the relation itself - touching the
You. For as we touch a You, we are touched by a breath of eternal life" (Buber, I
and Thou 112). I-Thou dialogue serves no purpose; it is an event of ultim ate
purport. It im parts to our life w ith our fellow beings a fundam ental m eaning
an d non-derivative value whereby we may affirm our co-existents and ourselves
as w e stand together with them in co-creatitrely kinship; it m ay offer, along with
joy an d beauty, the gifts of faith, love, compassion and respect as well as the
guiding directive - the im perative - to incarnate these gifts in faithful, loving,
com passionate and respectful action tow ards our fellow creatures.

But does w ilderness really offer us all of this? As a w ilderness resource no; as a hom e of dialogue - absolutely; as a mix of the two - potentially and on
occasion. I am convinced - 1 know - that through our im m ersion in w ilderness
(w hether designated or not) we may, and sometimes do, find ourselves graced by
the pow er of these places to attune our ears to the self-speaking voices of
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w ildlands and w ild creatures and to ready our hearts to m eet them in the
sacram ent of dialogue, through which we m ay receive an intim ation of the
j

m eaning and value of our m utual co-existence and the capacity to incarnate the
sense of that m eaning and value in non-arbitrary, decisive action. In concluding
m y discussion of w ilderness as a potential hom e of dialogue, a use-less place of
ultim ate p u rp o rt and m eaning for our lives, I’d like to present this rather lengthy
quote from H enry Bugbee's "Wilderness in America" as a beautiful and
illum inating articulation of so m any of the things I'd like to suggest here.
Yet, how could it be that a place m ight hold such force? Only, it
w ould seem, in some radical way; positioning us, as it were, w ith
respect to our involvem ent in reality, as a m atter to be resolved. N o
d o ubt our situation is always implicitly a m etaphysical affair. But
wilderness, to the extent that it will not perm it one to take one's
surroundings for granted, is a place which will not let one off the
m etaphysical hook. At the same time it establishes us in such
decisively lived relationship w ith our surroundings that it
precludes subsum ption of the lived relationship to any depictive
representation of how we are situated in relation to our
surroundings, for example in ecological terms. We are not there as
seen by ourselves, as parts w ithin a whole. No, we are there as on
the spot with respect to the m eaning of w hat we behold. H ow does
nature speak to our concern? That is the question. A nd the
relationship is one of participation in w hat occurs, the presencing of
heaven-and-earth and of all that abounds therein. One is b rought
to realize one is held within the embrace of w hat is proferred in its
being proferred. No behind or beyond the things themselves.
Therefore no understanding of their presencing in the m ode of
com prehension of it. From within the lived relationship in which
the presencing occurs m ust arise the sense of the occurrent, if at all.
The givens of life are laid down. The foundations of the w orld are
laid. Things are in place and stand firm. Beings stand forth on
their own. They do not ask our leave. They invite m utuality. That
m easure of trust. If one agrees to live with them , rather than
sum m arily reduce them to the service of intention. In contrast w ith
the subordination of attention to intention, to be intent in attending
is to give heed, and therein the perceived m ay w ork evocatively, to
cum ulative effect. Together, the perceived and the perceiver enter
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into the working of the world: things in their m eaning as
responded to, taking shape (10-11).
In w ilderness we enter a place and are, consequently, placed - oriented - in such a
w ay that things - w ildlands and wild creatures - m ay present them selves to us
and w e m ay receive them as such - that is, receive them as presences. And in
th at m utual contact we come to know these things, ourselves an d our cocreaturely co-existence as meaningful. Indeed, reality daw ns upon us as
m eaningful - a w orld of m eaning, w here our participation not only affords bu t is
also, in itself, cause for affirmation and sacramental celebration, and where our
co-participants are not taken for granted but, instead, are granted the abiding
respect and heartfelt concern they deserve. W ilderness, I believe, is a place
w here m eaningful reality may, to varying degrees, be m ade m anifest and where
m eaningful existence may find sponsorship. W hat could be of greater ultimate
im port?

II.

An older friend of mine recently told me that w hen he lived in M issoula
back in the m id 70s, he didn’t go up into the m ountains m uch because m ost of
the social justice advocates, socialists and Marxists in his circle, including
himself, considered it "escapist" - time spent away from the 'real w ork' of social
change and transform ation, an idle distraction, a dodge. At first this notion
struck m e as, alternately, unbelievable and absurd. And yet, as I thought about it
a bit, his recollection seem ed to point tow ards a very matter-of-fact truth
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regarding the place of wilderness in our lives and our society: w ilderness is, by
definition and for almost all of us, a place apart, a place of w ithdraw al and
retreat from the patterns and activities of our everyday lives. H ow ever, to equate
w ithdraw al and retreat (of the two competing images this latter term conjures, I
intend the religious over the military one) with escape seems to m e a
fundam ental m isunderstanding, perhaps one sym ptom atic of a society that can
no longer recognize or acknowledge anything m eaningful or com pelling outside
an exclusively hum an frame of reference - a society in which all nonhum an
otherness, be it 'natural' or divine, has been done away w ith or explained away,
reduced to a hum anly fabricated construct. It seems to suggest that if we're not
actively engaged in the interhum an world, we're not in the w orld at all, at least in
any m eaningful sense. Throughout the history of homo rdigiousus, on the other
hand, the periodic retreat from, or suspension of, our day-to-day lives and
practices, w hat Bugbee calls "sabbatical placement" in "Wilderness in America"
(6), has played a central role - an inspiring, anim ating, orienting an d em pow ering
role - in hum an beings' struggles to live meaningful and active - ever m ore fully
hum an - lives.

W ilderness, rather than a place of escape, may offer us a place of sabbath,
w here w e step back from the busy-ness of our lives and, from that distance, gain
a fresh perspective on the m eaning - or m eaningless folly - of w h at w e do; where
w e m ay m eet our fellow beings - wild places and wild creatures - in all their
irreducible otherness and non-instrum ental value (and where this otherness and
value cannot so easily be subsum ed under the rubric of hum an projection,
im position, fabrication or conveyance), and where through such holy intercourse
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- sacram ental participation in our m utual co-existence - w e re-touch the
fundam ental sources of faith and m eaning and receive the capacity and
com m ission to em body that faith and m eaning in affirm ative, m eaningful action.
W ilderness sabbatical offers us the possibility of a radical re-orientation w ith
respect to our entire lives as well as renew ing and sponsoring contact w ith the
holy ground of our being. Rather than being an escape from the ’real work,'
regular and engaged wilderness sabbath observance m ay grant us the capacity
and strength to do the work at hand with knowledge, respect and compassion,
hum ility and certainty, com m itm ent and enduring vigilance. A nd finally, it
seem s that only through sabbath participation in w ilderness can w e re-hear that
obligating divine im perative to "Remember the sabbath place and keep it holy;"
out of the respect born of our holy and healing contact w ith w ildlands and wild
creatures we can do no less.

Of course, if I rem em ber my Luther's Small Catechism correctly, the
com m and reads, "Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy." W ithin the
C hristian tradition, and the Jewish tradition from which the Christian sabbath
observance w as im m ediately derived, the sabbath is understood prim arily in
tem poral, not spatial, terms. For Jews, the sabbath is som ething that begins at
sunset on Friday evening and ends with sunrise on Sunday m orning. It is a holy
time, a 'holiday,' w hen work is set aside and business is p u t aw ay, a time for
ritual, reflection, respite and prayer. It is, fundam entally, not hum an time, but
G od’s time; the prim ary referent is other-than-hum an and ultim ate, eternal.
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W ilderness, understood as a sabbath place, seems to share m any of these
sam e general characteristics. It is a place apart from the daily pursuits of hum an
life. A nd w hile this has not always been the case over the course of hum an
history, it is a fact of experience in the m odern U nited States. A nd in m y life. I
w as one year old w hen the W ilderness Act finally passed after years of debate
and am endation; the Act's very existence and passage reflects our nation’s
recognition of the scarcity of w ildlands left on this continent and the urgent need
to p rotect from eventual destruction a few of the wild places that yet remain.
After centuries of exploration, settlement, developm ent and transform ation, the
U nited States is a land where w hat few w ildlands rem ain are a rem nant,
vestigial. We m ay eulogize our deep alienation from nature and m ourn our
eviction from the garden, and we m ay eagerly aw ait the daw n of the messianic
age when lions lie dow n with lambs (or some other, perhaps less extreme,
ap o caly p tic/utopian vision), but if we w ant to understand the potential
significance and place of wilderness in our lives, then we would do well to
describe and interpret our relations to w ildlands as they, in fact, present
them selves to us in experience. And one fact seems fairly clear: m ost of us no
longer reside or work in wild places. In fact, designated w ilderness is defined as
a place apart from hum an habitation; it is a place we visit, usually during our
'free time' and days off, on weekends, holidays and vacations, and then return
hom e - not unlike visiting a church or synogogue, temple or m osque. A nd upon
returning home, we go back to business as usual; we do our work, earn our
income, carry out our commercial transactions. Aside from guides and outfitters,
trail crews, researchers and various others, wilderness is a place w here business
and w ork are set aside.
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Of course, for m ost of us in our secular society (including those fast-food
style churchgoers who get their sabbath's dose of som ething called "religion" in
45 m inutes or less), the alternative to work and business isn't ritual, reflection
and prayer bu t recreation; that's w hat weekends are for! Unfortunately, while
recreation m ay connote the possibility of re-creation, as folks w ho w o u ld like to
rescue the w ord from its bankruptcy often point out, m ost of w hat w e describe as
recreation are usually things that, according to W ebster, "provide diversions and
am usem ents." In my mind, the w ord evokes images of recreation room s - "rec
rooms" - filled w ith pool tables and ping pong tables, pinball m achines, TVs and
VCRs, w here adolescents while aw ay time in idleness and the yearning for
som ething w orth doing (I adm it that these images m ay be a bit parochial, of
course; geographically, economically and spiritually, I grew up right around the
corner from "W ayne’s World."). W ithin the fram ework of our dom inant cultural
patterns, business and recreation (business and pleasure?) are two sides of the
sam e coin of instrum entality and intentionality. If we work in order to make
m oney, w e recreate in order to be diverted, am used, entertained - have fun. Like
recreational drug use, recreational wilderness use offers no exception to the rule
of technology; that's why the terms wilderness resource and recreational resource
(non-m otorized recreational resource, to be m ore precise) are so often used
synonym ously by m anagem ent agencies and wilderness visitors alike. Perceived
as a recreational resource, however, w ilderness offers no alternative to, or place
apart from, our busy-ness at all; both are thoroughly enveloped w ithin the sam e
practical and theoretical fram ework - the rigorous subordination of m eans to
ends (and the latter’s subsequent subordination to higher, greater and bigger
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ends) and the purposive and acquisitive striving for m ore of w hatever
so m eth in g/anythin g is 'good for.'

The sabbath time or place, on the other hand, calls for a suspension of
such pursuits and offers a radical departure from so m any of our purposespecific practices. W ilderness sabbatical offers us a place for engaged and
regular practice (given its current bastardization, I w on't say ritual), sustained
reflection, prayer and, perhaps ironically, play (which, as I will describe it
shortly, is the polar opposite of recreation as outlined above). It is a place in
w hich our participation involves setting aside our purposive endeavors and
claims of m astery and control and availing ourselves to m eet others - nonhum an
others - on their own terms, as they may speak of themselves w ithout reduction
to hum anly conferred interests; and, finally, it is a place w here the voices of these
self-speaking others m ay resonate within us and sponsor recognition of our cocreaturely kinship and reflection on the m eaning and ground of our m utual
being-together. As a sabbath observance, the prim ary referent in wilderness is
nonhum an, the m eaning foundational, the commission non-arbitrary. As such,
like the religious devotee for w hom the sabbath m arks, not the weekend but the
week's beginning, our wilderness sabbatical is anything bu t peripheral or tacked
on; it is a central, centering event that animates and orients us as w e m ove
through our days carrying the wilderness ethos - the sabbath spirit - w ith us
th roughout the week(s) ahead.

A nd if, as I'm suggesting, wilderness is a place of sabbath, then it is, above
all, a place of prayer. W ithin the Jewish tradition, m ore so than in the Christian
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tradition it seem s, prayer has played a central role in sabbath observance. I read
w ith aw e the legends of those prayerful Hasidic rabbis spending hour after hour
of sabbath and holy days w rapped in their prayer shawls, rapt in ecstasy. A nd
even in o ur time, the brilliant Jewish thinker A braham Heschel w as renow ned as
a legendary pray-er. For the Jew, the sabbath was - and is - a tim e of prayer, a
time w hen, according to Buber, we "step 'before the countenance,'" "say You and
listen" (I and Thou 131). Prayer, above all, is active attentiveness (Bugbee’s
"intent attending") and listening. In The Eclipse of God, Buber defines prayer
this way:
We call prayer in the pregnant sense of the term that speech of m an
to God which, w hatever else is asked, ultim ately asks for the
m anifestation of the divine Presence, for this Presence’s becom ing
dialogically perceivable. The single presupposition of a genuine
state of prayer is thus the readiness of the whole m an for this
Presence, sim ple turned-tow ardness, unreserved spontaneity (126).
In prayer we stand ready, in openness and presentness, for the advent of the
divine Presence. And, as discussed in Chapter Two of this paper, the place of
that advent and incarnation is the place where we stand, where, as we m eet our
fellow creatures as Thous, the Creator, eternal Thou, m anifests itself and becomes
present. As such, prayer describes not an act or orientation tow ard an
exclusively divine referent so m uch as a basic posture in which we stand ready to
go out to m eet the w orld in which we live in the fullness of dialogue. M aurice
Friedm an, draw ing on an 18th Century Hasidic saying, describes pray er as
follows:
"Alas the w orld is full of enorm ous lights and m ysteries,” says the
Baal Shem, "but m an hides them from him w ith one small hand."
Prayer is the removal of that hand.
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Prayer has to do w ith discovering each time anew w hat w e can
bring and w hat can be b ro u g h t.... The life of prayer can only be
sustained if w e bring ourselves to each situation w ith all that we
know and have been (Touchstones 340 & 341).
A n d if this prayerful disposition m arks the w ay we com port ourselves - "bring
ourselves" - tow ards our fellow beings as we encounter them in the m anifold
relational events of our lives, it also informs our reflective, reflexive
com portm ent as well. Prayer, alm ost paradoxically, extends inw ard to that
honest an d open reflection upon the m eaning of who we are and w ho we m ay
yet become through our active participation and involvem ent in the process of
creation. It is this reflexive openness - this "deepening of candour" w ith respect
to oneself that leads Bugbee to link the idea of prayer w ith m editation. In Inw ard
M orning he writes, "For years I have been im pressed with the justice of
connecting the ideas of m editation and prayer. In true m editation one is opening
oneself, there is a deepening of candour w ithout w hich nothing is revealed, but
for w hich one's thought skims round and round on surfaces" (143). Prayer, then,
describes not only that opening of ourselves to the divine Presence and to our
fellow creatures as we meet them as presences, but also a reflexive opening,
reflective candour, honest self-appraisal.

Obviously, prayer is m uch m ore than som e form ulaic recitation or even a
variety of conscious activity. In fact, as Buber point out, our overly-conscious
and willful intentionality m ay even preclude the possibility of true prayer and
rob it of its spontaneity.
But in this our style of subjectivized reflection not only the
concentration of the one who prays, but also his spontaneity is
assailed. The assailant is consciousness, the over-consciousness of
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this m an that he is praying, that he is praying, that he is praying.
The subjective knowledge of the one-turning-tow ards about his
turning-tow ards, this holding back of an 1 which does not enter into
the action w ith the rest of the person, an I to which the action is an
object - all this depossesses the moment, takes away its spontaneity
(Eclipse of God 126).
M ore than a particular volitional act, prayer is a faith posture, a basic stance of
the entire person - the disposition of dialogue, sabbath and, I believe, w ilderness.
In pray er one stands ready and open to receive, and in that readiness and
openness one m ay receive the touch of divinity, co-creaturely intim acy a n d /o r
reflective in-sight. In prayer we do not arrogantly call the shots but present
ourselves to hear and respond in all attentiveness and hum ility. In prayer, as in
w ilderness placement, we m ay recognize ourselves and our fundam ental
vocation as respondents. And so, it seems, that w ilderness m ay teach those of us
w ho have lost the capacity to pray, som ething of the m eaning and im port of
prayer. The pow er of wilderness to suspend our claims and reveal the claim ant's
stance for the arrogant and im poverishing pose that it is m ay also em -pow er us
to m eet the w orld in a m ore hum ble, attentive and spontaneous w ay, a m ore
prayerful way, re-attune us to the evocative voice of the other-than-hum an, and
lead us to a renew ed awareness of w hat it m ay mean to live in a w orld that we
d id n o t m ake and where hum an beings are not the sole and absolute source and
referent of m eaning and value.

I find this prayerful disposition central to m y experience of w ilderness as a
sabbath place; to speak of w ilderness as a place of prayer conveys the m editative
receptivity and keen - though casual - sensuality that w ilderness placem ent
engenders as well as the stillness, the cathedral quietness and am plitude, of the
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places them selves, especially during those high and holy hours of m atins and
vespers. And yet, while I find these prayerful images true to my experience, the
sense of solem nity they invoke only tells part of the story. W ilderness placement
also kindles the sparks of what is m ost vital within us - a certain exuberance,
verve or zest, an overflowing of intoxicating joy and lightness, plain old fun.
W ild places call out to us to scramble up that next ridge (and the next one after
that), to follow game trails to see where they'll lead us, to explore waterfalls, to
sw im in deep pools, to laugh and howl in response to their beauty. In other
w ords, the voice of wild places speaks to our sense of play. If wilderness is a
place of prayer, it is, at least as m uch, also a place of play.

Of course, I adm it that play is not exactly a dom inant feature in traditional
understandings of sabbath observance. At least not for adults. A nd yet, it strikes
m e that in grow ing up and giving up our "childish ways," as St. Paul adm onishes
us to do (I Cor. 13:11), we most often end up losing our capacity for both play
and prayer. It seems that wonder, awe and reverence give way, if not to some
'm ature' atheism , then to creed, dogm a and religion at about the sam e time that
our playfulness gets buried under, and its energies sapped by, our all-consum ing
(though, in a sense, futile) efforts to "make a living" (we are not the creators of
our being) or "earn a living" (existence comes to us as a gift of grace; w e cannot
possibly earn it). Perhaps we need to re-hear the w ords of Jesus w hen he says,
"Truly, I say to you, whoever does not receive the kingdom of God like a child
shall not enter it" (Mark 10:15). Perhaps Jesus is exhorting us to regain our
childish playfulness and spontaneity, our willingness to be aw estruck and
am azed. For it seems that the capacity for play in our all-too-adult w orld has
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great sacram ental im port for our lives. Play, as Erazim Kohak defines it, lies at
the heart of the wilderness, sabbath ethos that stands as the strict counterpart and
subversive challenge to the instrum entality that informs our technologicallyconditioned patterns and drives our work-world lives and agendas. According
to Kohak,
In play, the w orld and I stand in a relation of m utual freedom , of
non-dem and. There is no task to be accomplished or result to be
obtained. I do not engage in play even for the purpose of am using
myself. That is an attem pt which invariably fails. Play is at its
p urest w hen it is an expression of w hat for w ant of a better term we
could call vitality, when am usem ent is not its goal but rather its by
product. Perhaps it w ould be m ore accurate to speak of playfulness
as the pure expression of w hat Heidegger called overtness betw een
w orld and the subject.... We shall establish a provisional criterion
for play and say that to the extent to which an activity is
subordinated to the achievem ent of a particular goal, it falls into the
broad category of work, while to the extent to which it is its ow n
justification, it constitutes play ("I, Thou, and It" 53).
From this definition of play, it should be obvious that play and recreation, as I
described the latter term earlier in this chapter, are two very different things. In
fact, given their respective definitions, they mark opposite poles along the
spectrum of intentional activities. M ost basically, the goal of recreation is to
"provide diversions and amusements," while play, as Kohak understands it, has
no goal; it is the opposite of goal-oriented activity. The purposiveness of
recreation is absent from play; play serves no purpose. Ask a young child w hy
h e /s h e is playing and sh e /h e will usually say, "I dunno," and give an alm ost
disdainful, im patient shrug of the shoulders as a fitting response to this stupid,
peculiarly adult question. A nd w hat's more, I'd guarantee that only some overlym ature, brainw ashed child w ould ever answer this question with, "To have some
fun." Even as an adult equipped with a m uch larger vocabulary and m ore adept
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in the arts of deception and miscommunication, m y own explanations as to why
I'm going out to walk in wild places are rarely more articulate than a child’s: a
kick at the ground and a quick study of my boots, followed by "Just ’cuz," or "It’s
such a nice day," "I just wanna get out of town," "I w anna get up into the
m ountains for awhile." Neither the child nor I are as dum b as we sound; it's just
that the im plied instrum entality begs the question, and the only honest response
takes on the form of a tautology. We play in order to play, walk in w ilderness to
w alk in wilderness. In this general sense, then, w ilderness is a sabbatical place of
playfulness and play.

Of course, there's a lot of hard work involved in this play, and at times lots of times - w e’re obviously not playing at all. It's physically dem anding and
som etim es even exhausting to walk with a pack up steep inclines, over m ountain
passes or through dense brush. And when I'm fording swift-m oving, deep
rivers, crossing stream s on slick rocks or dead-fallen trees, or balancing on
w obbly talus boulders, I'm quite sure that I'm not playing at all. In these
narrow er contexts, I can answ er your 'why' questions quickly and easily: "In
order to get to the other side," or "In order to get dow n off this ridge or
m ountaintop.” These particular tasks have very well-defined, specific goals.
A nd in addition to these, there are all the less taxing tasks around the cam p to
attend to: setting u p some form of shelter, cooking, cleaning up, securing food,
m aintaining an adequate supply of drinkable w ater and countless other highly
specific, goal-oriented pursuits. Even though our wilderness w alking is fram ed
w ithin the overarching context of a play event, work and play interm ingle in the
particular situations that arise in our actual wilderness travels. A nd, in fact, an
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activity that we may have experienced as play one day m ay be nothing m ore
than dreary w ork the next. Like prayer, play involves the disposition or posture
that w e bring to w hat we do and w hom we meet. Play is that disposition of
vitality and non-instrum entality - a disposition that m ay w ithhold or m anifest
itself in both situations of w ork or play, broadly defined. As Kohak explains,
To be sure, play is again a broad and often indistinct concept, one
we need to define further. There are elements of play in alm ost all
m y pursuits - w ithout them, work becomes drudgery. Similarly,
there are often elements of work in my play. ... As an instance,
w hen I w ould enjoy sailing to leeward of an island but lay a course
to w indw ard because letting the island m ask my w ind w ould cost
m e m inutes in reaching my destination, sailing has, in that lim ited
context, ceased to be play and has become (enjoyable) work.
Conversely, when I decide to decorate a board inside a cabinet I am
m aking with delicate scrollwork for the sole reason that I enjoy
carving scrollwork and in spite of the fact that it will prolong the
job and serve no purpose, my work has become play ("I, Thou, and
It” 53).
Play describes those things we do for their own sake, irrespective of the purposes
they serve. More than a description of a particular class of play events, how ever,
play - playfulness m ight be better - describes a disposition characterized, above
all, by purposelessness and the suspension of purposive pursuits.

As such, playfulness is the hum an posture or spirit that corresponds most
closely w ith pointless activities in use-less places. It is a posture both appropriate
to and engendered through sabbatical wilderness placement. W ith o ur purposes
an d goal-oriented pursuits suspended in engaged and intent participation in
w ilderness play, nature no longer receives its definition and existence solely in
term s of our categories of resource developm ent and use. A ccording to Kohak's
definition, in play our relations with things are defined in term s of "mutual
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freedom " and "non-dem and.” In play we encounter things as independent
others, as ends in themselves and not just means to be used or m anipulated
according to our purposes and ends. Play offers the im m ediacy that, along w ith
the openness and attunem ent of prayer, m ay foster I-Thou dialogue with the
beings w hom w e m eet in m om ents of playfulness.

A nd it seems that this is the point to which all the images I've used in m y
shotgun approach to the im port of w ilderness placem ent keep returning and at
w hich they all converge. W ilderness is the place where I most often encounter
the beings and things of nature as Thous and not Its. In speaking of wilderness
as an anti-resource, a home of dialogue and a sabbath place of prayer and play,
I'm trying to point to the way these places actively predispose us to, and foster
our participation in, I-Thou encounters with nonhum an beings and things encounters through which we receive the irreducibly m eaningful and lifeaffirm ing gifts of dialogue, the im m ediate knowledge of these nonhum an others
as non-instrum entally valuable and respectworthy, and the pow erful im perative
to em body that knowledge in respectful, compassionate action w ith regards to
them.

Up to this point, w hat I have, presented in this section m ight best be
described as a fairly general and exploratory reflection upon the sabbath
potential of wilderness as a place of prayer and play. To show how sabbatical
placem ent in w ildlands m ay actually inform and enrich our lives, I'd like to offer
several of W endell Berry's poems - in full or in part - from his collection entitled
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Sabbaths. Berry w rote these poems over the course of six years of Sundays
am ong the w ooded hillsides of Kentucky. And while the im portance of his
regular, w eekly observance of sabbath time should not be overlooked, I have
chosen these few selections to highlight the equally im portant role of the sabbath
place - the place apart, the place of sanctuary and w ithdraw al, the place of
sacram ental celebration and renewal, healing and sustenance, sponsorship and
commission. The poem s address all these themes and a great deal m ore. They
speak, above all, to the ultim ate im portance and necessity of both sabbath places
and our sabbatical placem ent within them. The poem s require no exegesis, and
I'll give none. W hat few comments I will offer represent my personal responses
to their pow erful elicitations. I sim ply ask my audience to read Berry's w ords
poetically and with an eye to their im port and relevance for the them es discussed
above.

The bell calls in the town
W here forebears cleared the shaded land
A nd brought high daylight down
To shine on field and trodden road.
I hear, but understand
C ontrarily, and walk into the woods.
I leave labor and load,
Take up a different story.
I keep an inventory
Of w onders and of uncommercial goods.
I climb up through the field
That m y long labor has kept clear.
Projects, plans unfulfilled
W aylay and snatch at me like briars,
For there is no rest here
W here ceaseless effort seems to be required,
Yet fails, and spirit tires
W ith flesh, because failure
And weariness are sure

In all that m ortal wishing has inspired.
I go in pilgrim age
Across an old fenced boundary
To w ildness w ithout age
W here, in their long dom inion,
The trees have been left free.
They call the soil here "Eden"; slants and steeps
H ard to stand straight upon
Even w ithout a burden.
N o m ore a perfect garden,
There's an im m ortal m em ory that it keeps.
I leave work's daily rule
And come here to this restful place
W here music stirs the pool
A nd from high stations of the air
Fall notes of w ordless grace,
Strewn rem nants of the prim al Sabbath's hymn.
A nd I rem em ber here
A tale of evil twined
W ith good, serpent and vine,
A nd innocence as evil's stratagem .
I let that go a while,
For it is hopeless to correct
By generations' toil,
A nd I let go my hopes and plans
That no toil can perfect.
There is no vision here but w hat is seen:
W hite bloom nothing explains.
But a m ute blessedness
Exceeding all distress,
The fresh light stained a hundred shades of green
U proar of wheel and fire
That has contained us like a cell
O pens and lets us hear
A stillness longer than all time
W here leaf and song fulfill
The passing light, pass w ith the light, return,
Renewed, as in a rhym e.
This is no hum an vision
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Subject to our revision;
G od's eye holds every leaf as light is worn.
Ruin is in place here:
The dead leaves rotting on the ground,
The live leaves in the air
Are gathered in a single dance
That turns them round and round.
The fox cub trots his almost pathless path
As silent as his absence.
These passings resurrect
A joy w ithout defect,
The life that steps and sings in ways of death (10-12).

W hat is the way to the woods, how do you go there?
By climbing up through the six days' field,
kept in all the body's years, the body's
sorrow , weariness, and joy. By passing through
the narrow gate on the far side of that field
w here the pasture grass of the body's life gives way
to the high, original standing of the trees.
By com ing into the shadow , the shadow
of the grace of the strait w ay’s ending,
the shadow of the mercy of light.
W hy m ust the gate be narrow?
Because you cannot pass beyond it burdened.
To come into the woods you m ust leave behind
the six days' world, all of it, all of its plans and hopes.
You m ust come w ithout w eapon or tool, alone,
expecting nothing, rem em bering nothing,
into the ease of sight, the brotherhood of eye and leaf (88-89).

H ere w here the w orld is being m ade,
N o hum an hand required,
A m an m ay come, som ew hat afraid
Always, and som ewhat tired,
For he comes ignorant and alone
From work and worry of
A hum an place, in soul and bone
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The ache of hum an love;
H e m ay come and be still, not go
T ow ard any chosen aim
O r stay for w hat he thinks is so.
Setting aside his claim
O n all things fallen in his plight,
His m ind m ay move w ith leaves,
W ind-shaken, in and out of light,
A nd live as the light lives,
A nd live as the Creation sings
In covert, two clear notes,
A nd waits; then two clear answerings
Com e from m ore distant throats May live a while with light, shaking
In high leaves, or delayed
In halts of song, subm it to making,
The shape of w hat is m ade (39-40).
I think I love this last poem most of all; quite literally, it evokes a physical
response in me. My stomach knows the fear and w orry, the ache and lack of
w hich Berry speaks; m y shoulders have felt that debilitating weariness. H ow
often have I entered my wilderness sabbath in such an em pty and broke-dow n
condition? But my body also knows the gift of that deep sigh the last four
stanzas of this poem bespeak - the relinquishm ent (I’m at a loss to say who is the
agent here; who d o es/g ran ts this relinquishing?) of claims and the lightening of
m ind, the freedom to w ander in the com panionship of light and leaves and
sound, the grace of things arising, presencing and falling aw ay as I stroll or sit,
m iraculously enough, with no desire or attem pt to control them, m anipulate
them or m ake them stay.
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Perhaps it is this gift of the sigh - our graciously bestow ed acceptance and
affirm ation of stillness and non-interventionist participation, so to speak - that
leads Berry to link our w ilderness sabbaticals w ith death in the first tw o poems.
C ertainly our sabbath rest points to our final rest, the end of labors and cares, the
ultim ate disburdenm ent. But that sounds awfully cliche; to be honest, it's been a
long tim e since I found m uch comfort in any abstract notions, theories or ideas
about death, w hether it be eternal life ad infinitum (ad nauseum ?) or som e
ecological re-union with the organic building blocks of life (or, in a slightly
different version, a re-mixing with the anim ating Energy that courses through
the 'veins' of the cosmos). And yet I sense Berry m eans som ething very different
than all of this; on occasion, death and resurrection m ay 'flash' in m y soul as
accessible and potentially m eaningful, usually w hen I'm dw elling in places
w here the hum an project to arrest the form er and force the latter aren't so
evident. There's a place - a high m eadow - up near the Bitterroot Divide that I
visit w ith som e regularity, and where, almost as regularly, the inevitability of my
ow n death - and the deaths of those w hom I love - loses m uch of its sting.
W ithout explanation, this place im parts an unspoken, unspeakable 'sense' to our
final sigh and offers the possibility of a m eaningful death.

These first three poems speak of the way we come into the sabbath place;
for the m ost part, they describe our m ovem ent from the w ork place and home
place into the sabbath place. And they also describe the grace of w hat aw aits us
there as w e are en-couraged and en-abled in our sabbatical placem ent to let go of
our claims and pursuits, suspend our efforts to represent and explain, exert
control and establish 'order,' and to stand am ong our fellow creatures in the
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"brotherhood (sic) of eye and leaf." As we step up - and step back - to m eet these
w ild places and wild creatures in such a way, we find ourselves received by their
welcom ing presence and graced with their ultim ate gifts: joy, beauty, silence,
ease, an d intim ations of kinship, divinity, and life (and death) -affirm ing
m eaning.

The final two poem s I'd like to present speak of a very different
m ovem ent. Actually, this fourth poem speaks of no m ovem ent at all; instead, it
offers a stark snapshot - a freeze frame - of the profane and sacred standing side
by side.
Hail to the forest born again,
that by neglect, the American benevolence,
has returned to semi-virginity, graceful
in the putrid air, the corrosive rain,
the ash-fall of Heaven-invading fire our time's genius to mine the light
of the world s ancient buried days
to m ake it poisonous in the air.
Light and greed together make a sm udge
that stifles and blinds. But here
the light of Heaven's sun descends,
stained and m ingled with its forms,
heavy trunk and limb, light life and wing,
that we m ust pray for clarity to see,
not raw sources, symbols, worded powers,
but fellow presences, independent, called
out of nothing by no word of ours,
blesse'd, here w ith us (57).
In a single verse, Berry counterposes the profane consequences of business as
usual under the claim ant's stance with the possibility of a clear vision (which, as
Berry notes, comes to us through prayer, prayerful disposition) very m uch like
the wilderness ethos and sabbath spirit described earlier. W hereas the first half
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of the poem bespeaks our sinful heritage, the second half suggests the potential
source of healing and renewal - re-sacralizing. Like the H asidim and Buber and
myself, Berry, in his w ritings, conveys that faith posture in w hich the profane is
not understood as essentially and irrevocably so, but m ight instead be m ore
m eaningfully described as the not-yet-hallowed - a place of potential hallowing.
A nd so, in this final poem Berry suggests the possibility of the com plim entary
and harm onious m ovem ent of return from the sabbath place, in w hich our
sabbath renew al and commission m ay perm eate and transform the rest of our
lives - and our world.
W hat if, in the high, restful sanctuary
That keeps the m em ory of Paradise,
W e're followed by the drone of history
A nd greed's poisonous fumes still burn our eyes?
D isharm ony recalls us to our work.
From Heavenly w ork of light and w ind and leaf
We m ust turn back into the peopled dark
O f our unraveling century, the grief
Of waste, the agony of haste and noise.
It is a hard return from Sabbath rest
To lifework of the fields, yet we rejoice,
Returning, less condem ned in being blessed
By vision of w hat hum an work can make:
A harm ony betw een w ood-land and field,
The world as it was given for love's sake,
The w orld by love and loving w ork revealed
As given to our children and our Maker.
In that healed harm ony the world is used
But not destroyed, the Giver and the taker
Joined, the taker blessed, in the unabused
Gift that nurtures and protects. Then w orkday
A nd Sabbath live together in one place.
Though mortal, incomplete, that harm ony
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Is our one possibility of peace.
W hen fields and woods agree, they m ake a rhym e
That stirs in distant m em ory the whole
First Sabbath's song that no largess of time
O r hope or sorrow wholly can recall.
But harm ony of earth is Heaven-made,
H eaven-m aking, is promise and is prayer,
A little song to keep us unafraid,
An earthly m usic m agnified in air (15-16).
R eading this poem makes me a little uneasy - som ething to do w ith the messiness
of juggling the two w orlds and trying to affirm both. I adm ire Berry's courage
here. He speaks of a balanced syncopation betw een address and response,
dialogue and responsibility, withdraw al and return, sacram ent and commission
through which we are afforded the possibility of a w orld - neither an idyll nor a
heaven - w here the sponsorship of our w ilderness sabbaths finds its incarnation
in a m ore just and compassionate society. W ilderness, attended to, offers no
escape, as m y friend and his peers once thought; rather, it offers the blessings of
renew al and re-orientation that potentiate active, transform ative retu rn and the
obligating im perative that dem ands it.

Berry's poem s, Kohak's understanding of play, Buber's, Friedm an's and
Bugbee's reading of prayer, and Bugbee’s thoughts on wilderness [both in
"W ilderness in America" and writ large in Inw ard M orning, w here w ilderness
takes on ontological significance as "reality experienced as call and explained in
responding to it absolutely" (128), and "the home in which things other than
ourselves m ay be welcomed as guests, where innocence is sacred, and
helplessness m oves us not to abandon the helpless, in spite of our not know ing
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how to help" (224).] - how m any times have I re-read their w ords, an d how m any
miles have I walked with their ideas swirling through my head? A nd it all still
seem s so true, so apt and resonant w ith m y personal experiences of w ilderness as
a place of sabbath. During the years reading, re-reading and thinking about
these things, wilderness has, as a fact of m y experience, been a sabbath place for
me. It has stood as a place apart from the corrosive and erosive stupidity of m ost
of m y em ploym ent, the suffocation, isolation and loss of so m uch hu m an society.
It has offered me a sanctuary and retreat, a place of w ithdraw al and, no doubt, at
times, a place of escape. But despite the baggage and pre-occupations I bring
w ith me, and no m atter the m isguided and self-centered nature of m y motives,
w ild lands and wild creatures have continued to bestow their blessings upon me.
W ith their eloquent voices they have, at times, startled me out of my self
absorption and re-attuned m y hearing to the call and plaint of m y fellow
creatures. W rapped in the embrace of wild places, I've known - though always
partially and ephem erally, that is, hum anly - som ething of healing and renewal,
joy, faith and meaning. And, finally, I've heard and know n the pow erful claim of
these places upon me. Cut off from regular and intim ate contact w ith them , I
can't quite seem to make sense of my life; I lack some basic sustenance and I wilt.
This, too, is a fact of my experience; I've tried to leave before - twice now. A nd
each time, I’ve found myself called back - beckoned - to return for another
sum m er, another year, to walk am ong these m ountains. A nd I believe that if m y
life will ever take on the character of a vocation, it will be to the degree that I can
act w ith integrity and m eaning in consonance w ith the instruction received, and
the respect and love engendered, in walking in the gracious presence of
w ildlands. But to "put to the proof in action," to incarnate that respect and love

248

in respectful and loving action, to keep these places holy in a w orld so
antithetically opposed to holinesis, how does one venture to respond? W hat
answ er can I - can we - make?

III.

Responsibility means responding. If we have found ourselves called upon
and claim ed by the presence of wild places and wild creatures, encountered in
the reciprocal co-presence of dialogue, we cannot but respond. We are,
inescapably, responsible. The rhythm ic alternation between call and answ er,
claim and response, dialogue and responsibility - the rhythm this entire paper is
an attem pt to articulate - attains completion and fulfillment only insofar as we
actively work to incarnate the m eaning and knowledge received in dialogue in
respectful and com m itted response.

A t the m ost basic level, then, w ilderness preservation is a m atter of ethical
responsibility. It is grounded upon and rooted in our reception and
acknow ledgm ent of the address of wild places and wild creatures heard, not as
resources defined according to our objectifying representations and categories of
m anipulation, use and control, but as eloquent, self-speaking others - Thous.
A nd in m eeting these places and creatures as such, we come to know them as
em inently respectw orthy beings with an integrity, independence and value that
defy reduction to term s of function, purpose or instrum entality. That is, the
evocative voice of self-speaking, wild nature, heard in the m om ent of dialogue,
elicits our respect and concern, and we find ourselves placed in a position of
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irrevocable responsibility, called forth - both by these fellow creatures and from
o u t of the depths of our creaturely being and vocation - to em body our respect
and concern for them in respectful and concerned response. In sacram ental
intercourse w ith the beings of w ild nature we come into their holy presence,
intim ate the potential holiness of our lives, and receive nothing short of a nonarbitrary - fully binding, ultim ately liberating - divine im perative to rem em ber
these places and creatures for w hat and who they are in their ow n right and keep
them holy.

But, after talking at length about wilderness as a sabbath place, I think it's
im p o rtan t to note that that's not w hy we ought to preserve w ilderness. In other
w ords, w e don't preserve w ildlands because they are sabbath places that offer
grace and m eaning for our lives (although they are, indeed, that); the prim ary
sponsorship of w ilderness preservation cannot and should not be reduced to a
causal, functional explanation carried out in terms of hum an self-interest - even
religio-philosophical or onto-theological ones. Again, w ilderness preservation is
a m atter of ethical responsibility. We preserve w ilderness because in and
through our sabbatical placem ent in w ildlands and among w ild creatures we
have heard their self-speaking address, m et them in dialogue, and com e to know
them as fellow creatures w orthy of respect and concern. We are enjoined to
rem em ber and keep these sabbath places holy not out of self-interest b u t out of
respect and reverence - even love.

The w ords of John M uir and David Brower, w hen they equate the
flooding of Hetch Hetchy or Glen Canyon with the flooding of a great cathedral,
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seem relevant and illum inating here. They're not suggesting that w e shouldn't
flood a cathedral because we need beautiful places to w orship (although it's also
true that w e do need them and that our w orship m ay be especially m eaningful
and noum enal in such places). Rather, we preserve the cathedral because we
know it as som ething w arranting preservation, som ething beautiful (that is,
som ething w hose "sense," according to Bugbee, cannot be explained strictly in
term s of its purpose) and holy, the "house of God" - irreducibly m eaningful,
unqualifiably valuable, sacred. A nd w hile this latter implication of the analogy
betw een flooding these valleys and canyons and flooding cathedrals is rarely
discussed explicitly, as deeply religious a m an as Ed Abbey knew the sacrilege of
such desecration w hen he eulogized the lost red rock country of Glen Canyon as
a place w here "God lived" (movie soundtrack to "Abbey's World"). To speak of
w ildlands as cathedrals or sabbath places is an attem pt to invoke the pow er of
these rich religious images and call upon their attendant m eanings. W hen we try
to testify to the irreducible and indescribable value of the things w e love and try
to speak of the love and respect we hold for them, our ordinary, daily speech
sounds so prosaic - says so little. We strain against and stretch the lim its of our
language and find ourselves draw n to the more evocative images of poetry and
religion, w here we can at least point tow ard and bear witness to the fundam ental
an d fundam entally ineffable m eaning these things m ay hold. A nd this seems
fitting. For respect, concern, love and compassion are born of our experience of
things encountered apart from our representations and objectifying constructs,
an d so, consequently, the m eaning, knowledge and value im parted in those
m eetings elude representational thought and speech. A nd yet, while the
conceptualization and articulation so often escape us, one thing rem ains sure: we
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know these things as claiming our respect and concern, and we know we are
obliged to incarnate that respect and concern in respectful, com passionate
response.

W ilderness preservation, then, is not an act of self-interest bu t one of
respect and concern - an act of ethical responsibility. U nfortunately, m ost
w ilderness advocates rarely offer ethical grounds for their position; that's why
w e've become just another com peting user group (and an "elitist" and "selfish"
one at that) haggling with timber interests, petrochemical executives and
snow m obilers over who gets how m uch of the rem aining roadless resource to
use according to our respective needs and desires. W ilderness preservation may
m ake good scientific, economic, social, recreational, aesthetic and religious sense,
but to sell w ilderness strictly in terms of its usefulness and instrum entality - its
benefits and gifts - m is-speaks the ethical foundations of our concern and ignores
the fundam ental m eaning of preservation. As I suggested earlier, w ilderness
preservation is our (last chance) attem pt at "leaving (wild) things be" - that active
response to things that involves, according to Bugbee, "respecting things, being
still in the presence of things, letting them speak" (Inward M orning 155). In
preserving wilderness we acknowledge the respectw orthiness of these wild
places and wild creatures; we curb our hyperactive instrum entality an d lust for
overrunning (and transforming) our nonhum an fellow creatures an d sum m arily
reducing them to non-presences (Its); we recognize the self-speaking eloquence
of these beings and things and allow them to speak in their ow n term s and in
their ow n right. In sum , leaving wild things be is our response to their eloquent
address as they speak not to our interests but to our capacity for respect and
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concern and, in doing so, elicit both. In the case of wild places, leaving them be
m eans preserving w hat integrity and independence from hum an artifice they still
possess; for w ild creatures, it m eans preserving sufficient and appropriate space
for healthy populations of the m ost far-ranging and habitat-specific species to
evolve and reproduce, live and die in their ow n ways, independently of heavyhan d ed hum an interference. These are the things we find ourselves obliged to
do o u t of the respect and concern engendered in and elicited through our
intim ate, know ing contact with wild places and wild creatures.

So, how m uch wilderness are we obligated to preserve? Given the time
and place, this becomes the basic ethical question that we m ust answ er in
deciding the fate of the rem aining roadless lands - de facto w ilderness - in
M ontana and the northern Rockies. This is the ethical question to w hich any
political solution to the wilderness issue in our region - be it a w ilderness bill or a
tim ber release bill - m ust be held accountable, answerable, responsible. A nd,
generally speaking, the answ er to this question is, I believe, fairly
straightforw ard: all that's respectworthy, all that speaks to our concern. A nd for
me, that m eans all of it - all that remains relatively intact and undefiled. As a
nation, w e face our final opportunity to leave a few small pieces of w hat's left of
w ild nature be. In recognition of, and out of respect for, the independence and
otherness, the irreducible m eaning and non-instrum ental value of the other-thanhu m an and that which we did not alter, fabricate or m ake over in o ur own
im age, we need to - we m ust - set aside and protect the few tracts of w ild land
that rem ain on this continent.
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Of course, if I'm going to advocate wilderness preservation w ithin the
fram ew ork of ethical responsibility, such general, abstract and prescriptive
statem ents cannot furnish the proper experiential starting point for m y
argum ents; instead, they are conclusions based upon our im m ediate and
participatory know ledge of these w ild places and w ild creatures as noninstrum entally valuable and respectw orthy and our reflective recognition of the
m eaning and purport of our being-together-with them as co-participants in the
process of creation. And so, if I w ant to talk about w ilderness preservation in
term s of ethical responsibility, I m ust begin at the beginning; I m ust begin w ith
the actual, concrete encounters with w ild places and wild creatures that have
engendered and nurtured m y respect and concern for them and through w hich I
have found m yself claimed by the non-arbitrary, obligating im perative to
em body m y respect for these beings and things by leaving them be. In other
w ords, I m ust begin by looking to my own experience of the rem aining de facto
w ilderness in M ontana and the northern Rockies and bearing w itness to those
events through which I have come to know these places and their inhabitants as
respectw orthy and through which I have received the com m and to enact m y
respect for them and keep them holy. And while my experiences here m ay be
fairly lim ited, they furnish the necessary experiential starting point from w hich
to begin m y reflective exploration of w hat it may mean to act responsibly ethically - with respect to wildlands in general.

Usually, I don't venture too far from the m ountains aro u n d M issoula, so,
of all the undesignated, unprotected w ildlands in question, I only visit tw o of
these areas w ith any regularity: the Great Burn and the Q uigg Peak-Rock Creek
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roadless area. In addition to m y visits to these places, how ever, I've also had the
opportunity to go to several other de facto wilderness areas in the region, and of
those infrequent visits, m y trips to the Rocky M ountain Front, H um bug Spires
and Lost River Range stand out as especially m em orable and m eaningful. In an
infinite m ultitude of voices, each of these places has, in very unique and different
w ays, called to m e and claimed me. In the smell of w et sage a t daw n, in the
enveloping coolness of a grove of ancient cedars, in the sights and sounds
(especially the sounds!) of a moose cow and calf casually foraging along the
banks of a lazy creek (the alternate sucking of hooves in the m ud or clacking
against rocks, the slosh of water, the tear of plants from the ground - all so clearly
audible in that evening's stillness), in the full m oon's glare on chalky rock
pinnacles w ith a chorus of coyotes howling nearby, in the calm of a July
snow show er, the blast of autum n's first winds, in the m atter-of-fact dynam ism of
a devastating forest fire and the more subtle processes of renew al, in the eruption
of m assive m ountains out of a flat, grassy sea, in rushing stream s and hellish
aridity - in all these events, along with a hundred thousand others, these places
have addressed me. They've spoken to me as so m uch m ore than cheap sources
of fossil fuels or so m any million board feet of timber or potential m ining sites,
m ore than a breeding ground for productive fisheries an d abu n d an t "game"
populations, m ore than recreational backpacking or horsepacking resources.
W ith unsurpassable eloquence, they’ve spoken to me of them selves - of their
irreplaceable uniqueness and w ondrous beauty, their sense and w orth and
goodness, their integrity and independence apart from any hum an purpose, goal
or intention. A nd in that graciously bestowed reception and acknow ledgm ent of
this self-speaking address, I’ve come to know these w ild places and their
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inhabitants as irreducibly and indescribably m eaningful and valuable, obviously
and overw helm ingly respectworthy. A nd I know they cry out - alternately
pleading and dem anding, it seems - to be protected and preserved, let be,
allow ed to enact and articulate their existence on their own term s and in their
ow n way. O ut of the respect and concern born of such dialogue, I feel w e are
called upon and obligated to do nothing less.

But, as I m entioned before, m y experience here is fairly lim ited. W hat
about all the roadless areas I've never visited? H ow do I know that each one is
respectw orthy and w arrants preservation? Upon w hat do I base m y ethical
responsibility for them? As I've m entioned throughout this paper, ethical
responsibility is born in and sponsored by our encounters with others as we m eet
them as fellow beings, presences, Thous, partners in dialogue. Ethical
responsibility "springs" from our concrete, actual participation in the reciprocity
of dialogue, w here we come to know our fellow creatures as respectw orthy and
irreducibly valuable, where our lives and actions m ay be inform ed by direction
and m eaning, and where we recognize the potential holiness of our beingtogether-w ith-them in what Bugbee calls the "sacrament of co-existence." A nd
yet, while our participation in dialogue begets a n d /o r nurtures our respect and
calls forth our respectful response, ethical responsibility only comes to full
fruition through our serious reflection upon the sense and m eaning of these
encounters and our ability to incarnate that sense and m eaning in thoughtful,
com m itted action. A nd it seems, upon reflection, that the respect engendered
and the m eaning im parted in m y experiences of the Great Burn or Q uigg Peak
inform m y responsibility to like things - say the Blue Joint area, the Tobacco
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Roots, Lemhis or Crazy M ountains, by way of analogy and association, m y
encounters w ith both designated wilderness and de facto w ildlands suggest that
these roadless areas and their inhabitants are sim ilarly evocative and
respectw orthy and w arrant preservation and protection. By w ay of
generalization, I m ight say that I've never walked in a w ilderness area designated or not - that didn't speak to my capacity for respect an d elicit my
respectful response, and, furtherm ore, I have trouble im agining any such place
not evoking such a response. A nd although we can never lose sight of the
experiential ground of our thoughts and actions or try to substitute abstractions
and generalizations for the compelling and em pow ering im m ediacy of our
encounters, neither can we limit our ethical responsibility to those relatively few
beings and things w e m ay come to know as intim ate partneres in dialogue.
Therefore, as an extension of my respect and concern for the w ild places and
creatures I've know n, I’m lead to conclude that not only the G reat Burn and
Rocky M ountain Front w arrant protection and preservation as w ilderness, but
that each one of the rem aining de facto wilderness areas in the northern Rockies
calls forth and compels the sam e ethical response.

Furtherm ore, in attem pting to bear witness to the reality and im port of
those im m ediate and engaging encounters with wild places and w ild creatures
that sponsor our ethical concern for them, and in attem pting to reflect upon and
interpret the sense and m eaning of these meetings as they inform our ethical
responsibility toward w ildlands in general, we are, in addition, aided and
instructed in our ethical decision-making and action by our fellow h um an beings
as they testify to and enact their concern on behalf of those w ildlands they care
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about most. A nd so, as we seek to come to some general position of ethical
responsibility with respect to wilderness preservation in the northern Rockies it
seems especially relevant that, according to Regional Forester Dave Jolly,
”[T]here is a constituency for every one of these roadless a re a s.... W hen w e start
analyzing the effects of entering any one of them, we hear from people"
(M issoulian. Oct. 10,1992). And he's right. Consider this very brief an d partial
list of local environm ental groups working to preserve and protect the rem aining
roadless lands of their locale: Great Burn Study Group, Rock Creek Protective
Association, Badger-Two Medicine Alliance, Save the Yaak Com m ittee, Friends
of the Bitterroot, Wild Allan M ountain, Friends of the Wild Swan, Sw an View
Coalition, Deer Lodge Forest Defense Fund, Beaverhead Forest Concerned
Citizens, Friends of the Clearwater, Hells Canyon Preservation Council, and the
list goes on and on. Through w ord and action these groups and their m em bers
tell their stories of ethical concern and invite and encourage us to support a n d /o r
join their efforts to act with respect toward the particular places they seek to
protect and preserve. For the m ost part, the m em bers of these groups are people
w ho live near the areas in question; they visit these places regularly and, through
years of intim ate contact, have come to know them as irreducibly and
irreplaceably valuable. And out of respect and love, they w ant to see these
places allow ed to m aintain their integrity and independence; they w ant to see
them protected from desecration, disrespectful use and abuse, and unnecessary
an d care-less sacrifice for the sake of short term hum an gain. I believe the efforts
of these local groups testify, above all else, to the self-speaking eloquence, deep
respectw orthiness and non-instrum ental value of the places they seek to
preserve. So, while I’ve never been to the Yaak or hiked in the Tobacco Roots, I
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have w itnessed the respect and compassionate com m itm ent these places and
others call forth in my fellow hum ans, and their testim ony resonates w ith m y
ow n experience of w ildlands and confirms m y general conviction that, ou t of
respect, w e m ust leave these w ild places - each of them - be.

But why should I trust the Badger-Two M edicine Alliance? It appears that
the oil and gas industry hears som ething very different along the Rocky
M ountain Front. And how can I know that the Rock Creek Protective
Association is any more attuned to the self-speaking voice of the m ountains in
that drainage than the timber interests who w ant to log their slopes? Finally,
how do I know that all I’ve heard in my own encounters w ith w ild places and
creatures isn't sim ply a projection? These are the kinds of questions th at will
alw ays hound any attem pt to advocate wilderness preservation in term s of
ethical responsibility. In his article "Saving You for Real People," John Kultgen
sum s u p this critical position when he writes,
You-saying is a very dangerous foundation for an environm ental
ethic. It and the ethic built on it will simply reflect the prephilosophical prejudices which the You-sayer brings to the
encounter with natural things. If he should happen to be a sadist,
pillager or chauvinist pig, they will say to him "rape us, despoil us,
enslave us - we are yours" (66).
H ere K ultgen intends intends to discount an environm ental ethic of
responsibility, such as the one I've suggested, by reducing it to a your-w ordagainst-m ine relativism. He seems to say, "You hear one thing; I hear som ething
else. H ow do you hope to adjudicate between com peting claims and discern
w ho's right w ithout some 'objective' referent?"
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H ow ever, through the extreme overstatem ent of his critique, Kultgen
inadvertently suggests a way of establishing a general criterion to evaluate w hat
w e say we hear nonhum an nature say to us. In m eeting another being or thing as
a Thou, w e receive the address of that other as it speaks, not of its function,
purpose, instrum entality or usefulness, but of itself - as a unique and
independent partner in an imm ediate, present and reciprocal relation. As such,
our consequent ethical response to our fellow creatures is not dictated by our
needs and desires but by the respect and compassion born of those m eetings,
through which we come to know our fellows as em inently respectw orthy and
irreducibly valuable regardless of the hum an purposes or intentions they serve.
A nd, as I've already suggested, wilderness preservation - our efforts to leave
w ildlands be - is, at root, not a m atter of self-interest or expediency but one of
enacting our im m ediate and intim ate knowledge of these places and creatures as
respectw orthy and honoring their claims to be granted the 'space' to articulate
their existence in their own unique way.

O n the other hand, hearing things ask to be raped, despoiled or enslaved
seems rooted in a very different kind of relation: the I-It relation of experience
and use. In this case, things speak, not of themselves, but according to the
hearer’s understanding (or m isunderstanding) of w hat they're 'good for,' the
function he assigns to them, the purposes they may serve; they 'speak' as m ute
and plastic resources, silent objects. And in actuality, they don't speak at all;
w hat 'voice' they have is projected upon them by the subject according to his
goals and agenda, his needs and desires, and their value - entirely instrum ental is determ ined accordingly. W hat Kultgen describes, in fact, is that all-too-
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com m on (il)logic of "blaming the victim" and can easily be identified for the
obvious and distorted projection that it is. In the case of rape, for example, does
any w om an ask to be assaulted, brutally violated, objectified, dehum anized,
tortured, beaten, even m urdered? No. And to say that a wom an "asks for it" is
n othing b u t a projection of the perpetrator's desires and intentions onto the
victim in order to justify his own unjustifiable actions. It reflects the assailant's
attem pts to absolve himself of responsibility and bears absolutely no
resem blance to any act of ethical responsibility. Similarly, forests d o n ’t ask to be
clearcut; species don't ask to go extinct; intact ecosystems don't ask to be
fragm ented or altogether destroyed. Anyone who says they hear a forest, species
or ecosystem say such things is simply attem pting to justify his use and
exploitation of them by projecting upon them his own representations and
categories in which these beings and things have no standing except as natural
resources to be m anipulated, developed and used according to the hearerprojector's purposive agenda and intentionality. So, to anyone w ho w ould argue
that the rem aining w ildlands in the northern Rockies are begging to be roaded,
drilled, logged and m ined, I'd ask you to step back and reflect upon w hat you are
hearing. Is it the voice of these places and creatures as they speak of them selves
and their integrity, independence, otherness and non-instrum ental value? Or
does the voice you hear speak of these same places and creatures as objects to
m anipulate, order and control, resources to exploit, develop and use, dead and
speechless things w ithout any m eaning apart from the purposes they m ay serve?
Is it the self-speaking voice of a Thou or the projected utterance of an It that you
are responding to? Are your actions sponsored in respect and concern or selfinterest? Insofar as we honestly ask ourselves such questions, I believe we can
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evaluate w hat we hear and how we respond, and, contra Kultgen, w e can discern
betw een the address of self-speaking fellow creatures and the purposive
prejudices of our instrum entalist projections. It seems to m e that ethical
responsibility does not require some mythic objectivity as m uch as it requires
reflective candour and philosophical honesty.

Ethical responsibility with respect to w ildlands m eans responding to their
address. As resources these places do not - cannot - address us; resources have
no voice apart from that projected upon them according to our intentions and
purposes. As such, we cannot practice responsibility tow ard a resource.

O ur ethical responsibility to wild places and w ild creatures m ust be born
in and funded by our relations with them, not as resources, but as independent
others, fellow beings, partners in dialogue, Thous. Through the suspension or
bracketing of our objectifying constructs and instrum ental categories, we m ay
hear the self-speaking address of these beings and things and find ourselves
called upon to respond. In the immediacy of dialogue (where our projections do
not intervene), these eloquent places and creatures speak to us of their otherness,
independence and integrity, their non-instrum ental goodness and value, and, in
doing so, they elicit our respect and concern. Consequently, our response to their
self-speaking address, if it is to be ethical, will not fail to em body that respect and
concern. And our respectful and caring response to w ildlands involves, m ost
fundam entally, leaving them be (understood in the w ay Bugbee defines that
p o stu re/m o v em en t/actio n ). Preserving the rem aining w ildlands of this region
is not just good science, sm art economics or sound recreation m anagem ent; it is
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our ethical responsibility. The rhythm of dialogue and responsibility w ith
respect to the w ildlands of the northern Rockies culm inates in our preservation
of each - and consequently, all - of the rem aining roadless lands in the region.
O ut of our respect and concern for these places and their inhabitants, w e are
obligated to protect, preserve and keep them holy.

A nd so, I'd like to conclude this chapter, and this entire essay, by
advocating and endorsing w hat I believe is the appropriate political enactm ent of
our ethical responsibility to the w ildlands of this region: the N orthern Rockies
Ecosystem Protection Act (NREPA). W ritten by grassroots environm entalists
from aro u n d the region, this bill w ould preserve about 20 m illion acres of public
w ildlands in eastern W ashington and Oregon, Idaho, M ontana and W yom ing
through a variety of m anagem ent designations, including w ilderness areas, wild
and scenic rivers, national park study areas, biological corridors and w ildland
recovery areas. In short, it w ould protect and preserve w hat rem ains of the
w ildlands of the northern Rockies as well as begin the process of rehabilitation
and healing on certain public lands that have been degraded through prior
developm ent and use. And while NREPA is almost always argued for on the
basis of its biological and economic merits, to me, it stands as a testam ent to the
dynam ic and compelling rhythm of dialogue and responsibility. It is an
enactm ent of the respect and concern these w ildlands and their inhabitants call
forth from us and instill within us; it is, at root, a respectful and com passionate ethical - response to the eloquent address of these places and creatures an d an
honoring of their claims to be allowed to exist and evolve in their ow n w ay and
in their ow n right.
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